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This thesis looks at the relationship between evolutionary theory and 
educational theory. The core objectives are, firstly, to contribute to the gap in 
knowledge regarding evolutionary underpinnings in influential educational theories, 
and, secondly, to enhance our broader understanding of the core concepts 
constituting different evolutionary paradigms and approaches in education. This is 
relevant because even though evolutionary ideas, terms, and concepts are 
circulating in educational discourses today, there exists little knowledge as to the 
nature of those arguments, thus limiting critical discussion. Through the 
hermeneutical analysis of the evolutionary underpinnings of the educational theories 
of Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, and Lev Vygotsky, this thesis not only provides a 
novel reading of these thinkers, but also sheds some light on the nature of 
evolutionary educational theory as an intellectual tradition with relevancy for 
educational theory, practice and policy today. 
 
The genealogy of evolutionary educational theorising presented in this study 
spanning from Spencer to Dewey and Vygotsky sheds some light on the versatile 
nature of the concept of adaptation in the context of educational theorising, while 
also underlining its potency in informing core educational concepts. While all three 
thinkers apply an evolutionary lens to their educational concepts and theories, they 
each present highly different understandings of the process and aims of education, 
learning, and teaching. In particular their diverging concepts of adaptation, as this 
research shows, inform those profound differences. Spencer’s passive and 
unidirectional conception of adaptation based primarily on biological inheritance 
engenders and understanding of education as a process of the subject adjusting to 
her/his environment. Dewey’s idea of adaptation as a process of simultaneous 
growth of individual and environment in experience, in contrast to Spencer, fosters 
an understanding of education as a never-ending, contingent reciprocal interaction 
between the learner and her/his environment. Finally, Vygotsky’s post-adaptation 
paradigm opens a perspective for thinking about education not in adaptive, but 
primarily transformative terms. 
 
In closing, the thesis critically analyses the global educational discourse 
surrounding the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
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In the context of PISA, the notion of ‘adaptation’ is a highly frequented and yet 
largely undefined concept. Based on the study of Spencer, Dewey and Vygotsky, 
the thesis contributes to a gap in knowledge by offering a conceptual apparatus for 
analysing current educational discourse such as PISA, in a way that provides insight 




While the most obvious association between evolution and education might 
lead one to science education, and the teaching of evolution in biology classes, 
there is more that connects these two: Evolutionary principles like natural selection 
and adaptation were popular amongst certain modern 19th and 20th Century 
educational thinkers. For these thinkers, conceiving of development and learning as 
dependent on changes in the environment provided an interesting perspective to 
many, for reflecting on the nature of education, its processes and aims. 
 
Selection and adaptation allow us to think of education functionally, that is, 
as a process of forming the individual in relation to demands posed by the 
environment. While early pre-Darwinian thinkers like Spencer thought of adaptation 
as a passive activity of the individual adjusting to external changes, later thinkers 
like Dewey and Vygotsky expanded adaptation to mean both the adjustment of the 
individual to her/his surroundings and the individual’s active changing of that 
environment. Education from an evolutionary perspective, it can be gathered, can 
both mean a passive alignment with sovereignly existing external facts, or a 
reciprocal relationship of a learning subject that is also an agent in forming her/his 
surroundings. Distinguishing different understandings of evolution as they inform 
educational ideas is, therefore, significant – even more so considering the recent 
popularity of evolutionary terminology in global educational discourses. If ideas like 
‘learning as adaptation’ are not clarified, their meaning remains obscure which 
makes it difficult to discuss them critically. 
 
This research contributes to the clarification of evolutionary principles 
informing concepts important to education – such as learning, development, 
teaching – by analysing the evolutionary foundations in the educational theories of 
Herbert Spencer, John Dewey and Lev Vygotsky. Additionally, in this thesis the 
current influence of these three evolutionary educational theories is illustrated with a 
study of the concept of adaptation adopted by the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) – a programme which is currently 
producing the most influential educational discourse enforcing a neo-liberal market 




I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not 
been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except 
where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is 



















I thank the University of Edinburgh for funding this research with the Principal’s 
Career Development PhD Scholarship and The Moray House School of Education 
for providing me with the resources and support to conduct this project. 
 
My sincere gratefulness goes to Dr Andrea English and Professor Dr John 
Ravenscroft of the University of Edinburgh who as my dedicated supervisors 
challenged me in the right ways and moments, allowing me to grow as an academic 
and a person. 
 
I thank the community of fellow PhD students and staff at Moray House: Ethan, 
Ramsey, Lisa, Suse – thank you! I am also grateful for friends old and new, near 
and far, who accompanied me on this PhD journey – Lori, special thanks to you. 
Finally, I am thankful to you, Tom, for being the kindest soul I know. 
 
Special thanks I dedicate to Professor Emeritus Hans-Ulrich Grunder for his 
mentorship. 
 








1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 10 
1.1 Gap in research ............................................................................. 10 
1.2 Structure of the thesis .................................................................. 12 
2. The Principle of Evolution ................................................................ 16 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Evolutionary biology – genesis and paradigms ......................... 18 
2.2.1 Theories of evolution before Darwin ..................................................... 19 
2.2.2 The Darwinian Revolution ..................................................................... 22 
2.2.3 Post-Darwinian evolutionary paradigms ............................................... 24 
2.3 Evolutionary socio-cultural theory .............................................. 27 
2.3.1 The intellectual history of evolutionary in socio-cultural theory ............. 28 
2.3.1.1 Neo-Darwinist social theory: Social Darwinism and Sociobiology .. 29 
2.3.1.2 Pluralist, non-reductionist evolutionary ontologies in social theory: 
Marxist-Darwinism .......................................................................... 33 
2.3.2 The current landscape of evolutionary socio-cultural theory ................. 35 
2.4 Systematics of an evolutionary framework ................................ 38 
2.4.1 An analytic framework for evolutionary educational theory ................... 40 
2.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 45 
3. Herbert Spencer ................................................................................ 47 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 47 
3.2 Spencer's evolutionism ................................................................ 49 
3.2.1 Spencer's theory and concept of evolution ........................................... 49 
3.2.2 Social evolution ..................................................................................... 50 
3.2.3 Normative components in Spencer’s evolutionary perspective ............. 52 
3.2.4 Spencer’s theory of morality ................................................................. 53 
3.2.5 Key themes of Spencer’s evolutionary theory ....................................... 57 
3.3 Spencer’s educational theory ...................................................... 60 
3.3.1 Spencer's concept of education ............................................................ 61 
3.3.2 Educational practices and institutions ................................................... 62 
3.3.3 Moral education .................................................................................... 66 
3.3.4 Education for ‘Complete living’ .............................................................. 68 
3.4 Key themes of Spencer’s approach to education ...................... 69 
3.4.1 The ‘ultimate man’ and the impossibility education ............................... 69 
3.4.2 A Spencerian theory of education? ....................................................... 72 
8 
 
3.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 74 
4. John Dewey ....................................................................................... 77 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 77 
4.2 Dewey’s evolutionism ................................................................... 78 
4.2.1 The Hegelian deposit in Dewey’s thinking ............................................ 79 
4.2.2 Dewey’s criticism of Spencer ................................................................ 80 
4.2.3 Dewey’s integration of Darwinism ......................................................... 86 
4.2.4 Dewey’s use of James’s pragmatism .................................................... 89 
4.2.5 Key themes of Dewey’s evolutionary thinking ....................................... 91 
4.3 Dewey’s educational theory ......................................................... 93 
4.3.1 Individual growth ................................................................................... 94 
4.3.1.1 Educative experiences ................................................................... 95 
4.3.1.2 The social environment and the socialised mind .......................... 100 
4.3.1.3 The educational environment ....................................................... 101 
4.3.1.4 Communication ............................................................................ 102 
4.3.2 Societal growth ................................................................................... 103 
4.3.2.1 Growth as Bildung ........................................................................ 105 
4.3.2.2 Habits ........................................................................................... 110 
4.3.2.3 Democracy ................................................................................... 113 
4.4 The pedagogical dimension of growth ...................................... 115 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................... 119 
5. Lev S. Vygotsky .............................................................................. 123 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 123 
5.2 Vygotsky’s evolutionism ............................................................ 126 
5.2.1 Historical and philosophical contextualisation ..................................... 127 
5.2.1.1 Secondary influences – Hegel and Spinoza ................................. 127 
5.2.1.2 Vygotsky’s Marxist Darwinism ...................................................... 128 
5.2.2 Vygotsky’s negation of the adaptation paradigm ................................ 129 
5.2.2.1 Vygotsky’s Marx and the revolutionary mind ................................ 130 
5.2.2.2 The nature of the leap .................................................................. 132 
5.2.3 Key themes of the evolutionary foundations in Vygotsky’s work ......... 135 
5.3 Vygotsky’s theory of education ................................................. 137 
5.3.1 Education as artificial development .................................................... 137 
5.3.1.1 Vygotskian ontogenesis – the socio-biological development of the 
individual ....................................................................................... 138 
5.3.1.2 The role of learning ...................................................................... 139 
5.3.1.3 The problem of Cartesianism ....................................................... 142 
5.3.2 Integration and Mediation ................................................................... 143 
5.3.2.1 Tools ............................................................................................ 144 
5.3.2.2 Language ..................................................................................... 144 
9 
 
5.3.3 Labour and education – human’s second nature ................................ 146 
5.3.4 From a relational to a transformative ontology .................................... 148 
5.3.5 Vygotsky’s non-externalist concept of environment ............................ 150 
5.4 Instruction, teaching and development .................................... 153 
5.4.1 Development vs. learning ................................................................... 154 
5.4.2 The Zone of Proximal Development ................................................... 156 
5.4.3 The teacher’s pedagogical expertise and cultural evolution ............... 160 
5.5 Implications of a Vygotskian theory of education ................... 162 
5.5.1 Education as a cultural practice .......................................................... 164 
5.5.2 The pedagogical dimension of development ...................................... 165 
5.5.3 A Vygotskian concept of Bildung ........................................................ 166 
5.6 Conclusion ................................................................................... 168 
6. Evolutionary Educational Theory .................................................. 171 
6.1 The evolution of evolutionary epistemologies in education ..... 172 
6.1.1 Spencer – A utilitarian-evolutionary theory of education ..................... 173 
6.1.2 Dewey’s pragmatic Darwinian philosophy of growth and education ... 175 
6.1.3 Vygotsky’s development-focused Marxist pedagogy .......................... 177 
6.2 Adaptation-perspectives on learning and teaching ................. 180 
6.2.1 Types of educational concepts of adaptation ...................................... 182 
6.2.2 Adaptation and Learning ..................................................................... 187 
6.2.3 Learning and transformation ............................................................... 191 
6.2.4 Evolutionary concepts of teaching ...................................................... 197 
6.3 Educational concepts of adaptation today – the example of PISA 
...................................................................................................... 199 
6.3.1 Contextualisation - the hegemony of PISA ......................................... 200 
6.3.2 Adaptation and adaptability in PISA documents ................................. 203 
6.4 Future possibilities for evolutionary educational theory ........ 208 
6.5 Thesis summary .......................................................................... 214 





Evolutionary theory and educational theory have, at first thought, not much in 
common. In this thesis, however, I shall argue that evolutionary theories have 
significantly shaped important educational concepts and theories while, at the same 
time, being severely underappreciated by educational research. I seek to 
demonstrate that evolutionary educational concepts and ideas, like ‘learning as 
adaptation’, are highly influential not only historically, but continue to shape current 
educational discourses, without being conceptually clearly defined. Through the 
critical hermeneutical analysis of Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, and Lev S. 
Vygotsky, I seek to enhance our understanding of the ways different evolutionary 
frameworks have informed – and keep on informing – educational concepts, 
theories, and discourses. I aim to demonstrate that acknowledging underlying 
evolutionary foundations in educational theories contributes to a novel and enriched 
reading of those. Moreover, I will use the insights produced about the nature of 
evolutionary theorising in the context of education to assess the prevalence of the 
evolutionary notions in PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) 
documents in the last part of this thesis. Overall, I seek to contribute to the 
development of an analytic apparatus for educational philosophers and practitioners 
to better understand evolutionary concepts in current educational discourses that 
significantly shape educational policy and practice. 
 
1.1 Gap in research 
 
Evolutionary ideas have been integrated into educational theories over 
centuries in the form of analogised language or metaphors, as educational theories 
drawing ‘eclectically’ from evolutionary concepts, or in the shape of evolutionary 
pedagogies fully committed to an evolutionary framework (Andresen&Tröhler 2001; 
Baader 2005; Müller&Müller 2001; Bernstorff 2009; Glick 2010, Bellmann 2007a). In 
this thesis, I focus on the second category: Educational theories and philosophies 
that draw from theories and concepts of evolution, yet without explicitly naming 
themselves ‘evolutionary’. With that focus I intend to respond to a gap in research 
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surrounding the influence of evolutionary ideas and concepts on well-known 
educational thinkers, such as Dewey and Vygotsky. These ‘eclectic’ theories stand 
in contrast to explicitly evolutionary paradigms like behavioural ecology, evolutionary 
educational psychology, or evolutionary pedagogies, which, due to their explicit 
evolutionary framing, do not bear the same potential for conceptual ambiguity as the 
latent evolutionary frameworks of Spencer, Dewey, and Vygotsky. 
 
As of yet, there exists no theoretical account of the argumentative patterns, 
conceptual nature, and epistemological functionality of evolutionary reasoning in the 
context of these well-established educational theories. The evolutionary 
underpinnings in these key thinkers are often mentioned in a footnote, or labelled 
generically as ‘evolutionary’, or ‘Darwinian’. What exactly those categorisations 
mean, however, remains unclear, presenting a prevailing hurdle for a more nuanced 
understanding of the concepts drawing from evolutionary frameworks. While studies 
about evolutionary theorising in a non-science context exist in other social science 
disciplines like sociology, or anthropology, the extent to which they are applicable in 
the context of educational theory is limited; they lack the educational focus 
necessary to reflect upon the particularities of the intersection of evolution and 
education. Based on the analyses of Spencer, Dewey, and Vygotsky, I want to 
contribute to the development of a conceptual apparatus to allow for a better 
understanding of the meaning and implications of evolutionary notions and ideas in 
educational theories and discourses. 
 
The rich tradition of the integration of evolutionary terms, ideas, or concepts 
into educational theories has been appreciated by a number of historical studies 
(Bernstorff&Langewand 2012; Nipkow 2002; Müller&Müller 2001; Becker 2011; 
Baader 2005; Andresen&Tröhler 2001). The phenomenon of evolutionary theorising 
in an educational context has, however, not been discussed comprehensively by 
philosophers of education. While these historical studies provide vital points of 
reference for such a philosophical focus, they cannot make up for the lack of 
systematic theoretical knowledge about evolutionary argumentation in educational 
theory. Enhancing our systematic understanding of evolutionary reasoning in 
educational theory, however, is important for a set of reasons. The lack of such an 
analytic framework, I argue, first and foremost hinders a critical assessment of 
evolutionary ideas in educational theory, which has led to the underappreciation of 
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evolutionary underpinnings in highly influential educational thinkers, as well as what 
appears to be a historically informed general aversion to naturalistic perspectives in 
educational theory. 
 
The reflective void caused by the lack of an analytic framework also hinders 
a theoretically founded discussion of the potential fruitfulness of evolutionary 
frameworks for educational theory and research (Nipkow 2002, 670; Lüders 2004, 
236; Becker 2011, 225). While there might indeed be factors offering a synthesis of 
evolutionary theory with educational thinking, such as the shared problem of 
ensuring continuity across generational change (Bellmann 2007a, 106), there are 
also inherent problems to that theoretical synthesis that remain problematically 
undiscussed in the light of the prevailing lack of an analytic apparatus. The 
integration of evolution and education brings with it a fundamental mismatch 
between the inherent normative nature of educational theory, and the naturally non- 
normative and descriptive nature of evolutionary theory. Educational theory 
necessarily goes beyond a descriptive account of educational processes. It has 
necessarily a normative component, or as Biesta (2006) called it, an account of 
“purpose” (22). The theory of evolution itself, in contrast, is non-normative. A look 
into the intellectual history of evolutionary thinking suggests that this inherent non- 
normativity of the evolutionary principle is connected a certain proneness to 
normative charging (Runciman 2009). Throughout history, the evolutionary principle 
was used internationally to naturalise and justify political, social, cultural, and 
ideological causes and purposes along the political spectrum. Even the more 
troublesome is that in the philosophy of education in particular, silence reigns 
regarding evolutionary perspectives and their theoretical premises. 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
In this thesis I present a historical narrative of the genealogy of evolutionary 
thinking in the discipline of education, as well as an analysis of the core concepts, 
questions, and arguments constituting evolutionary educational theory. Based on 
the analytic framework developed, in closing this thesis I will critically analyse the 
use of evolutionary concepts in the current educational discourse surrounding PISA 
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and sketch out alternative potentiality of an evolutionary framework in educational 
theory. 
 
In chapter 2 I develop the scientific-conceptual framework that enables us to 
understand the evolutionary educational approaches studied in this thesis. Therein, I 
will sketch out the relevant scientific history of the term and concept of evolution pre- 
Darwin, during the so-called Darwinian revolution, and in the recent debates 
surrounding Neo-Darwinism and anti-adaptationism. Knowing the basic concepts 
and assumptions forming these different evolutionary paradigms is crucial for 
understanding different evolutionary paradigms in the context of education. 
Additionally, I will discuss how the evolutionary principle was integrated into social 
theory through these different paradigms and highlight the philosophical challenges 
that accompanied that theoretical synthesis. In closing chapter 2, I present a 
catalogue of key questions and concepts constituting difference amongst different 
evolutionary paradigms and discuss the characteristics that allows us to differentiate 
different types of evolutionary reasoning. 
 
Based on this analytic framework, I then ensue to hermeneutically analyse 
three evolutionary approaches to educational theory spanning from the late 19th to 
the mid-20th Century. In chapter 3 I analyse Spencer’s Lamarckian understanding of 
evolution and discuss how it paved the way for this intellectual tradition by first 
introducing an evolutionary paradigm to educational thought. Chapter 4 is 
concerned with Dewey’s criticism of Spencer’s approach and the way he sought to 
develop a more intricate account of human evolution in relation to education with his 
concept of growth. In chapter 5, finally, a Vygotskian understanding of development, 
education and teaching is explored. While the analysis of Spencer, Dewey and 
Vygotsky produces important insights into some of the history and theoretical width 
of evolutionary educational theory, it is nonetheless a cross-section presenting 
merely a selection that is by no means exhaustive. The rationale for selecting these 
three thinkers is, on the one hand, the criteria of difference regarding the 
evolutionary paradigms they draw from. The fact that Spencer, Dewey, and 
Vygotsky all hold rather fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of 
evolution makes it possible to explore a wide spectrum of evolutionary educational 
concepts. Dewey and Vygotsky, on the other hand, remain highly prevalent in 
current educational discourses which makes the aspired novel reading with an 
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evolutionary focus a significant and timely contribution to knowledge. Spencer, while 
being a widely forgotten figure in educational discourses today, has significantly 
shaped the intellectual tradition of evolutionary theorising in the context of 
education. Spencer also presents a fruitful contrast to Dewey and Vygotsky that 
enriches my account of their approaches. 
 
In chapter 6 I draw together the findings of the hermeneutical analysis in order 
to develop a concept of evolutionary educational theory that fills the gap in 
knowledge about the nature of evolutionary argumentation in the context of 
education, as well as the problems and potential benefits of evolutionary 
frameworks applied to educational matters. My contribution to knowledge is the 
identification of core concepts of the theoretical synthesis of evolution and education 
and clarify their meanings. This shall contribute to an informed assessment and 
criticism of evolutionary ideas entering educational theory. It shall also raise 
awareness for potentially fruitful paths of evolutionary reasoning in the context of 
education. 
 
One of the core concepts of evolutionary theorising in the context of 
educational theory that I will be focusing on in this thesis is the concept of 
adaptation. Adaptation transpires as a, if not the key principle informing the 
synthesis between evolutionary and educational theory. All three thinkers studied in 
this thesis use concepts of adaptation, yet, based on their diverging concepts of 
evolution, mean highly different things by it. The differences in their understanding 
of adaptation affect profoundly how they come to define learning, teaching, and the 
aims of education. By making their different concepts of adaptation explicit, I aim to 
make at least two contributions: Firstly, understanding their concepts of adaptation 
may enrich our reading of these thinkers. While, for example, it is broadly 
acknowledged that Spencer and Dewey draw from evolutionary frameworks, the 
nature of those frameworks is rarely discussed. Because the differences in their 
evolutionary theories are disregarded, their evolutionary terminology might be 
equalised. This leads to misunderstandings. An example for such a 
misunderstanding is Egan (2002), who in his book Getting it Wrong from the 
Beginning identifies Piaget and Dewey with Spencer based on the insight that they 
all use a naturalistic/evolutionary framework. However, such a unification happens 
in broad disregard of the unequivocal nature of the principle of evolution and, in 
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particular, of the different concepts of evolution formulated by these three thinkers 
(Zebrowski 2008). Secondly, differentiating between different educational concepts 
of adaptation may enhance our ability to assess and critically discuss current and 
future evolutionary ideas and frameworks entering the discipline of education. The 
reflective gap prevailing when it comes to evolutionary concepts in education theory 
has led to problematic ambiguities in popular notions like ‘learning as adaptation’. 
 
To create an analytic perspective that goes beyond a historical perspective 
on evolutionary reasoning in education, in the second part of chapter 6 I use the 
findings of this thesis regarding the nature of evolutionary theorising in education to 
shed some new light on the recent discourse produced by and surrounding the 
OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA is highly 
influential in the way it informs international educational thinking, policy, and 
practice. Nonetheless its use of the term ‘adaptation’ remains undiscussed at the 
expense of clarity and criticality. 
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In this chapter I aim to provide the historical, scientific and theoretical 
background necessary to better understand paradigmatic, conceptual, and 
argumentative differences amongst different evolutionary approaches in educational 
theory. Today, the term 'evolution' describes the process of descent with 
modification based on natural selection. This meaning stems from a Neo-Darwinist 
understanding of evolution, which gained wide acceptance as the leading 
evolutionary paradigm in the 1930’s scientific discourse integrating Mendelian 
genetics with Darwinian natural selection (Ayala 2005, 1). However, the term, 
concept, and theory of evolution have a complicated history. Even though Darwin is 
probably the most popular name associated with the theory of evolution, the 
Englishman was by no means the only, or even the first one to develop a theory of 
organic evolution. While thoughts on evolutionary principles date back as far as 
Aristotle, in this thesis, I aim to focus in on the intellectual history of evolutionary 
thought beginning in the 19th Century, when some of the core concepts of modern 
evolutionary thought – such as ‘adaptation’ – were coined. 
 
Since the 19th Century, evolutionary theory has changed and mutated in 
manifold ways, creating a rich variety of ideas, concepts, and sub-theories that were 
not merely of biological importance, but also consistently accompanied – and at 
times even informed – by social and cultural ideologies. The complicated history of 
the evolutionary principle and its constituting concepts still today contributes to 
resistant misinterpretations of key evolutionary ideas that obstruct the analysis of 
evolutionary foundations prevalent in educational thought (Ruse 2012; Mayr 1991, 
122). Further complicating an understanding of evolutionary underpinnings in 
education is the wide omission of these foundations (Baader 2005, 74; 
Bernstorff&Langewand 2012, 1f.; Rogers 2012; Bellmann 2007a) – if hermeneutical 
studies of educational thinkers mention evolutionary references at all, they tend to 
be overly simplified, and frequently reduced to a footnote. This analytical practice is 
detrimental to a wider understanding of educational theories drawing from 
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evolutionary notions. That is, because evolutionary ideas are strikingly varied in their 
meaning, depending on historical and socio-cultural context, as well as political 
agendas and social ideology. A clarification of the nature of the evolutionary 
foundation of educational theories, is, thus, necessary. It tells us about the 
fundamental understanding of nature, culture, human nature, and their relationship. 
However, such an in-depth analysis of different evolutionary approaches in the 
context of educational thinking presents a gap in research. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the required scientific and ideological 
background for the analysis of the diverging evolutionary underpinnings of the 
concepts of education by Herbert Spencer, John Dewey and Lev S. Vygotsky. I 
seek to develop an analytic framework that allows me to study the evolutionary 
foundations of these thinkers in a substantial way. So far, such a substantial study is 
missing. When analysing and discussing evolutionary framed educational 
arguments the discipline is either forced to remain highly generic, without an 
acknowledgment of the rich variety of definitions within different evolutionary 
paradigms, or, has to studies about evolutionary theorising in the social sciences, or 
historical accounts of evolutionary ideas entering educational discourses. These 
generic social science frameworks, however, lack a genuine educational, pedagogic 
perspective. The development of an analytic framework tailored to an educational 
context, therefore, is an important contribution. 
 
The chapter consists of three parts. The first part is a historical narrative 
outlining how the biological theory of evolution developed historically and how the 
core concepts like adaptation and natural selection have emerged and changed 
over time. This will allow me to later locate the educational thinkers historically, as 
well as identifying the evolutionary foundations they draw from. The second part of 
this chapter leads over to the socio-cultural bearings of the evolutionary principle. 
Specifically, I will sketch out how, historically, evolutionary notions have ‘spilled 
over’ back and forth between the natural and social sciences and, therein, created 
new evolutionary concepts, categories, and arguments. In the final part of this 
chapter, in preparation for the detailed analysis of Spencer, Dewey and Vygotsky, I 
will summarise the parameters constituting difference between diverging 
evolutionary approaches and point towards the philosophical challenges emerging 
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in regard to the theoretical synthesis of evolutionary theory with educational 
questions. 
 
2.2 Evolutionary biology – genesis and paradigms 
 
In this part of the chapter I will provide an intellectual history of evolutionary 
biology. This historical approach is grounded in the assumption that a systematic 
understanding of what constitutes the theory of evolution and its core philosophical 
challenges cannot be sensibly detached from its coming-into-being (Ruse 2012). 
The evolutionary concepts we use today are not ahistorical scientific statics, but 
rather carry a history of meaning (Ruse 2012; Mayr 1991, 122). Over the course of 
the last few centuries, the concept and term of evolution repeatedly changed its 
meaning in fundamental ways – from ontogeny to phylogeny – and in more subtle 
ways – according to the exact definition that was given to it within different theories 
of evolution. Before different evolutionary paradigms incorporated the term 
‘evolution’ and assigned their own meaning to them, evolution, in fact, was not 
associated with natural history at all. 
 
The term ‘evolution’ circulated in biology since the 18th Century but was 
initially used to describe the development in embryos. Stemming from the Latin 
word evolvere – which means to unfold or to unroll – the term captured the idea of a 
process of a germ unfolding that matched the largely predefined developmental 
process studied and described by 18th Century embryology (Bowler 2010a, 18). 
Natural history, on the other hand, at the time was called transformism or 
transmutationism – ‘evolution’ remained reserved for embryology for an extended 
period (Ruse 2005, 31; 2012, 4). 
 
Ontogeny, i.e. the development of the individual – was first associated with 
the development of species, i.e. natural history, when Ernst Haeckel's recapitulation 
theory became popular in the late 19th Century, suggesting that the process from 
gestation to hatching recapitulates the stages of natural history, i.e. phylogeny 
(Müller 2005, 89; Müller&Müller 2001, 767). Before Haeckel made this connection, 
however, ‘evolution’ signified embryologic development unfurling from the germ to 
its full form. The term evolution received its current connotation – as the 
development of species based on descent – not until after Darwin. It was in fact 
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Herbert Spencer who first used ‘evolution’ to describe natural history; Darwin 
followed him in the later editions of his own works (Bowler 2010a, 19). 
 
Besides this fundamental shift in meaning that the term ‘evolution’ 
underwent, a significant part of the intellectual history of the principle of evolution is 
its incorporation into a variety of different evolutionary paradigms. I will now sketch 
out the paradigmatic history of the principle of organic evolution, drawing out how 
diverging evolutionary paradigms have developed over time, redefining, refuting and 
adding evolutionary concepts. This paradigmatic history begins approximately at the 
point where the meaning of the term ‘evolution’ transformed from embryology to 
natural history. This historical narrative will be roughly divided into three sections: 
(1) theories of evolution before Darwin, (2) the Darwinian revolution, and (3) the 
current landscape in evolutionary biology. 
 
2.2.1 Theories of evolution before Darwin 
 
Despite the fact that today pre-Darwinian theories are widely regarded as 
mere artefacts of the history of biology, they remain relevant for this study as they 
introduced crucial ideas and concepts that influenced Darwin's works and in that 
have contributed significantly to the development of modern evolutionary biology 
(Bowler 2010a; 2010b). As pointed out above, it was the German thinker Ernst 
Haeckel who first linked the findings from embryology with natural history, furnishing 
biology convincingly with a theory that accounted for similarities in growth amongst 
different species. In that, he induced the fundamental shift in meaning of evolution 
from ontogenesis to phylogeny (Müller 2005, 89). However, the embryological 
perspective lacked a scientific explanation for how new species emerge. The reason 
for this gap was the lack of a concept of descent in pre-Darwinian theories of 
transformation/transmutation; each species was believed to evolve separately, from 
lower forms to higher forms, on a constant path towards perfection (Bowler 2010a, 
19). To compensate for the lack of scientific explanation for how new species come 
about, these early pre-Darwinian theories of evolution by Erasmus Darwin, Ernst 
Haeckel, or Jean-Baptiste Lamarck resorted to a set of metaphysical assumptions 
(Ayala 2016, 8; Wuketis 2005, 81). Such assumptions were the belief in a natural 
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tendency to progression, the idea of spontaneous generation of new species, or the 
speculation about inorganic matter turning into organic matter (Ruse 2005, 31). 
 
The progressivist ideology underpinning pre-Darwinian evolutionary thinking, 
entailing the idea of a natural tendency to improvement, is unsurprising considering 
the teleological nature of contemporary evolutionism. Teleology is "the philosophy of 
the purposefulness of processes" (Mittelstrass 1996, 228; translation mine). 
Arguably, when the meaning of ‘evolution’ shifted from ontogeny to phylogeny, part 
of the implied unfolding, pre-determined trajectory of the originally embryological 
concept was carried along with it (Ruse 2012, 1). Pre-Darwinian evolutionism, 
moreover, was still very much tangled up with religious notions; evolutionary 
concepts were often rendered compatible with the idea of nature as God's work, 
supposing either a creator-figure external to nature guiding it, or, a pantheism that 
located the perfectioning force inside the matter (Mayr 1991, 57; see also Midgley 
1992). “For all those who have been willing to accept evolution, but at the same time 
unwilling to renounce the concept of cosmic teleology – with humans still in the 
centre of nature – evolution has become a new religion” (Wuketis 2005, 81). 
According to Bowler (1989, 90) the progressivist underpinnings of pre-Darwinian 
evolutionary thinkers like Lamarck has to be understood within the socio-cultural 
context they emerged: Social progress was “a standard theme for nineteenth- 
century thought" (Bowler 1989, 90) that significantly informed the rise of science. 
 
Marking an important turning point in the concept of evolution's 
transformation into what we understand it to be today is the introduction of the idea 
of adaptation. Adaptation was first introduced by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck to describe 
a species' ability to adapt to the environment and therefore develop relative to the 
environment, rather than as a mere unfolding of a pre-destined developmental 
trajectory inherent in the germ. Due to the lack of an account of descent or common 
ancestry, however, pre-Darwinist thinkers like Lamarck saw evolution as a process 
of natural history concerning each species separately, i.e. they were studying 
anagenesis. The French naturalist Lamarck used to concept of adaptation to explain 
how a species changes over time, and, specifically, how species improve over time. 
From Lamarck stems the popularised idea that giraffes have long necks because 
with each generation stretching their necks to harvest food from high trees, the neck 
grows longer, and the elongated necks then get passed on to the next generation 
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and so forth. Adaptation for Lamarck, thus, was hereditary and thus contributing to 
the improvement of the species (Bowler 2010a, 19). In that, each generation was 
believed to add a new step to the ladder, which turned progress into law and 
perfection inevitable (Bowler 2010b, 21). His theory, thus, was a typical pre- 
Darwinian theory of evolution in its teleological nature. On a Lamarckian view, a 
species improves through individuals adapting to their environment (Popp 2007, 31). 
Applied to the human species this has profound implications, in particular regarding 
the educational formation of individuals that, on a Lamarckian view, gains profound 
importance on the scale of the species’ evolution (Turner&Maryansky 2015, 94f.). 
Lamarckism, i.e. Lamarck's theory of the hereditability of adaptations, was broadly 
applied – in fact long after Darwin. Spencer, who we will get to know in depth in 
chapter 3, for example was a convinced Lamarckian and derived his theory of 
education from Lamarckian adaptation. 
 
From this historical overview over pre-Darwinian evolutionism, we can gather 
that despite the fact that the way pre-Darwinian evolutionary are hardly comparable 
with what we understand evolution to be today, their contribution to the history of the 
concept and theory of evolution is significant. They induced the shift of ‘evolution’ 
from ontogeny to phylogeny and in that set the groundwork for a new focus for 
further research. Understanding the way this fundamental shift in meaning of the 
concept of evolution informed the origin of core concepts constituting evolutionary 
theorising is not of mere historical interest: It has been argued that a hint of pre- 
determinism stemming from the origin of the term of 'evolution' in embryology, as 
well as the intellectual context that some of the most central concepts of 
evolutionary theorising have been developed in, have left a permanent imprint 
modern evolutionary theory that seems hard to shake (Ruse 2012). The teleological 
heritage stemming from the scientific origins of the evolutionary principle in 
embryology, as well as the religious connotation of many of the principle’s key 
concepts are some of the major marks that the complex intellectual history of 
evolutionary thought brings into the equation when functioning as a theoretical 
framework (Mayr 1991, 5). Even though today we understand the process of 
evolution to be guided by the environment-relative mechanism of natural selection 
rather than any sort of pre-defined purposeful trajectory, teleological notions in 
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evolutionary arguments are persistent, manifesting in teleological ‘language’ using 
terms like purpose, progress, aim and function (Bowler 2010a, 18). 
 
The historical account of pre-Darwinian evolutionary theory has shown, 
furthermore, that counter the popular status of Darwin in the history of evolutionary 
biology, many core concepts and ideas that Darwin used to build the theory are 
actually not Darwin's own (Wuketis 2005, 62). And yet, pre-Darwinian theories had 
significant gaps that demanded for further research (Bowler 2010a, 19). While 
Lamarckism had furthered the shift in meaning of evolution from individual to 
phylogenetic development induced by Haeckel, it lacked a concept of descent. 
Hence, while Darwin definitely was not the 'inventor' of the theory of evolution, he 
was able to complement existing theoretical attempts in important ways that I will 
come to now (Ruse 2005, 29). 
 
2.2.2 The Darwinian Revolution 
 
When Darwin published his evolutionary writings in the second half of the 
20th Century, several evolutionary theories had already been developed; Darwin 
reused many of the evolutionary concepts developed by his predecessors. 
Nonetheless, his theory was fundamentally new in the way it opposed to the 
idealistic philosophy of his contemporaries and rejected the speculative elements 
that were used to fill the scientific gaps (Wuketis 2005, 57). Darwin’s account of 
evolution was different in many crucial ways, justifying that his contribution is often 
described as revolutionary (Ayala 2016, 3; Bowler 1989, 1). In the following section I 
will introduce Darwin's two main contributions to the concept and theory of evolution. 
These were, firstly, the expansion from pre-Darwinian anagenetic theories of 
descent by integrating a notion of common ancestry, and, second and most 
importantly, the replacement of a creating purposeful force with natural selection 
(Schmitt 2010, 3f.). 
 
As indicated above in the history of pre-Darwinian theories, early 
evolutionary theorising stalled in trying to explain how new species emerge, 
respectively, how they emerge from existing species and resorted to cosmological, 
spiritual and teleological explanations instead. Pre-Darwinian accounts of evolution 
laid the focus on developmental laws and how they contributed to constant progress 
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within the same species; this meant that a scientific explanation for similarities 
between different species was lacking which made a recourse into metaphysical 
speculation necessary. Darwin was the first to provide a genealogical view of 
evolution combining all living matter in one process that he processed scientifically 
(Bowler 2010a, 19). In that, he created a new paradigm for evolutionary thinking, 
causing a shift in meaning in some of the main pre-Darwinian concepts of evolution 
(Ruse 2005, 29; 2012, 101; Ayala 2016, 145). 
 
One of these core concepts that Darwin integrated in his theory while also 
redefining it fundamentally was ‘adaptation’. In a Lamarckian concept of adaptation, 
there exists a direct causality between the life of the individual and the evolution of 
the species; ontogeny and phylogeny, thus, are directly connected in a relationship 
of perfectibility (Bowler 2010a, 19). This teleological perspective, characterised by 
"reasoning from purpose” (Midgley 1992, 9) was typical for pre-Darwinian 
evolutionism. Core element of the Darwinian shift in how evolution and its 
functionality were perceived was the retrospective orientation of Darwin's thinking 
(Toepfer 2005, 42). In contrast to his predecessors, Darwin assumed that a species' 
current form could only be understood in retrospect, i.e. that there was no pre- 
determined developmental trajectory guiding phylogeny (Bowler 2010a, 19). Post- 
Darwin, adaptation is not teleological – it is not 'meant' to make anything 'perfect'. 
Rather, Darwinian adaptation determines fitness as a "measure of the reproductive 
efficiency" (Ayala 2005, 11) of a phenotypical characteristic. Crucially contributing to 
this renewed view of evolution was the concept of natural selection (Mayr 1991, 
122; Ayala 2005, 15). 
 
Natural selection describes the fact that evolution is driven by constant 
population increase and limited environmental resources, which demand for the 
selection of the fit over the unfit in the struggle over these limited resources (Ruse 
2005, 34; Offer 2010, 308). The novel concept was important for the shift in 
meaning of evolution away from teleological anagenetic phylogeny – i.e. the largely 
pre-determined progressive fate of each species separate – to a genealogical view 
of evolution as natural history shared by all living matter. Natural selection is a 
mechanism that accounts for evolution 'judging' developments, e.g. adaptations, 
posteriori. Due to the fact that natural selection selects in retrospect, the mechanism 
does not allow predicting what adaptation will useful in the future (Mayr 1991, 58); 
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this changed the trajectory of evolutionary theorising fundamentally (Bowler 2010a, 
19; Ruse 2010a, 9). Lamarckism assigned inherent dynamic properties to matter. 
With Darwin’s causal explanation of evolutionary processes via natural selection, 
the theological or metaphysical explanations of this "idealistic morphology" (Levit et 
al 2005, 276) were contrasted with a revolutionary scientific alternative. 
 
2.2.3 Post-Darwinian evolutionary paradigms 
 
The Darwinian revolution, as has been noted above, further developed the 
evolutionary principle in two major ways. Firstly, Darwin introduced a genealogical 
perspective that allowed species henceforth to be studied in their ancestry with 
other species which cleared up some of the questions in pre-Darwinian theories 
regarding the emergence of new species. Secondly, Darwin redefined adaptation. 
Instead of designative as a progressive improvement that would be passed on from 
generation to generation, in Darwin, adaptations were retrospectively valued in 
natural selection. He thus, put emphasis on the contingency of the environment 
and, therein, rendered the idea of evolutionary progress relative. Despite the fact 
that he lacked the knowledge about genetic inheritance, Darwinism also introduced 
an alternative idea of descent that was related to fitness in natural selection, rather 
than, as in Lamarck, to the inheritance of adaptation. 
 
However, even after natural selection was eventually accepted as a 
"legitimate scientific theory" (Mayr 1991, 119) in the 1930’s to the 1950’s – when, in 
the so-called modern synthesis Mendelian genetics were integrated with Darwinian 
natural selection –, many of Darwin’s contemporaries retained their idealistic mind- 
set, either reinterpreting natural selection, or deeming it wrong of insignificant 
(Wuketis 2005, 62). Still in the 20th Century discourse in evolutionary biology, 
disagreements about the role and significance of natural selection and adaptation 
are at the core of what distinguishes different schools and paradigms. Broadly, even 
though this is an admittedly simplified and rather rudimentary cross section of a 
highly complex and vast landscape of evolutionary biology, two opposing paradigms 
can be identified over this disagreement: Neo-Darwinism and anti-adaptationism. 
 
Neo-Darwinism appears to be the most influential Darwinian scientific 
naturalism in current evolutionary discourse. It emerged from the evolutionary 
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synthesis of the 1930's and 40's, combining genetics, taxonomy, ecology and 
molecular biology (Mayr 1991, 166; Krohs 2005, 304). Extreme positions within 
Neo-Darwinism perceive natural selection as the only evolutionarily active 
mechanism, and adaptation to selective pressures is considered omnipresent. 
Within this paradigm, every trait of the organism can be explained in terms of 
selective pressure and adaptation as a reaction to it (Offer 2010, 306). Proponents 
of such a "selectionary extremism" (Mayr 1991, 170) consider every trait of the 
phenotype as adaptive. Also, adaptation is understood as adaptation to external 
demands, i.e. improved adjustment to surroundings. 
 
In criticism of a neo-Darwinian paradigm, Vecchi (2012, 226) argues that 
Darwin's Darwinism was more pluralistic than this orthodox selectionary 
understanding of evolution held by proponents of Neo-Darwinism. Other forms of 
selectionary pressure – such as sexual selection –, as well as traits that are by- 
products of adaptations rather than adaptive themselves, are disregarded (Brigandt 
2010, 5). Hence, despite its remaining influence, Neo-Darwinism is not infrequently 
described as dogmatic and fundamentalist (Mayr 1991), and "Darwin's Church" 
(Vecchi 2012, 227), therefore, presents a matter of dispute in evolutionary biology 
today. Nagel (2012, 3), in addition, claims that Neo-Darwinism relies on speculative 
and reductive Darwinian explanations. 
 
Anti-adaptationism emerged in the 1980's as a reaction to the selectionary 
paradigm of Neo-Darwinism (Mayr 1991, 170). The controversy was initiated by 
Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin in the 1980’s, who emphasised the 
existence of evolutionary mechanisms other than natural selection, such as genetic 
correlations – meaning that some genes in correlation can manifest in the 
phenotype without an environmental stimulus – and genetic drift – meaning the 
change in frequency of a gene due to the random event that has nothing to do with 
adaptive fitness (Stegmann 2005, 287). Anti-adaptationists claim that adaptation is 
not ‘perfect’; that some characteristics of the phenotype cannot be explained in 
terms of individual adaptive fitness. 
 
It is important to point out that anti-adaptationism does not entail a total 
rejection of Darwinian adaptation, but rather a rejection of the neo-Darwinian 
interpretation of Darwinian adaptation. The anti-adaptationist critique actually draws 
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from Darwin to point out flaws of Neo-Darwinism. First of all, with sexual selection, 
Darwin presented another selectionary mechanism that follows a different 
selectionary bias than natural selection. For example, some birds develop highly 
unpractical plumage that grant them no adaptive advantage at all, but they 
contribute to reproductive fitness because they are favoured in sexual selection 
(Brigandt 2010, 5). Second of all, as agreed upon in modern evolutionary 
psychology, through kin selection and altruism the organism does not strive for its 
individual adaptive fitness, but rather contributes to the fitness of others (Ayala 
2005, 17). 
 
Besides this broad criticism, some distinct anti-adaptationist theories 
developed, amongst others niche construction theory and gene-culture coevolution. 
Niche construction theory is part of the anti-adaptationist critique of Neo- 
Darwinism’s externalism because it refutes the concomitant passivity that is 
assigned to the adapting organism (Wuketis 2005, 76f.). As the name suggests, 
niche construction theory deals with the way that organisms modify selective 
environments. On that perspective, the organism is not merely reacting passively to 
environmental pressure, but rather constructs its own environment and in that alters 
natural selection. Niche construction theory is widely understood to be part of 
Lewontin's 1980's critique of adaptationism (Laland et al 2016, 192). 
 
Also committed to an anti-adaptationist paradigm is gene-culture co- 
evolution theory (Keuchle&Rios 2012, 211). The theory proposes an alternative 
evolutionary active mechanism: Co-evolutionists think of culture and nature both 
equally influencing the evolutionary process (Offer 2010, 321). Instead of thinking of 
cultural and social evolution as mere by-products to biological, i.e. gene centred, 
evolution, the dual inheritance model of this position presupposes that culture is 
evolutionarily active, i.e. is able, just like genetic variation and inheritance, to change 
the phenotype and that these culturally induced changes are transmitted socially, 
i.e. via learning (Lachapelle 2000, 344). Hence, in a sense it is both a biological 
theory of evolution, integrating Darwinian principles, and an evolutionary socio- 
cultural theory (Durrant&Ward 2011, 363). 
 
In summary, Darwinism marked the change from essentialism to a dynamic 
worldview, contributing to a turn in science from metaphysical explanation to 
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materialism (Wuketis 2005, 57). He reinterpreted evolutionary concepts formed in 
the 19th Century, like adaptation, and used them to furnish his own theory. Not only 
did Darwin reject the teleological and progressionist underpinning of his 
predecessor’s accounts of evolution, but he also was dissatisfied with the non- 
scientific explanations they resorted to in filling gaps in their theories. With natural 
selection, Darwin introduced a new paradigm that fundamentally changed the way 
natural history was seen. Completion found Darwin’s theory in the 1930’s to 1950’s 
in the so-called modern synthesis, where natural selection was integrated with 
genetics. The result of that completion was Neo-Darwinism, which is, until today, 
probably the most mainstream evolutionary paradigm. Neo-Darwinism is focused on 
adaptation; the underlying “extreme externalism” (Godfrey-Smith 1996, 45) has 
given rise to a new evolutionary paradigm: anti-adaptationism. The critics of Neo- 
Darwinism argue that because of the omnipotence that is given to environmental 
adaptive pressure, other important strategies that define the organism-world- 
relationship are omitted. They seek to develop, in consequence, a more pluralistic 
evolutionary framework. 
 
2.3 Evolutionary socio-cultural theory 
 
It appears to be the case that within the current discourse in evolutionary 
biology as discussed above – and, specifically in the anti-adaptationist critique of 
Neo-Darwinism –, the boundaries between science and socio-cultural theory are 
becoming increasingly blurry. Particularly within anti-adaptationist positions, culture 
receives an increasingly important role. The conceptual proximity between 
questions about human biology and human culture, however, is not a novel 
appearance. Despite the perhaps common assumption that socio-cultural theories 
of evolution were informed by biological concepts, this is actually historically 
incorrect. Darwin’s concept of natural selection, for example, which, as discussed 
above, is doubtlessly one of the most important evolutionary concepts, Darwin 
derived from the economist Thomas Robert Malthus. Malthus, in 1798, developed a 
theory about the growth of populations that maintained that population increase and 
resources multiply at different arithmetical patterns and thereby produce a 
misalignment that throttles back unlimited population growth (Bowler 1989, 23; 
Sarasin 2010, 34). From Malthus’ population principle, Darwin derived his concept 
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of natural selection. This interesting origin of Darwinian natural selection in social 
science, demonstrates that from the beginning evolutionism was more than a mere 
descriptive biological theory. Moreover, it points towards the entanglement of 
evolutionary theorising with social issues and political ideology from the outset. 
 
From the beginning, evolutionary theorising was accompanied with 
ideological issues – at time explicitly, as amongst most pre-Darwinians, and at times 
more implicitly. The evolutionary perspective opened up questions about human 
nature "since essences have become precarious" (Kronfeldner et al 2014, 642). 
This bore significant philosophical challenges that I will discuss in this part of the 
chapter. I begin this discussion with the origins of evolutionary socio-cultural theory, 
where I draw out some of the key movements in the intellectual history of 
evolutionary reasoning outside of biology. After having introduced the current 
landscape of socio-cultural evolutionary theory, I will end this second part of the 
chapter with a characterisation of different ways evolutionary concepts inform socio- 
cultural theory. 
 
2.3.1 The intellectual history of evolutionary in socio-cultural 
theory 
I will now discuss two different evolutionary traditions that emerged in the 
social sciences in the early period of evolutionary theory, from shortly before the 
publication of Darwin’s Origins of Species until the end of the 20th Century. Social 
Darwinism and sociobiology emerge from a Neo-Darwinist paradigm; a Marxist- 
Darwinism can be seen as an example of a pluralist, non-reductionist ontology. 
These two traditions are by no means the only ones, or even objectively the most 
important. They are chosen here, firstly, because of their big divergence. In this 
thesis, I pursue a focus on difference within evolutionary paradigms, arguments and 
traditions in order to enable a study of difference amongst the currently categorically 
named ‘evolutionary’ or ‘Darwinist’ underpinnings in Spencer, Dewey, and Vygotsky. 
Secondly, social Darwinism and Marxist-Darwinism present the relevant intellectual 
contexts for the thinkers chosen for this study. 
29  
2.3.1.1 Neo-Darwinist social theory: Social Darwinism and Sociobiology 
 
Social Darwinism emerged in the 1850’s, i.e. before Darwin. Darwin 
(1859/1998) himself had used the notion of 'struggle' rather cautiously, emphasising: 
"I should premise that I use this term in a large and metaphorical sense, including 
dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not 
only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny." (50, emphasis mine) 
Despite this note of caution to think of the notion of ‘struggle’ metaphorically, when 
the metaphors of struggle and competition were translated back into the social 
sciences, the result was a ruthless Social Darwinism. 
 
Social Darwinism is most frequently associated with the works of Spencer, 
who coined the competition-focused idea of Social Darwinism as well as its two 
leitmotifs ‘struggle for existence’ and ‘survival of the fittest’. The socio-cultural and 
historical context's influence on the development of this strand of evolutionary 
thought was significant (Bowler 1989). According to Ruse (2005), early evolutionists 
were largely "enthusiasts of the chief secular philosophy or ideology of the age: 
progress." (28) Combining idealistic embryological morphology, recapitulation 
theory, and Lamarckian inheritance, these early theories of evolution saw progress 
as a direct consequence to the adaptation of the individual (Ayala 2016, 145; 
Midgley 1985, 7). This understanding of evolution significantly informed the 
constitution of the theory of evolution as, in parts at least, a reaction to urbanization, 
industrialization, and the accompanied societal and economic challenges. From the 
fear of the “threatening decay of German culture” (Bernstorff 2009, 108, translation 
mine) in that socio-cultural context, emerged utopian dreams of not only making a 
“new human”, but rather a “new society” (Herrmann 1995, 125, translation mine). 
Within this intellectual climate of the early 20th Century evolutionary theories were 
associated or specifically formed in service to race theory and eugenics (Ruse 2012, 
226f.; Schmuhl 2010, 373). 
 
Throughout its history, Darwinism was associated with political agendas and 
ideological causes. One of the most harmful association was the connection made 
between Darwin, genetics, eugenics and the holocaust. In the German era of 
national socialism, Hitler used Darwin’s idea of natural selection to underline his 
claims of racial superiority. This association has discredited Darwinism for many 
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and, still today, fosters general suspicions against Darwinian socio-cultural theory 
(Schmuhl 2010, 368). Weindling (2010, 2) also emphasises, however, that the way 
Darwinism was used in Nazi propaganda does not hold up scientifically and that the 
association of Darwin with Hitler is an example for the importance of carefully look at 
how evolutionary concepts are interpreted in each case. 
 
In the decades after WWII, an evolutionary perspective on society was 
widely abolished due to its connection to national socialism (Kronfeldner 2010, 111). 
In the 1970’s, however, sociobiology revived evolutionary social theory (Merz-Benz 
2010, 318). 'Sociobiology' is sometimes used as a label for all current evolutionary 
approaches to the study of human behaviour, society and morality. Here, with 
'sociobiology' I refer to the work of O. Wilson and his immediate followers in the 
1970's. O. Wilson was a Harvard evolutionary biologist interested in insect sociality. 
The main assumption of his theory was that altruism is not part of human's genetic 
endowment, or 'nature'. 
 
Sociobiology stands in the tradition of Neo-Darwinism in evolutionary 
biology. It seeks to explain behaviour in terms of its adaptive benefits, i.e. 
reproductive advantages. Culture is seen as being “held on a leash” (Wilson 1978, 1 
cited from Dugger 1981, 221), or, in other words, determined by genes. On that 
view, social practices and institutions that build on the assumption of altruism 
fundamentally counteract 'human nature'. The approach faced severe criticism. 
While the findings and methods of sociobiology itself have been broadly been 
deemed valid, the "reductionist claims put forward by E.O. Wilson in the name of 
‘consilience’" (Runciman 1999, 146) have been challenged within socio-cultural 
evolutionary theory. Sociobiology was further associated with eugenic ideology 
(Alcock 2017, 383), and accused of false causation by deriving ethics from biology 
(Ruse 2012, 29). 
 
Midgley (1985, 7) puts sociobiology in direct intellectual ancestry with Social 
Darwinism. And indeed, Social Darwinism and sociobiology share core 
epistemological assumptions. Firstly, they are both striving for bottom-up – i.e. 
biological – explanation for human behaviour (Kingsland 1988, 181). Secondly, both 
theories assume – and this is what makes them 'Darwinist' – that the evolution of 
human social behaviour and morality function according to the principle of natural 
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selection. They attribute the development of morality, religion and social practices 
and institutions to the advantage in competition, i.e. fitness, they granted in human 
evolution (Schmuhl 2010). Consequential to the shared fundamental Darwinist 
epistemology, Social Darwinism and sociobiology also face some common 
philosophical challenges. Both theories had to grapple with the question of how 
adaptation and natural selection relate to progress. That is, because they both 
assume that in the process of evolution, consisting largely of adaptation and 
selection, the 'better' will survive and the 'weak' or ‘unfit’ will die. However, and it is 
here that the two theories seem to diverge from each other, Social Darwinism and 
sociobiology came up with considerably different solutions to the issue of defining 
progress and its relation to evolution. 
 
The notion of ‘progress’ in the context of evolutionary theorising is complex, 
and therefore demands further attention. The principle of evolution, being a theory of 
movement and development inherently connotes ideas about trajectory, 
directionality and purpose (Mayr 1991). While these normative questions tend to be 
implicit in theories of biological evolution, in the case of theories of socio-cultural 
evolution, explicit normativity seems unavoidable, because even if a theory of socio- 
cultural evolution merely describes processes of social and cultural development, 
there emerges a normative element about how society and culture ought to develop. 
According to Ruse (2010b) progress as a “social doctrine or ideology” (1) was, from 
the outset, attached to the idea of organic evolution, describing “the idea or hope 
that humans through their own efforts can make things better – socially, 
educationally, in health care, in knowledge and understanding.” (1) Progress, on this 
understanding, inherits a notion of directionality, of ‘betterment’. Ayala (2016) also 
defines progress as occurring "when there is a directional change toward a better 
state of condition." (147) This 'better state', naturally, requires a normative 
judgement about what is better and what is worse, "according to some axiological 
standard." (Ayala 2016, 147) 
 
Darwin himself explicitly refuted any directional notion being attached to 
progress. He thought of perfection not in absolute terms, but rather in the sense of 
specialisation. While Lamarck had understood as adaption as 'becoming better' for 
Darwin adaptation was related to fitness, i.e. situational temporary adaptation to an 
ever-changing environment (Bowler 2010b, 21). This functional understanding of 
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adaption includes specialisation in all directions, i.e. increasing complexity, 
'broadening, reduction, or even degeneration. However, Darwin did not reject all 
notion of progress. As Ruse (2012) remarks, Darwin "was a child of the Industrial 
Revolution" (103), embracing a progressivist ideology. Especially in Descent of Man 
(1872), Darwin aligned with contemporary progressivism when he maintained that it 
was adaptation that brings about progress (Radick 2000, 479). And indeed, already 
in Origin of Species (1859), Darwin (1859/1998) writes: “And as natural selection 
works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental 
endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.” (368) Nonetheless, Bowler 
(2010a, 19) maintains that Darwin's notion of 'perfection' differs significantly from his 
contemporaries' as he explicitly refuted all notion of 'higher' and 'lower' in evolution. 
 
This normative judgement, in the context of an evolutionary framework, in 
particular before Darwin, was connected to ideas of the 'natural' versus the 
'unnatural'. It was believed that "the human race cannot be confidently expected to 
evolve further in a literal biological sense. Human social arrangements, even in 
simple cultures, block normal natural selection." (Midgley 1992, 8) The result of the 
normative contrasting of the supposedly natural with the supposedly unnatural was, 
following Kronfeldner et al (2014), deep "fears (bestiality) and hopes (salvation)" 
(642). Those hopes and fears induced an interventionist utopianism 
instrumentalising economic competition and eugenics as deliberate selection as a 
'support' for nature's trajectory. The result was Social Darwinism, an, as Midgley 
(1985) calls it, "escalator-type" (37) evolutionism that functioned as dogma justifying 
social interventionist policy making. Practically, this perspective induced a laissez- 
faire attitude towards nature and a negative connotation of everything unnatural, i.e. 
societal or cultural. The ideological charging of 'progress' as a predetermined 
upwards movement and counter-pole idea of social degeneracy had implications for 
social politics and helped the rise of eugenics. 
 
There are, however, notable differences between Social Darwinism and 
sociobiology. While Social Darwinism sought to actively influence social ‘progress’, 
sociobiology pioneer O. Wilson explicitly pointed out the unforeseeable risks of 
social planning. This makes sociobiology significantly less directly interventionist 
(Kingsland 1988, 196). Furthermore, due to advances in evolutionary science, 
sociobiology is less speculative and more scientific than Social Darwinism could be 
33  
at the time it emerged. Second of all, the strong notion of altruism and kin selection 
that sociobiology contrasted the strong social Darwinist individualism with, has 
important theoretical repercussions for how competition is understood – while in 
Social Darwinism everyone struggles against everyone, in sociobiology the concept 
competition is widened to group competition (Kingsland 1988, 191f.). 
 
2.3.1.2 Pluralist, non-reductionist evolutionary ontologies in social 
theory: Marxist-Darwinism 
 
Social Darwinism and eugenics were aimed at social change – either 
theoretically in the case of the former, or in the form of 'applied' interventionist 
science in the case of the latter (Kingsland 1988, 195). While some of Darwin's 
contemporaries were optimistic and assumed that evolution entailed constant 
improvement by 'weeding out' of the undesirable, for others, this hope turned into 
fear accompanied by a "pessimistic gloom and doom scenario of large-scale 
degeneracy" (Schmuhl 2010, 369; translation mine). For the pessimistic, natural 
selection in society was problematic in its ways of allowing the morally "less 
favoured race" to procreate more than the virtuous individual who "passes his best 
years in struggle and in celibacy, marries late, and leaves few behind him", to use 
the words of (Darwin 1872/2013, 134). With reference to eugenics pioneer Galton, 
Darwin (1872/2013) remarks further: "If the prudent avoid marriage, whilst the 
reckless marry, the inferior members will tend to supplant the better member of 
society." (645) The result was strong advocacy of some of Darwin's contemporary 
evolutionists for eugenics and human breeding in order to support natural selection. 
 
A fundamentally different early evolutionary socio-cultural theory was 
presented by a Marxist Darwinism. Social Darwinism and sociobiology had seen 
culture as an externally induced adaptation, and therefore developed socio-cultural 
theories in the argumentative logics of biological concepts and ideas. In Marxist- 
Darwinism, in contrast, this expansion of Darwinism for the purpose of explaining 
culture and society was seen as unjust (Krementsov 2012, 5). Similar to Social 
Darwinism, Marxist-Darwinism formed not primarily as a scientific theory, but rather 
as a political instrument; it was used to further a Marxist agenda in and after the 
Bolshevik revolution. In early 20th Century Russia, Darwinism had sparked a great 
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deal of interest, both amongst scientists and in the public. Marx’s Das Kapital 
(1867), however, did not. To further a Marxist socialist agenda, in the Bolshevik 
revolution of 1917, the popularised Darwinism was integrated into Marxism; 
revolutionaries like Trotsky pushed for that association that, after the revolution 
became increasingly popular (Krementsov 2012, 6). Darwinism, within that process, 
became increasingly subsumed by Marxism and seen as a useful biological theory. 
Following Krementsov (2010) Marxist-Darwinism then functioned “as an influential 
cultural resource” (22) to further broader socio-cultural and political agenda of 
socialism in the Cold War. 
 
On the view of Marxist-Darwinism, there is a qualitative difference between 
the evolution of nature and the evolution of culture. While the former works 
according to Darwin’s principles, the latter emerged from nature with its own rules 
and functionalities. Culture, on a Marxist perspective, is the result of the human 
struggle with the material and social world. It does not function according to natural 
selection and adaptation, but rather according to the active transformation of the 
world according to chosen purposes. This difference, at first sight, seems marginal. 
However, in particular if we begin to ponder what these perspectives mean for 
questions of human agency, freedom, or social progress, the difference is important. 
Following Dawson (2002, 43), while in a Darwinist perspective on culture, the 
argumentative focal point is biology, in a Marxist idea of cultural evolution, the focus 
is on ecology, i.e. on the relationship formed between individuals and the socio- 
cultural and material environment, rather than on heredity and phylogeny. In a 
Darwinist perspective, we follow, human agency is reduced to a biological function; 
a non-Darwinian perspective on culture, in contrast, leaves more (potential) space 
for rationality and agency. 
 
A Marxist perspective, “has consistently rejected Darwinian interpretations of 
culture and has tried to explain cultural evolution without any recourse to the 
conceptual furniture of evolutionary biology.” (Dawson 2002, 43) This argumentative 
tradition falls into the broad categorisation of anti-adaptationism. It builds the 
foundation of the American cultural materialist school that has signposted a 
“radically divergent path to the understanding of cultural evolution” (Dawson 2002, 
43) to Darwin. How a Marxist-Darwinism plays out in the context of educational 
theory, we will discuss in Chapter 5 of this thesis on Lev S. Vygotsky. Marxist- 
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Darwinism, however, is by no means the only, or even the most dominant anti- 
adaptationist socio-cultural theory. Evolutionary anthropologists, for example, 
oppose a neo-Darwinian paradigm, while at the same time maintaining a 
fundamentally different definition of culture based not on conflict and struggle, but 
on cooperation and solidarity as the main characteristics of human culture. I have 
chosen to discuss Marxist-Darwinism rather than other anti-adaptationist traditions 
in socio-cultural theory firstly because the focus of this thesis lies on difference 
between diverging approaches. This leads me to resort to the ‘extremes’ on both 
ends. Secondly, with Vygotsky being a core resource for this study, the tradition of 
Marxist-Darwinism receives a key role. 
 
2.3.2 The current landscape of evolutionary socio-cultural theory 
 
Two important traditions of evolutionary socio-cultural reasoning have been 
identified – Social Darwinism/sociobiology and Marxist-Darwinism. It has been 
established that these two main paradigms gave rise to highly divergent 
interpretations of nature, culture, and their relationship that are connected to their 
ontological footing in Neo-Darwinism and anti-adaptationism. While socio-cultural 
theories that stand in the tradition of Neo-Darwinism focus on the conceptual and 
explanatory framework of evolutionary biology, anti-adaptationist socio-cultural 
approaches, despite also using an evolutionary framework, develop alternative 
categories and theories with the aim of developing novel evolutionary mechanisms 
that are genuinely cultural. Both traditions have demonstrated a striking tendency for 
political exploitation. 
 
Today, evolutionary social science appears to be more popular than ever 
(Durrant&Ward 2011, 362). The two main traditions identified above can still serve 
as a useful model to get an overview over the vast and diverse field of evolutionary 
socio-cultural theory: On the one hand, while Wilson's work has faced strong 
criticism and seems to have widely vanished from recent publications, the 
externalist underpinning of his sociobiology and the perspective that it introduced to 
the study of human nature after the discovery of the genome, remain influential 
nonetheless. Stepping into the tradition of Social Darwinism – epistemologically, not 
in terms of claims – and sociobiology are, what Runciman (2009) calls, "ultra- 
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Darwinians" (6) who maintain that evolutionary social science has to be applied 
biology in order to qualify as 'evolutionary' at all. On that view, the evolution of 
culture and nature is unilinear. The main example for the ongoing prosperity of a 
neo-Darwinian socio-cultural paradigm are the Santa Barbara School evolutionary 
psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (2007), dual inheritance theorists and 
behavioural ecology. I also count the ‘unificationists’ Mesoudi, Whiten and Laland 
(2006) to this group as they also share the common proposition of an ontological 
reductionism and advocate for the epistemological unification of evolutionary biology 
and social science. Within this reductionist epistemology, lower-level explanations 
are developed based on the assumption of a bottom-up causation (Lachapelle 2000, 
332). This means that human behaviour, including social behaviour, religious belief, 
or morality, are explained in terms of the adaptive advantage they granted within 
natural selection. 
 
On the other hand, there is a wide field of pluralist evolutionary 
epistemologies drawing eclectically from different concepts within diverging 
approaches in evolutionary biology, adding their own concept and understanding 
concerning social or cultural evolution as a separate – or at least largely separately 
functioning – kind of evolutionary development. According to Haines (2007), 
evolutionary approaches committed to the rationality of explanatory pluralism can be 
summarised methodologically as using "evolutionary biological theory as the primary 
analytical tool for their work." (249) These approaches differ from neo-Darwinian 
epistemological reductionist paradigms that do not use biological theory as an 
analytical tool, but rather as the theoretical framework. Within pluralist 
epistemologies, nature and culture evolve in a discontinuous manner, i.e. they are 
not part of the same lineage, but either different from the outset, or taken apart at 
some point in biological evolution. These pluralist epistemologies in evolutionary 
socio-cultural theory also tend to focus on rationality and agency which further 
reinforces their resistance to Darwinian natural selection as an explanatory principle 
for culture (Dawson 2002, 54). 
 
Within the pluralist line of evolutionary thought there seems to be a broad 
consensus about cultural and social evolution being more than mere ‘sidekicks’ to 
biological evolution and therefore have their own explanatory requirements that 
have to be accounted for theoretically (Lachapelle 2000, 331). These thinkers are 
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putting the applicability of a neo-Darwinian paradigm to the social sciences up for 
debate and severely challenge "the tendency to accept too uncritically and 
appealing bur rather simplified vulgate of Darwinism." (Vecchi 2012, 225) Runciman 
(2009, 34f.), for example, maintains that all the core Darwinian notions – selection, 
adaptation, heritability – have to be reconceptualised for each particular level of 
evolution. He argues that a reductionist ontology that works under this assumption 
of all levels of evolution underlying natural selection, is not necessary for a 
consistent Darwinian socio-cultural theory that acknowledges "the disanalogies 
between the successive levels of what is nonetheless a continuous process." 
(Runciman 1999, 147) This basic assumption that culture and society evolve 
independently from natural selection on genes, through heritable variation and 
competitive selection of their own kind, has produced a rich landscape of 
perspectives opposing the Neo-Darwinist perspective tying onto the epistemic 
project of sociobiology to explain human social behaviour exclusively in adaptive 
terms. These perspectives have sought to add an explanatory framework to the 
landscape of evolutionary thought in socio-cultural theory that does not rely on 
biological explanation for non-biological phenomena (Lachapelle 2000, 350f.). 
 
A pluralist evolutionary epistemology combines evolutionary biology with an 
evolutionary socio-cultural theory that is not simply a derivate of a methodologically 
and explanatorily unified evolutionary theory encompassing nature and culture, but 
rather introduces its own concepts and functional principles. Examples for such a 
pluralist evolutionary epistemology present Verbeek (2005, 267), who sees culture 
as affected by selectionary pressures from both outside and inside of the cultural 
realm. 
 
Similarly, Mayer (2004, 136) distinguishes between primary socio-cultural 
institutions that have emerged as a result of natural selection – due to the human 
capacity for language, emotions, etc. – and secondary socio-cultural institutions that 
have emerged from their primary 'ancestors' and follow their own set of rules, i.e. 
develop separate 'social' selective pressures. According to this distinction, primary 
institutions are universal elements of human culture, occurring in all societies. 
Examples are religion, kinship, or incest taboos. Secondary institutions consist of a 
set of more or less dynamic rules. They emerge from the abilities that these cultural 
universalities grant but are subject to social transmission and transformation within 
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separate societies instead of natural selection (Mayer 2004, 139). Examples are 
family and school. 
 
Birch (2017b, 9f.) also maintains that in cultural and social evolution, 
secondary selective mechanisms become effective. Besides granting an adaptive 
advantage to the human species in evolution that is second to none, Birch (2017b) 
argues, the ability for culture and social behaviour introduced its own selective 
pressures. Those ‘secondary’ selective pressures are widely decoupled from natural 
selection and bring with them their own rules of adaptation and fitness. This ‘cultural 
fitness’, so Birch (2017b) has even become more relevant in modern human 
evolution than biological fitness: “In early hominins, biological fitness differences 
would still have been the primary driver of adaptive change; but, as our ancestors 
evolved ever more sophisticated capacities for social learning, the relative 
significance of cultural as opposed to genetic variation […] would have gradually 
increased.” (12) This underlines the profound way in which biological, cognitive, 
social, and cultural evolution are connected. 
 
Likewise, within the moderate, selective synthesis of pluralist approaches to 
evolutionary socio-cultural theory, a set of theoretical and methodological 
challenges has been acknowledged (Turner&Maryanski 2015, 94). One main 
challenge seems to be the persistence of false or inept analogies: Evolutionary 
socio-cultural theories struggle theoretically with lacking social science analogies to 
biological mechanisms, and in turn social science mechanisms that cannot be 
matched with a biological mechanism (Derksen 2005, 144). There are also anti- 
Darwinian critics that challenge the appropriation of biological concepts by social 
theory per se, claiming a concomitant necessarily implied ontological reductionism 
to evolutionary socio-cultural theorising – a position that Runciman (1999) disputes. 
 
2.4 Systematics of an evolutionary framework 
 
It was the aim of this chapter to develop the conceptual and historical 
framework for the analysis of the evolutionary foundations in Spencer’s, Dewey’s, 
and Vygotsky’s educational theories. To that end, I have analysed different 
biological evolutionary paradigms as well as the traditions of evolutionary socio- 
cultural theory emerging from these paradigms. After summarising the findings of 
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that analysis, in terminating this chapter, I will develop an analytical framework for 
the succeeding analysis of evolutionary approaches in the context of educational 
theory. 
 
The analysis has shown that the relationship between biological, socio- 
cultural and psychological evolutionary concepts is complex. The evolutionary 
paradigm is – against the reasonable expectation – not primarily a biological theory. 
Some of the core concepts of evolutionary theory – such as natural selection – stem 
from a social science context. Over the course of the intellectual history of the 
evolutionary principle, concepts, ideas and sub-theories have spilled over back and 
forth between biology and social sciences. Despite this complexity that challenges a 
simplified narration, there can be observed patterns and dynamics that allow us to 
sketch out categories of evolutionary reasoning. 
 
The key narrative that has stood out from this analysis is that within the 
landscape of evolutionary theories of the 20th Century – which is the relevant 
timeframe for the analysis of the three educational thinkers to be discussed in this 
thesis – we can broadly distinguish between neo-Darwinian approaches, and anti- 
adaptationist perspectives. The former are characterised by a ‘bottom-up’ 
epistemology. These approaches use evolutionary biology as the explanatory focal 
point, which reduces culture, society and individual behaviour to the principle of 
biological adaptation. Reductionist ontologies reject attempts to develop new 
concepts and categories specifically for socio-cultural evolution. The most prominent 
socio-cultural theory traditions emerging from the neo-Darwinian paradigm are 
social Darwinism and sociobiology. On the other end of the spectrum, there have 
been identified pluralist approaches that seek to expand a reductionist ontology of 
neo-Darwinian socio-cultural theories. These approaches see culture as something 
distinct from biology and use an evolutionary framework as an analytical and 
conceptual tool, yet without presupposing that biological evolution is the only type of 
evolution. Anti-adaptationist perspectives promote pluralist perspectives that either 
integrate Darwinian concepts eclectically or use evolutionary principles to describe 
novel forms of evolution that are genuinely cultural. The unifying characteristic of 
pluralist epistemologies in evolutionary socio-cultural theory is the idea that theories 
of social and cultural evolution have to add something to the picture of evolutionary 
biology that the latter cannot provide. 
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The historical narrative of the emergence and development of evolutionary 
paradigms and theoretical traditions has shown that the theory of evolution does not 
exist. In comparison to biology, where despite controversy Darwinism has been 
widely agreed upon as the leading paradigm, such clarity is lacking in the social 
sciences. Different evolutionary social and cultural theories are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, but rather complementary as they study different layers of 
evolution, or at least to exclusive to each other as they deal with different questions 
and methods (Durrant&Ward 2011, 363; Birch 2017a, 4). Evolutionary concepts 
carry a rich history of meaning that makes them applicable in highly divergent 
contexts, and for highly divergent purposes. The ideological and political 
exploitability of evolutionary theories has accompanied their intellectual history from 
the very start. One of the reasons of the close ties between evolutionary theorising 
and ideological and political instrumentalization is due to, what Krementsov (2010) 
calls, “certain general principles involved in the transformation of scientific 
knowledge into a cultural resource.” (25) In the process of becoming popularised, 
scientific knowledge “is simplified, fragmented, and reduced to a few, often 
disjointed general statements.” (Krementsov 2010, 25) There is, however, also an 
inherent tendency to evolutionary theories to spark ideological debate. The 
evolutionary principle, in its unique capacity to raise existential and philosophical 
questions affecting the very foundation of human existence has demonstrated to be 
an attractive ideological instrument. It is an instrument easily exploitable, once it has 
lost its embeddedness and conditionality and is reduced to popularised formulas. 
This effect is probably most strikingly shown in social Darwinism that has succeeded 
greatly in reducing Darwinian notions to phrases and applying them to novel 
contexts. Therefore, to understand evolutionary arguments not in their ‘disjointed’ 
manifestation, but as embedded into scientific concepts and traditions of socio- 
cultural theory is indispensable. 
 
2.4.1 An analytic framework for evolutionary educational theory 
 
Different paradigms and traditions have highly diverging implications for 
conceptions of nature, culture, society and human nature. One core point of 
contention between these different paradigms is the question of human agency in 
the process of cultural and social evolution. The concomitant debates about 
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determinism and freedom are also of particular relevancy for the assessment of 
evolutionary frameworks in the context of educational theorising. Depending on the 
underlying evolutionary paradigm, human activity and development are seen as 
more or less pre-determined; this makes educational practices more or less 
effective in the development of the individual, as well as the evolution of culture and 
society. 
 
In the light of these systematics of evolutionary theorising, a conceptual 
apparatus that allows me to discern the different evolutionary foundations in 
educational theories is needed. The focus of that analytic framework, thus, is to be 
put on difference. That is because, as this chapter has shown, terms and ideas can 
mean highly different things relative to the evolutionary paradigm and theoretical 
tradition they are drawn from. To understand that difference in the context of 
different educational theories drawing from an evolutionary framework – in order to 
then understand the ethical, normative, practical and broader philosophical 
implications of that difference – is the aim of this thesis. 
 
The historical, socio-cultural and intellectual context has an important impact 
on the constitution of evolutionary theories. As this chapter has shown, there are 
‘eras’ of evolutionary reasoning discernible that provide a first clue as to what 
understanding of evolution is held. The historical period, furthermore, gives some 
indication of the ‘epistemic expectations’ tied to an evolutionary framework. 
According to Ruse (2012, 103), evolutionary theories are very much connected to 
the broader socio-cultural climate. While Darwin, for example, carefully rejected 
prevalent ideas about purpose within evolution, emphasising the role of randomness 
in evolution, "he was a child of the Industrial Revolution" (Ruse 2012, 103) who 
embraced a progressivist ideology, particularly in Descent of Man (1872). Before 
Darwin, these progressivist tendencies of evolutionary theorising were even more 
explicit – Lamarck’s notion of the inheritance of adaptive traits was progressivist in 
every aspect. Ideas of purpose and evolutionary trajectory have played different 
roles throughout the intellectual history of evolutionary thought. But what does 
‘progress’ in evolution mean? From the comparison of a pre- and post-Darwinian 
understanding of progress in and through evolution, we can gather that a distinction 
between a functional improvement that is relative to circumstance, and a teleological 
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understanding of progress in the sense of gradual advancement of organisation has 
to be made (Bowler 1989, 9). 
 
Teleological notions of progress entail the idea of a determined trajectory of 
evolution that is either defined externally, in the form of an external creator figure, or 
from within, in the form of a pantheist germ-like unfolding. Such a notion of progress 
necessarily entails a preliminary normative decision about what the trajectory is, and 
what happens in the case of deviation from that trajectory. A naturalised 
interventionism immediately suggests itself to that notion of progress. A functional 
understanding of progress can either mean improvement, or specialisation in regard 
to specific environmental conditions. Within this understanding, adaptation can 
functionally only lead to progress, when sustained environmental conditions allow 
for the kind of complexation that comes from continuous accumulative adaptation. 
Hence, it is the happenstance of sustained environmental conditions that allow for 
increasingly complex adaptations, and, in that, enabling progress in the sense of 'x 
getting better at y over time'. Given that environmental conditions are changing, 
adaptation cannot lead to accumulative improvement or specialisation in that sense, 
which makes functional progress temporary and relative. 
 
The idea of progress and its normative charging are particularly relevant in 
the context of the synthesis of educational theory with the principle of evolution. 
That is because education differs from other social science disciplines in its inherent 
normative component. Whereas sociology or psychology know theoretical traditions 
that are – or at least aspire to be – primarily descriptive, in the discipline of 
education this is unfathomable. Educational theory is never a mere descriptive 
account of an educational process. It has necessarily a normative component, or as 
Biesta (2006) called it, an account of “purpose” (22). This account of purpose 
prompts reflections about ‘where to’ educational activity ought to be directed, and 
how these aims are to be reached. This produces notions of telos, as well as 
directionality and trajectory. How an evolutionary framework is used argumentatively 
in the context of thinking about educational purposes, is significant. If progress, for 
example, is thought of in as a process of pre-determined unfolding, education most 
likely receives a more passive, ‘negative’ role. If, in contrast, progress is thought of 
in relative terms then the educational formation of the individual is a matter of active 
environmental engagement and situational learning. Hence, the underlying 
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understanding of evolutionary progress is key to an in-depth understanding of these 
argumentative dynamics. 
 
Another aspect to be considered is the broader intellectual and philosophical 
context. The thinkers analysed in this study do not necessarily draw from exclusively 
from an evolutionary framework. It is more likely to assume that other social theories 
and philosophical traditions inform, supplement and alter their interpretation of 
evolutionary paradigms. 
 
Different historical periods gave rise to different evolutionary paradigms and 
theoretical traditions. On a conceptual level, different evolutionary paradigms 
diverge how evolution is defined, based, in turn, on how the main concepts 
associated with the principle of evolution are understood. At the heart of what 
divides two main paradigms of evolutionary theorising – namely Neo-Darwinism and 
anti-adaptationism – stands the concept of adaptation and its wider significance 
within evolution. The concept of adaptation, as discussed above, marks the origin of 
modern evolutionary theory. According to Mayr (1991, 159f.) adaptation is also one 
of the most confounded evolutionary concepts. This might be related to its roots in 
Lamarckism, as well as its conceptual proximity to natural selection, which itself has 
a long history of teleological charging. Lacking alternative explanations, Lamarck 
assumed that adaptations are directly inheritable from one generation to the next. 
This notion of inheritance of acquired characteristics named Lamarckism was highly 
influential for a variety of evolutionary theories developed in the 18th and 19th 
Century. For the concept of adaptation this Lamarckian connotation meant that it 
was perceived as an evolutionary active mechanism, i.e. a mechanism causing 
evolutionary change over time. This meaning changed with Darwin who associated 
adaptation with natural selection, reintroducing it as a mechanism that is not directly 
evolutionary effective (Ruse 2005, 34). 
 
According to Gould (1997), Darwin's emphasis on natural selection lead to 
an adaptationist constitution of Neo-Darwinism and affiliated disciplines such as 
evolutionary psychology. Yet, as Offer (2010, 307) maintains, Neo-Darwinist 
selectionism misunderstands Darwin, who did not exclude non-selectionary 
evolutionary effective mechanisms. In evolutionary socio-cultural theory within the 
ontological tradition of Neo-Darwinism, behaviours, strategies, developed structures, 
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etc. are perceived as adaptations (Durrant&Ward 2011, 365; Pigliucci 2011, 51). 
The anti-adaptationist critique challenges this view's underlying focus on adaptation, 
pointing out that inferences drawn from adaptations about the selective pressure 
they were responding to, is speculative. Furthermore, anti-adaptationists argue that 
to conceptualise everything in terms of its adaptive value means failing to account 
for non-adaptive by-products (Pigliucci 2011, 55). 
 
These different understandings of evolution are crucial as they lay the 
foundation for how the relationship between the organism and the world is defined. 
In the context of evolutionary theorising in the discipline of education, the nature of 
the evolutionary paradigm is, therefore, a primary concern. As it has been 
established in this chapter, the concept of adaptation takes on manifold meanings. 
When Lamarck introduced the concept of adaptation, the emphasis laid on the 
significance of the organism's ability to react to environmental pressure. Lamarckian 
adaptation, thus, was very much an externalist conception of adaptation, thinking of 
the organism as primarily reactive. After Darwin, in Marxist-Darwinism, for examples 
and some anti-adaptationist perspectives, such as niche-construction theory, a 
conception of adaptation emerged that understood behaviour not as merely 
reactive, but as entailing possibility for the purposeful transformation of the 
environment. These different ideas about adaptation that also significantly influence 
core educational concepts, such as learning. A concept of learning as adaption has 
been increasingly popular in recent educational discourses (Bellmann 2007a). It 
matters vastly, however, if adaptation is understood to be passive adjustment to 
external pressures, or if adaptation includes the agentive and purposeful 
transformation of the environment. 
 
Directly related to the evolutionary paradigm are epistemological 
considerations. These theoretical traditions stand on diverging epistemological 
grounds making them different argumentatively. In a neo-Darwinian paradigm, 
evolutionary biology provides the theoretical framework. The bottom-up 
epistemology informs the reduction of culture to a part of nature, rather than an 
entity with its own functionality. This has consequences for concepts of education 
formed within that framework. If culture is understood as an adaptation within a Neo- 
Darwinist, unilinear perception of evolution, education is most likely approached 
bottom-up, applying the methods and concepts of evolutionary biology. This might 
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have important implications for questions of freedom/determinism, individual 
agency, and the ‘power’ of education within biological laws. If, on the other hand, a 
pluralist evolutionary framework is used to study education, society and culture are 
perceived as evolutionary movements functionally separate from organic evolution. 
Education, most likely, therein also receives a functionally different role than it does 
in biological theories. Therefore, making the epistemological nature of an approach 
explicit is important to understand the broader impact of a particular evolutionary 




By shedding light on different ways of conceptualising evolution and forming 
evolutionary theory, I aimed to develop a framework for the successive analysis of 
different evolutionary epistemologies in education. Understanding the way that 
questions regarding epistemology, ontology, and normativity are being weighed, 
incorporated, or left out within different evolutionary approaches, is key for 
understanding the nature of the approach, as well as its philosophical and practical 
implications. 
 
This chapter has shown that there is no such thing as the theory of evolution. 
Rather, there are various sometimes mutually exclusive, sometimes adjoined 
evolutionary paradigms circulating both the biological and social science discourse. 
These paradigms build on diverging understandings of many factors, such as what 
evolution is, what drives it, to what extent its trajectory is predetermined, as well as 
epistemological issues coming with the different evolutionary paradigms. 
Consequently, the divide between scientific and socio-cultural evolutionary concepts 
cannot be sensibly upheld. That is because, firstly, evolutionary concepts like 
selection, adaptation are not only fluid in their meaning and realms of application in 
and outside the realm of natural science inquiry, but, secondly, they also frequently 
carry inherent notions pointing towards meaning, purpose and aims of evolutionary 
process, which makes them susceptible to ideological and normative charging. For 
the analysis of educational theories drawing from evolutionary frameworks this 
means that the broader scientific paradigms at its foundation are as important as the 
socio-cultural traditions it steps into. Across these broader scientific paradigms, 
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furthermore, the concept of adaptation has been identified as a point of analysis to 
identify difference amongst different evolutionary as it is used across evolutionary 
paradigms meaning highly different things. 
 
In the following chapter I will unpack the evolutionary underpinnings in 
Spencer’s educational works. Using the conceptual apparatus developed in this 
chapter, I will discuss Spencer’s understanding of evolution and explore how he 
applies his evolutionary concepts to elaborate on the aims of education, the nature 
of family and formal education, as well as the broader connections between moral 
education and social evolution. 
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In the previous chapter I developed an instrument to analyse evolutionary 
frameworks in education. Building on the insights gained about evolutionary 
theorising, in this chapter I study the nature of the evolutionary underpinnings in 
Herbert Spencer’s thinking and discuss in depth how it influences his concept of 
education. 
 
The first objective of this analysis is to enhance our understanding of the 
detailed meaning of the evolutionary concepts that Spencer used for his theory of 
education. As the past chapter has shown, evolutionary concepts like ‘adaptation’ or 
‘progress’ hold diverging meanings that have to be extrapolated from the broader 
theoretical traditions and evolutionary paradigms that a specific theory taps into. The 
recent discussion raised by Egan (2002) makes apparent that such a clarification is 
important beyond a mere historical interest. Egan – in, what I consider to be an 
overt disregard of the broader locating of Spencer’s evolutionary ideas – argues that 
Spencer's evolutionary idea of progress has not only been the main theoretical and 
ideological thread in the American New Education movement of the early 20th 
Century but is still dominantly underlying current educational theory. Eminent 
educational thinkers such as Piaget and Dewey are, so Egan (2002, 12), merely 
repeating Spencer's principles. This assimilation of Spencer with other educational 
thinkers, levelling all theoretical differences amongst these thinkers under the label 
of ‘evolutionary progressivism’, can only be upheld if the strikingly different 
evolutionary traditions that these thinkers draw from are ignored. A reappraisal of 
the detailed nature of these evolutionary frameworks makes an important 
contribution to this discourse. 
 
The second aim of this chapter is related to the broader objective of this 
thesis to understand how evolutionary ideas have emerged in educational 
discourses and ‘evolved’ over time. Spencer is, according to Trompf (1971), "the 
beginner of the evolutionary movement in education" (185), which makes him a key 
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figure to begin the main part of this thesis. From the beginning of his intellectual 
journey, Spencer demonstrated a particular interest in educational concerns; before 
he began his major work Synthetic Philosophy (1862-93) or presented his first 
monograph Social Statics (1850), Spencer published several letters and magazine 
articles on education. These articles were concerned with national education and its 
boundaries and appeared in the dissenter magazine Nonconformist (1842). It was 
not until 1861 that Spencer collated his educational works into fours essays and 
published them in his volume Education (Trompf 1971, 185f.). Due to the fact that 
his book became a bestseller in Britain and the US in the 1880's and he published 
on the subject in teacher journals and newspapers in parallel, Spencer's educational 
thoughts were widely known. An unknown author writes in 1865 in the 
Massachusetts Teacher and Journal of Home and School Education: "There are few 
writers at the present day whose works are eliciting more attention, and whose 
views are the subject of more discussion" (372). By the late 19th Century Spencer's 
Education had been translated into thirteen languages and was used as a textbook 
in educational studies (Aleck 1931, 206). 
 
While Spencer’s educational works appear to have been of considerable 
significance in his own time, today he seems to be a somewhat forgotten figure. 
This can be deduced, for example, from the striking lack of recent literature on 
Spencer. Silberman (2003), therefore legitimately asks: "And yet, who reads 
Spencer today?" (85) I argue that even though Spencer might be of less direct 
current importance, his legacy as the first thinker to attempt to synthesise an 
evolutionary framework with educational theory provides an important background 
for the study of the more prominent works of Dewey and Vygotsky. As the so-called 
‘father’ of Social Darwinism, Spencer is a key figure of the intellectual history of 
evolutionary theorising in a social science context. Spencer’s dubious fame in 
connection with Social Darwinism, however, also makes him relevant for education 
today due to the recent neoliberal leaning within education policy making and 
practice that critical pedagogy thinker Apple (2016) deemed a resurgence of social 
Darwinist thinking in education. 
 
The study of Spencer’s evolutionary educational concepts consists of two 
parts. First, based on the framework developed in the previous chapter, I study of 
intellectual, ideological and theoretical roots of the evolutionary epistemology that 
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Spencer adopts, as well as the core concepts and assumptions constituting it. 
Throughout the analysis of different layers of Spencer’s evolutionary theory, I 
highlight potential issues emerging for a theory of education. This bridges over to 
the second part of this chapter, where I study the translation of Spencer’s 
evolutionary thought into educational theory. In concluding this chapter, I critically 
discuss the implications of Spencer’s location of educational practice within his idea 
of evolution and assess its broader usefulness from an educational perspective. 
This shall provide perspective on the kinds of evolutionary concepts, paradigms and 
argumentative traditions are educationally fruitful, and which prove to be 
problematic. 
 
3.2 Spencer's evolutionism 
 
Spencer was, first and foremost, an evolutionary theorist. His major work 
Synthetic Philosophy, a collection that he worked on for decades from mid-1800 
onward, is essentially a theoretical experimentation into the cosmological 
applicability of the universal laws of evolution. Spencer wrote on a range of social 
phenomena besides education. Nonetheless, Spencer dedicated numerous essays 
to the matter of education, which, eventually, made him popular as an educational 
thinker. This suggests that his interest in education was probably at least partially 
founded in his broader quest to explore the universal applicability of his 
evolutionism, rather than the phenomena of education itself (Andreski 1971, 7f). 
 
Because Spencer’s theory and concept of evolution build the foundation to 
his educational works, I begin this analysis with an outline of his understanding of 
the evolutionary process on the example of his social philosophy. Building upon this, 
I discuss epistemic assumptions, expectations, and claims with which Spencer 
equips his evolutionary theory. Finally, I delve into the normative components of 
Spencer’s evolutionary arguments. 
 
3.2.1 Spencer's theory and concept of evolution 
 
Spencer’s evolutionism is based on a bottom-up, reductionist and unilinear 
ontology. This means that he assumes that all processes in the cosmos function 
according to the same simple principle: Spencer (1892c) emphasises “that there are 
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not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in common, but one Evolution 
going on everywhere after the same manner.” (546; emphasis mine) On Spencer’s 
view, everything is connected in one movement guided by the same natural laws, 
and, therefore, can be explained through one and the same mechanism. 
 
Because for Spencer evolution is a principle functional an inorganic, organic, 
and super-organic level, his evolutionism can be described as cosmological. He 
uses the analogy of a biological organism as a functional principle for all levels of 
evolution, i.e. to "Inorganic" (astronomic and geological), "Organic", and "Super- 
organic" (Spencer 1892b, 3) evolution. While he describes slight differences 
between organic and supra-organic organisms in The Principles of Sociology 
(1892b, 116f.), he makes no factual difference regarding the direct analogy between 
the two. Spencer goes as far as to describe these subtypes described as artificial 
constructs with mere descriptive purpose, as a distinction between them would in 
fact be obsolete (Spencer 1892c, 8; 1892b, 4). 
 
The evolutionary process, for Spencer, is guided by three natural laws: 1) the 
law of the integration of mass, 2) the law of increase in structure, and 3) the law of 
growing heterogeneity (Spencer 1892c, 307f.). Evolution, thus, is a movement 
advancing “from the simple to the complex, through a process of successive 
differentiations", and "from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity” 
(Spencer 1893b, 91). This movement of evolution, on Spencer’s (1893b) view, 
terminates eventually in equilibrium as it is accompanied by “the dissipation of 
motion and integration of matter." (92) The driving force of evolution, i.e. the force 
that causes change, according to Spencer, is adaptation. Spencer defines 
adaptation as the movement or restructuring according to these three laws of 
evolution; adaptation and re-adaptation are induced by movement. This movement 
can be caused externally, by changed environmental conditions, or internally, by 
growth of mass. 
 
3.2.2 Social evolution 
 
Spencer’s social theory is based on exactly that principle. Through the 
collection of families into tribes, or the simple growth of the population, the social 
organism increases in mass (Spencer 1876, 109; 1893a, 68). Due to this increase in 
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mass, the ‘organs’ or entities of the social organism are forced to move and re- 
adapt. This re-adaptation can either mean splitting up or restructuration (Spencer 
1876, 109). In the rare case of splitting up, for Spencer the evolutionary process 
ceases – dissolution for Spencer is the opposite of evolution (Spencer 1892c, 555). 
Spencer’s rejection of an idea of evolution as anything else than increase in mass or 
structure is important, because it indicates that for Spencer, evolution is directional. 
His evolutionism lacks a concept of regression, de-evolution, or even stagnation. 
 
While the social organism grows, the units of the social organism go through 
a process of increasing structural differentiation and functional individuation 
(Spencer 1892b, 438). The units form an operative structure and position 
themselves hierarchically, according to the function they fulfil within the organism 
(Spencer 1889, 42). These structures become more and more complex as the units 
adapt to each other and develop an increasing mutual interdependency (Spencer, 
1892b, 450). With increasing mutual interdependency movement ceases and the 
need for re-adaptive restructuring declines. Adaptation ceases once equilibrium is 
reached, i.e. when the organism has perfectly coordinated its units and sub-units 
into a system of perfect interdependence (Spencer 1850, 148). Spencer’s concept 
of adaptation, it transpires, is teleological. This means that it leads to a certain 
endpoint. While it is relative to the environment to some extent, it ceases to be so 
once adaptation is ‘perfect’, meaning, when a relationship with the environment is 
attained that no longer demands for adaptation. 
 
If we begin to think about the implications of this view of society for a theory 
of education, important issues emerge. Most fundamentally, before even going into 
the conceptual study, Spencer’s argumentation raises the question to what extent 
his educational thought ultimately qualifies as genuine educational theory. As 
mentioned above, Spencer was first and foremost an evolutionary thinker, who 
seemingly had a primarily instrumental interest in the matter of education (Andreski 
1971, 7f). This has to be critically assessed when reading Spencer as an 
educational thinker, which – as the considerable influence he had on the early late 
19th, early 20th Century discourse in education indicates – he definitely has been. 
From Spencer’s evolutionary concepts, further important questions transpire. How 
can we fathom, for example, the role of school in a society that follows a terminating 
trajectory? And who is the educated subject if, like in this organismic view of society, 
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the focus lies on the emergent functions of the ‘body’ rather than on the ‘organs’ 
being? And what does it mean for his educational theory that his evolutionism is 
progressivist, i.e. knows no notion of regression or stagnation? This leads us over to 
a closer examination of the normative component of Spencer’s evolutionism. 
 
3.2.3 Normative components in Spencer’s evolutionary 
perspective 
As noted above, Spencer’s concept of evolution does not have a concept of 
de-evolution or regression. The Spencerian laws of evolution movements are 
essentially laws of growth, of accumulation of increase, be it in mass or structure or 
heteronomy. This makes Spencer’s concept of evolution inherently progressivist. 
And it is progressivist not in an environmental-relative sense of the word ‘progress’, 
but it is absolute and teleological. Once the progressive movement stops, according 
to Spencer, the process of evolution has effectively ceased. For his social 
philosophy, this has at least two important consequences. 
 
Firstly, it normatively charges inequality and power division as ‘natural’ and 
necessary element of progress. Effectively, Spencer (1889) claims that the process 
of evolution, if it is to ‘succeed’, i.e. reaches termination, necessarily has to go hand 
in hand with a permanent societal stratification: “It is a truth in sociology comparable 
to the biological truth, that the first step in the production of any living organism, high 
or low, is a differentiation whereby a central portion becomes distinguished from a 
peripheral portion.” (41) In that, Spencer not only naturalises a society of inequality 
– of, as described in the quote above, central and peripheral portions –, but also 
charges it normatively by tying it as a necessary premise to evolutionary progress. 
 
Secondly, the progressivist underpinning of his social philosophy implies that 
every state before the equilibrium can only be considered as an imperfect state of 
transition, a period of transition that has to be endured by all in order to ensure 
eventual progress. Spencer (1850) thought – resonating popular hypothesis of Neo- 
Darwinian evolutionary psychology – that humankind is not adapted to modern 
social life because they are still “fitted for his original predatory life.” (30) Hence, 
there is a considerable period of ill-adaptation, where “there must be an 
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inconsistency between the perfect law and an imperfect state.” (Spencer 1850, 75) 
With time, Spencer (1850) maintained, this inconsistency between human conduct 
and the ideal state would decrease: “Man will eventually become completely suited 
to his mode of life. […] Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity.” (31) 
In that, Spencer’s evolutionism evokes a future oriented perspective that renders the 
present into a mere state of transition that is to be overcome. 
 
How can education as a social practice of transmission be thought of in this 
view on society and the present? Progress being a necessity for Spencer, puts the 
role of education within the formation and re-formation of society up for question. If 
evolution is a process determined by laws, the role of human agency, and the 
overall influence that education can have, becomes doubtful. Furthermore, the 
future orientation of Spencer’s social philosophy severely challenges the value of 
education for the individual life, while also contesting any notion of the efficacy of 
education. The question is thus what education’s role is in a society that is, in a 
sense, merely enduring the status quo, waiting for the laws of nature to ensure 
progress. 
 
These issues, emerging from an educational perspective on Spencer’s 
evolutionism, circulate around Spencer’s concept of the individual in relation to this 
idea of the ‘natural’, objectively ideal constitution of the state to which human nature 
ought to be adapted to. In order to further clarify Spencer’s view on this relationship 
between the individual and the ideal constitution of the state, it is worthwhile to look 
into his idea of morality. Understanding the evolutionary foundation of his moral 
philosophy draws out a crucial connection between Spencer’s evolutionism and his 
theory of education. That is because, as explained in the following, the way Spencer 
conceptualises and locates education is crucially connected to his evolutionary 
theory of morality. 
 
3.2.4 Spencer’s theory of morality 
 
Society, for Spencer, functions like an organism (1892b, 436). This analogy 
entails an important distinction between individuals – the ‘organs’ – from the 
functionality of society – the ‘body’. Instead of thinking of society as a mere 
accumulation of individuals, Spencer assumes that society is emergent, i.e. that it 
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inherits its own functionalities that go beyond the accumulation of each of its 
‘organ’s’ abilities (Spencer 1892b, 114). Connected to this conception of society that 
constructs the individual regarding its function as an ‘organ’ are the three moral 
standards that Spencer derives from his evolutionary-utilitarian perspective on 
society. 
 
The utilitarian background to Spencer’s philosophy, and in particular his 
evolutionary take on it, profoundly shaped Spencer’s idea of human nature and 
morality profoundly. For Spencer, the aim of life is happiness. Spencer defines 
happiness as being dependent of the free expression of the individual’s endowed 
tendencies (Spencer 1893b, 490). Liberty of action, thus, in Spencer is instrumental 
to happiness. From this connection of the freedom to act and the purpose of life in 
individual happiness, Spencer derives his ideas of morality and justice. Just like Mill, 
Spencer assumed that society shall be guided by the utilitarian concept of equal 
freedom (Weinstein 1998, 120). Equal freedom is an individual right that emerges 
from Spencer’s notion of the freedom to exercise one’s “faculties” (Spencer 1850, 
44). Spencer used the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of 
people as a heuristic to assess the moral integrity of political decisions and actions. 
Spencer also maintained that happiness could only be strived for individually and 
not be transferred to others (Spencer 1850, 40f.). From this assumption, Spencer 
(1893b) derived his first, basic moral principle that "there remain to be equally 
distributed nothing but the conditions under which each may pursue happiness. The 
limitations to action – the degrees of freedom and restraint, shall be alike for all." 
(222) This means that for Spencer an equal society is a society that ensures equal 
distribution of the conditions for everyone to pursue happiness. Once this is ensured 
and everyone has an equal opportunity to adapt one's faculties as well to one's 
environment as possible, the ideal state would manifest as a “system of equity” 
(Spencer 1850, 58). 
 
On Spencer’s (1850) view, in this society of equity, everyone grants the 
same freedom and rights to adapt as well as possible to everyone else. “Every man 
has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of 
any other man.” (54) The prerequisite to this society is that individuals pursue their 
own rights, while not limiting the rights of others. Hence the second moral principle 
that Spencer (1850) derives is that "liberty of action being the first essential to 
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exercise of faculties, and therefore the first essential to happiness; […] it follows that 
the liberty of each, limited by the like liberties of all, is the rule in conformity with 
which society must be organized." (44) What guides this "law of equal freedom" 
(Spencer 1850, 203) is sympathy. With increasing mutual dependency in society, 
human nature changes as selfish, anti-altruistic behaviour is increasingly negatively 
rewarded, which induces a re-adaptation of behaviour (Spencer 1893b, 490). 
 
In a system of equity, or in any context of sociality for that matter, liberty of 
action demands for the conceptualisation of rights, in order to not defy itself. In 
contrast to Mill, however, Spencer thought of rights not as dynamically evolving, but 
as fixed. On Spencer’s view, certain kinds of actions would necessarily – even 
universally – lead to happiness, or unhappiness, independently from the effect they 
have on others. This was a matter of contention between Spencer and Mill, who 
deemed Spencer an anti-utilitarian, an egoistic hedonist whose theory had no 
bearings on a theory of morality (Weinstein 1998, 136). And indeed, the hedonistic 
nature of Spencer’s morality becomes, I argue, obvious when going into his writings. 
This is important for his definition of education. Spencer’s assumption of the 
universality of what individual happiness ultimately means, I associate with his 
teleological evolutionism. Spencer had a fixed idea of societal equilibrium and the 
kind of moral conduct necessary to achieve and uphold that equilibrium. 
 
Educating the young generation, both in the family and in formal pedagogical 
arrangements, in this society can take but one role: to ensure the first two moral 
principles, i.e. ensuring a system of equal distribution of conditions to pursue 
happiness for everybody, yet, without limiting each other’s freedom to do so. 
Sympathy, as the “recognition of the moral law” (Spencer 1850, 76) granting 
individual freedom to strive for happiness, in this conception of education, would 
become a core aim of education; it is the universal moral codex that, according to 
Spencer’s teleological utilitarianism, would lead to societal equilibrium i.e. the end of 
evolution. 
 
Spencer’s notion of sympathy, however, is not to be confounded with a 
selfless altruism. Sympathy, according to Spencer, is to be directed only to the 
pursuit of personal happiness (Weinstein 1998, 130). Sympathy as an aim of 
education, thus, inherits an instrumental role; it ensures societal equilibrium, where 
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everyone strives for personal happiness "not only without hindering other individuals 
from doing the like, but while giving aid to them in doing the like." (Spencer 1893b, 
44) This means that sympathy, according to Spencer, in this ‘system of equity’ takes 
a one-dimensional role; it is supposed to only prevent the disturbance of everyone’s 
ability to strive for happiness, yet without actively helping each other to improve 
these abilities either. That is, because Spencer (1850) believed that progress relied 
on obedience to "the natural order of things", which ensures that "society is 
constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members" 
(148). Hence, sympathy ought to be only influencing one's behaviour towards 
others, if it is related to their ability to adapt: "There is unquestionably harm done 
when sympathy is shown, without any regard to ultimate results." (Spencer 1850, 
203) Thus follows, that for Spencer (1893b)"personal well-being, considered apart 
from the well-being of others" (282) are to be favoured over social ethics, which are 
"judged as good or bad mainly by their results to other" (282) in all cases except 
when one is in danger to limit the other person's ability to adapt his "constitution to 
conditions" (Spencer 1850, 27). 
 
Ultimately, all of Spencer’s moral principles are directed towards enabling 
the necessary period of disequilibrium, "the temporary 're-barbarization' of mankind" 
(Mack 2001, 1637). The temporary ‘re-barbarization’ of humankind in ruthless 
competition, for Spencer (1850), is a requirement for progress: “The worse the 
condition of society the more visionary must a true code of morality appear.” (75) 
Free moving disequilibrium enables increased adaptive movement through which 
"the human faculties [will] be moulded into complete fitness for the social state; so 
surely must evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect.” 
(Spencer 1850, 31) In this final state, the gap between social and personal ethics 
will be closed, as “the ultimate man should be one who can obtain happiness 
without deducting from the happiness of others.” (Spencer 1850, 232) There would 
be an ideal balance between egoism and altruism (Spencer 1893b, 238). And once 
"all desires inconsistent with the most perfect social organization are dying out, and 
other desires corresponding to such an organization are being developed” (Spencer 
1850, 256), the "weeding out" (Spencer 1850, 203) would cease as human nature 
would be perfectly adapted to the conditions that formerly enforced selection. 
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From this conception of a society following the natural order, Spencer 
derives the conviction an over-emphasis or wrong directing of social ethics would 
actually stall societal progress and in that prolong the period of ill-adaptation that 
causes suffering. Thus, not to practice undirected sympathy in the sense that 
Spencer describes, becomes a moral standard itself (Spencer 1850, 201). Spencer 
discusses at length in his Social Statics (1850) how these moral standards play out 
practically in terms of social practices and policies. He maintains that the state 
should refrain from intervening in the societal structuring process – in equal manner 
to the way that individuals shall limit their helping of others outside of the realms of 
the 'law of equal freedom' (Spencer 1850, 143). Spencer claims that the benefit of 
this procedure will ultimately overrule the suffering it causes to the one's subjected 
to the “purifying process” (Spencer 1850, 146). Moreover, he deems the national 
poor-laws and the interventions of "well-meaning" (Spencer 1850, 148) 
philanthropists immoral and cruel in themselves, as they prolong suffering and 
"merely postpone what must ultimately be done" (Spencer 1850, 149). Any kind of 
formal education, consequently, would have to inherit a predominantly passive role, 
the role of the referee who ensures that nobody cuts anybody else’s right to seek 
happiness. From the organismic view of society, connected with the progressive 
evolutionism that Spencer assumed, he derives assumptions about the ideal state 
and the ideal human condition capable of bringing about this ideal state. This builds 
a crucial link between his evolutionism and educational concept: Educational 
practice is connected to moral education, which, in turn, he derives from his 
evolutionary utilitarian ethics. This is connection between his evolutionary morality 
and his theory of education, I will argue in the second half of this chapter, is crucial 
for his concepts of education and pedagogical direction. 
 
3.2.5 Key themes of Spencer’s evolutionary theory 
 
Before unpacking the detailed nature of the connection between Spencer’s 
evolutionary approach and his educational theory, I summarise the key themes 
emerging from the first part of this chapter. In the three previous sections, Spencer’s 
concept of evolution, his social theory, and his moral philosophy has been analysed. 
I have characterised Spencer’s evolutionism as unilinear, ontologically reductionist, 
teleological and aspiring to be of cosmological applicability. The three laws of 
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evolutionary change at the heart of Spencer’s teleological evolutionism are laws of 
growth, of increase and accumulation. Applied to his social philosophy, the inherent 
progressivism yields important consequences, in particular for a locating of 
educational practices within Spencer’s theory of the social. 
 
Firstly, Spencer’s evolutionism assumes the lawfulness of progress, given 
all evolutionary movements are allowed to unfold according to the natural laws of 
growth. This progressive determinism puts the role and efficacy of education up for 
question. Accompanying this progressivism, secondly, Spencer’s idea of evolution is 
largely future-oriented as its aim is the termination of evolutionary movement in 
equilibrium. Spencer used this evolutionary framing of society to form his own 
utilitarian morality, in which he defined the law of equal freedom as the pinnacle of 
human activity. Spencer’s utilitarian moral philosophy, thus, is based on the 
assumptions of a fixed moral conduct that leads to social equilibrium. The 
equilibrium is a distant aim for the development of human society; the individual is 
not ‘important’ in this phylogenetic perspective. This utilitarian framing of 
evolutionary laws and the concomitant future orientation, thus far, gives no 
indication about the educational formation of the individual beyond the aim of 
allowing the process of ‘weeding out’ to occur freely: “The state of transition will of 
course be an unhappy state. [...] The process must be undergone and the suffering 
must be endured.” (Spencer 1850, 148) 
 
The first moral standard derived from Spencer’s application of his particular 
evolutionary framework to questions of individual conduct within the broader aim to 
eventually achieve societal equilibrium is directed towards every individual's rights to 
have the necessary conditions to strive for happiness met, i.e. the necessary 
conditions to adapt to her environment. The second moral principle is the law of 
equal freedom, i.e. is directed towards every individual's rights to strive for 
happiness to the same extent as everyone else. The third moral standard can be 
seen as the counterpart to the second principle, the law of freedom: Spencer claims 
it not only to be futile, but rather immoral to help one another to adapt to life in 
society beyond the realms of the first and second principle, i.e. beyond enabling 
each other to have the conditions to strive for happiness and having the freedom to 
strive for it to the same extent like everyone else. That is, because he deems it 
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unnatural and therefore hindering in terms of progress, which for Spencer is a 
natural necessity, a law itself. 
 
Thus, what Spencer (1893b) wanted was a society where "each citizen 
pursues his own happiness independently, not to the detriment of others but without 
active concern for others" (227). This is a highly individualistic society, only 'social' in 
terms of mutual dependence. In this process, society would become increasingly 
more capable of serving the individual due to an increasing alignment of society to 
the individual. This would ultimately lead into a complete overlap between the two, 
with the individual living in freedom amongst others. Or as Deering (2001) put is, 
"humans learn to adapt to their new circumstances, acquiring characteristics 
suitable to his/her environment, which are subsequently passed on to future 
generations. [...] humans' adaptation to their circumstances results in a 
progressively altruistic, social being as society becomes more manifold and people 
more interdependent." (146) 
 
Spencer’s emphasis on freedom as a crucial part of the ideal state, is 
potentially deceptive and covering the underlying highly conservative, or even 
despotic nature of his social theory. Spencer assumes that state authority is 
necessary as long as the members of society revolt against the naturalised 
stratification – the state reinforces the societal order until it is accepted by everyone 
as their own, until the desires of the individual are moulded into fitness. His 
fundamentally negative anthropology enforces his view of the need of the state to 
restrain the fundamentally flawed, ill-adapted human nature. He assumed that 
human nature was fundamentally selfish and in that in conflict with the social 
organism that requires co-operation. Only once the perfectly adapted and integrated 
individual emerges that voluntarily accepts its subordination under the then to be 
permanent hierarchical structure of society, state authority can cease to exist and 
the beforehand militant society – where coordination is compulsory (Spencer 1876, 
160) – evolves into an industrial society, consisting of a perfectly coordinated 
division of labour, where "multiform beliefs voluntarily accepted" (Spencer 1876, 
163) and there is no opposition. "Adaptation to the social state must in time produce 
a nature such that the needful labour will be pleasurable" (Spencer 1893b, 490). 
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All in all, Spencer was a 'progressivist conservative', meaning that he 
believed in societal progress and individual happiness as a crucial element of the 
ideal society. However, his concept of the ideal society is deeply conservative and 
ultimately undemocratic and aristocratic. That is because as a progressivist, when 
envisioning the ideal society, Spencer talks about the future, about an end-state, an 
equilibrium. At the same time, he conceptualises adaptation merely as a process of 
the individual adapting to the societal structures and in that reinforcing them. Thus, 
when Spencer demands that society ought to exist for the benefit of the individual 
and not the other way around, Spencer talks about the composition of the eventual 
end-state of society in perfect equilibrium. However, on the way towards the ideal 
society, the individual hardly matters, especially if it does happen to not fit into the 
increasingly inflexible structure of society. 
 
3.3 Spencer’s educational theory 
 
In the preceding part of the chapter I have outlined the cornerstones of 
Spencer’s evolutionism and discussed the way his concept of evolution informs his 
social and moral philosophy. Spencer’s evolutionary cosmology and the 
accompanying social and moral philosophy also provide the foundation for his 
educational theory. From the analysis of Spencer’s evolutionary theory, a set of 
issues emerges regarding a theory of education. Firstly, due to the high 
epistemological aspiration of Spencer’s cosmologically oriented evolutionary 
concept, it has to be put up for question to what extend his theory of education can 
be considered truly ‘educational’, or whether his educational works were more 
exemplary for the universal applicability of his evolutionism. In other words, are 
Spencer’s educational works of educational interest at all? Secondly, due to the 
nature of Spencer’s concept of evolution, the possibility of a useful concept of 
education has to be challenged – what can the role of education be in a process that 
is largely determined by natural laws while at the same time is following trajectory? 
Thirdly, in Spencer’s organismic view on society, he focuses on the emergent 
properties of the organism rather than on the existence of the individual organs. This 
makes an educational subject difficult to fathom. Fourth, some profound ethical 
issues emerge from Spencer’s third moral principle for a theory of education. If so- 
called sympathy “without any regard to ultimate results” (Spencer 1893b, 203), is 
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considered a breach of desirable moral conduct in an ideal society, then formal 
education can in principle only act passively, enabling competition amongst 
students, rather than helping both weaker and more able students to reach their 
best potential. Basically, this means that education has to be degraded into provider 
of an even battlefield. 
 
With these questions in mind, I now move on to analyse the bearings of 
Spencer’s evolutionism on his concept and theory of education. In particular, I aim 
to critically discuss the connection that has been drawn out in the previous part of 
this chapter between Spencer’s evolutionary moral philosophy and the aim, function, 
and concept of education. I begin this analysis with Spencer’s concept of education 
and his idea of educational practice. 
 
3.3.1 Spencer's concept of education 
 
First to the broader locating of education within Spencer’s evolutionary 
cosmology. In Spencer’s theory of evolution, education is a societal practice 
directed at the adaptation of the individual to society with the purpose of reaching 
social equilibrium. Recalling the first part of this chapter, Spencer defines adaptation 
with reference to the laws of evolutionary movement. If the cosmos is allowed to 
unfold according to the evolutionary laws, progress and the eventual equilibrium are 
inevitable. Because of these laws, adaptation is strictly passive in the sense that it is 
compliance with the status quo, rather than intervention of transformation of society. 
Spencer (1850) emphasises: “Let us never forget that the law is - adaptation to 
circumstances, be they what they may.” (174) Spencer’s notion of adaptation, it can 
thus be noted, is one-directional, i.e. it does only entail the individual’s adaptation to 
society, and not the other way around. Adaptation, on that view, means compliance 
with these laws. The purpose of this adaptation, and the educational practices 
directed at it, we can note, is at first instance not related to the development of the 
individual, but instead to the progress of the societal organism, i.e. phylogeny. 
 
On the level of ontogeny, the aim of pedagogical practices is defined by 
Spencer’s moral philosophy. The objective of educational practice is directed at the 
pedagogical formation of the younger generation within the broader objective of 
societal equilibrium. In Spencer’s moral philosophy the attainment of societal 
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equilibrium is tied to a certain fixed kind of individual conduct. This conduct is guided 
by sympathy directed at the upholding of the law of equal freedom. That is because 
the law of equal freedom ensures the undisturbed progression of the laws of 
evolutionary movement towards equilibrium. From this follows that the aim of the 
education of the individual is also fixed in the moral standards derived from the law 
of equal freedom. In other words, the ontogenetic aim of educational practice is 
defined by the wider cosmological trajectory towards equilibrium. 
 
3.3.2 Educational practices and institutions 
 
Education understood as the formation of the individual in alignment with the 
laws of cosmological evolution is an important component of the overarching 
evolutionary trajectory toward equilibrium. Educational practices are involved in the 
process of moulding human nature into a fully equilibrated social order that allows 
for the process of restructuration to cease. In the light of the centrality of education 
within his evolutionary cosmology, it made sense for Spencer to write about 
education extensively. In these writings, Spencer focused mainly on two matters: 
Firstly, the issue of how educational practices can support each individual’s 
adaptation according to the ‘law of equal freedom’, and, secondly, how societal 
organs – of which educational institutions are a part – are to be shaped to ensure 
that they would allow for the necessary period of transition on the path to societal 
equilibrium. Within the social organism, Spencer locates the educational formation 
of the individual both in formal arrangements, and the family. I will now discuss 
Spencer’s perspective on both these contexts, focusing on how his evolutionism 
informs this perspective. 
 
Spencer was convinced that the ultimate flaw of national education was its 
artificiality – schools provide “factitious circumstances” that lead people to “adapt 
themselves to these instead; and will, in the end, have to undergo the miseries of a 
re-adaptation to the real ones.” (Spencer 1850, 174) In Spencer’s view, these ‘real 
circumstances’ are defined from an evolutionary viewpoint as the circumstances that 
allow for the evolutionary movement to unfold freely. Real circumstances present 
themselves outside of a sheltered educational institution, in the ‘real’ society 
founded on the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
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of people, where everyone is free to pursue their individual happiness in free 
competition against each other, with the only limitation of the law of equal freedom. 
These circumstances have to be unrestricted to allow for this free movement which 
is directed only by a utilitarian morality. As discussed above, according to Spencer’s 
utilitarian morality, each individual strives for happiness while complying with the law 
of equal freedom and the concomitant idea of directed sympathy. 
 
On Spencer’s (1889) view, national education misused its influence to 
transmit widely useless "ornamental knowledge and attire that brings societal 
advantages" (25). Instead of attempting to foster adaptation by introducing students 
to the prevalent cultural reality of society, or what Spencer called ‘ornamental 
knowledge and attire’, he believed national education should be focused on 
individual needs, on "knowledge which conduces personal well-being" (Spencer 
1889, 22). National education he perceived to be a "ramified network of restraints by 
which society is kept in order" (Spencer 1889, 25), veiling the natural order of things 
with an artificial order. In this artificial order, "instead of just unfolding ourselves to 
'full living', we try to find our place in the societal order and in that give in to its rule." 
(Spencer 1889, 26) In doing so, in Spencer’s view, national education is doing the 
exact opposite of what it ought to be doing – instead of allowing for adaptation to the 
status quo and thus allowing the evolutionary laws to do their ‘progressive magic’, 
national education is involved in the development of alternative, non-utilitarian forms 
of people relating to each other. Spencer, in contrast, advocates for a national 
education aimed at equipping every individual with knowledge that allows them to 
improve their own nature, and to compete against others through that. 
 
Spencer’s concept of evolution informed these concerns about adaptation to 
‘real’ and ‘artificial’ circumstances significantly: As a Lamarckian, he believed that 
“structural changes thus caused by functional changes are inherited." (Spencer 
1891, 435) Assuming that an individual’s adaptations are inherited to the next 
generation, fuelled Spencer’s conviction that school’s attempts to improve children 
superficially, had to be futile as long as their deeper nature, i.e. their deeper 
constitution that they inherited biologically, was so fundamentally flawed: 
 
The truth is, that the difficulties of moral education are necessarily 
of dual origin – necessarily result from the combined faults of 
parents and children. […] Evidently, therefore, the general 
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practice of any ideal system of discipline is hopeless: parents are 
not good enough. (Spencer 1889, 169) 
 
This means that even if parents give their personal best effort to enforce 
‘complete living’ and know what this endeavour comprises of – their own nature, 
during the transitive period of mal-adaption, simply is not allowing them to 
accelerate progress. School’s ‘unnatural’ attempt to accelerate societal progress via 
reform has to fail, for, according to Spencer (1850), “reforming men’s conduct 
without reforming their natures is impossible.” (172) 
 
At the core of Spencer's critique of the ineffectiveness of educational 
intervention is his conviction that there are natural developmental laws that guide a 
child's process of growing up and learning. These laws cannot be accelerated, and 
foreseen developmental trajectories cannot be altered – at least not without 
hampering societal progress. Understanding the psychology of individual learning, 
therefore, is a crucial element of an educational theory aligned with the natural 
order, i.e. an educational theory that instead of intervening positively with the 
natural order supports the individual's right to exercise her human faculties fully and 
freely and in that ultimately ensures progress: "Grant that the phenomena of 
intelligence conform to laws; grant that the evolution of intelligence in a child also 
conforms to laws; and it follows inevitably that education can be rightly guided only 
by knowledge of these laws." (Spencer 1889, 60) 
 
Spencer’s psychology of learning is largely a copy of his evolutionary 
cosmology: "If the doctrine of Evolution is true, the inevitable implication is that Mind 
can be understood only by observing how Mind is evolved." (Spencer 1892a, 291) 
Hence, for Spencer (1892a), the development of intellect is a process of 
environmental adaptation understood as “an adjustment of inner to outer relations” 
(389). This adjustment, however, must not be understood as a process involving 
agency, problem solving, multiple pathways, or anything of the like. Learning as 
adaptation in Spencer’s understanding is guided by natural laws. 
 
Spencer was one of the few remaining evolutionists after Darwin who stuck 
to the Lamarckian principle of inheritance: 
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We have already seen, that individual organisms become 
modified when placed in new conditions of life – so modified as to 
re-adjust the powers to the requirements; and thought there is 
great difficulty in disentangling the evidence, we found reason for 
thinking, that structural changes thus caused by functional 
changes are inherited. (Spencer 1891, 435) 
 
According to Freeman (1974, 213f.), Spencer's Lamarckian background is 
crucial as it rendered biological inheritance into the main cause of progress and in 
that emptied any other concepts of societal transformation, such as culture, 
democracy or political reform. In fact, due to his subscription to the theory of 
recapitulation, cultural transmission becomes actually impossible, because 
everything has to be learned by experience (Deering 2001, 310). The ideal society, 
as well as the path towards it, is conservative: it is not based on rationality, agency, 
or cultural reform, but rather relies on everyone's obedience to the status quo 
(Deering 2001, 145) 
 
Spencer’s evolutionist stance crucially informed his criticism of national 
education. He was convinced that society could not be formed rationally or 
intentionally, but rather progresses according to a natural order (Deering 2001, 151). 
In Education (1889), Spencer writes: “We are satisfied that though imperfections of 
nature may be diminished by wise management, they cannot be removed by it.” 
(165) Spencer believed that national education – just as the much-despised poor 
laws (Spencer 1850, 213) – in its attempt to interfere with societal growth positively 
actually halted progress. "The establishment became the insidious symbol of the 
'unnatural'." (Trompf 1971, 204) Because, from his evolutionary perspective, he 
deemed national school education as not only futile but actually detrimental to the 
development of society, Spencer resorted to family education to conceptualise an 
educational practice that was in alignment with what he deemed ‘natural’. 
 
Spencer assigned high relevancy to family education. Parenting, Spencer 
conceived to be one of the most challenging tasks in a human’s life. At the same 
time, he maintained that the significance of the task is widely unacknowledged by 
parents and its purpose overlooked in society – a fact that he partially assigned to a 
lack of insight into the crucial role of education within the cosmological scale (Muhri 
1991, 299). The prevailing artificial standard in national education also impacts 
family education. Spencer (1861a) was deeply concerned about the "monstrous" 
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(26) lack of preparation that individuals receive in school regarding the rearing of 
their future children. The curricular lack of the "laws of life" and the "psychological 
laws" (Spencer 1861a, 26) would have profound negative consequences regarding 
societal progress: "The training of children – physical, moral, and intellectual – is 
dreadfully defective. And in great measure it is so, because parents are devoid of 
that knowledge by which this training can alone be rightly guided." (Spencer 1889, 
62) 
 
It can be noted that Spencer used an evolutionary framework to form a 
normative account of ‘unnatural’ to criticise educational practice, in both these 
realms. Analogously to state/national education, education within the context of the 
family is, more than anything else, a threat to societal progress. While in institutional 
education Spencer was apprehensive regarding any ‘artificial agenda’ that would 
interfere with the evolutionary trajectory, in family upbringing he fears sheer 
incompetence on the side of the parents. This incompetence, on Spencer’s view, is 
largely ascribed to a lack of knowledge about the evolutionary trajectory and the 
associated moral principles. 
 
3.3.3 Moral education 
 
The normative foundation of Spencer’s theory of education is based on a 
combination of utilitarian moral philosophy and a notion of an evolutionary trajectory 
towards equilibrium. As a result, free conduct and unrestricted competition emerge 
as the core principle of Spencer’s concept of education and inform his thoughts on 
moral education. Free conduct that is merely limited by the ‘law of equal freedom’ 
allows for the necessary period of transition that ensures progress and ultimately 
leads to equilibrium. Hence, enabling the full expansion of each individual’s capacity 
to adapt to the status quo – and therein compete with others – is a necessary 
condition for Spencer’s notion of progress. Society’s attempts to improve the status 
quo, by, amongst other things, helping the poor, or supporting less abled students in 
school, are not only futile and ineffective – considering the law-directed trajectory of 
societal evolution –, but ultimately opposing the third of his three moral principles 
that forbids to positively trying to compensate for individual’s disadvantages in 
successfully adapting to the status quo. That is because as soon as this 
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disadvantage does not interfere with the first two moral principles, which ensure that 
everyone can participate in society, and that nobody’s attempts to adapt interferes 
with anyone else’s right to do so, positive support of individual’s actual capacity to 
compete is ultimately immoral: 
 
We must call those spurious philanthropists who, to prevent 
present misery, would entail greater misery on future generations. 
[...] Blind to the fact that under the natural order of things society 
is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, 
faithless member, these unthinking, though well-meaning, men 
advocate an interference which not only stops the purifying 
process, but even increases the vitation - absolutely encourages 
the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering 
them an unfailing provision, and discourages the multiplication of 
the competent and provident by heightening the difficulty of 
maintaining a family. (Spencer 1850, 148) 
 
Describing contemporary national education, Spencer (1889) deemed moral 
education to be the “most glaring defect in our programmes of education.” (161) 
Following his own psychology of learning, he maintains that moral education shall 
be mainly guided by natural consequences (Spencer 1889, 173). Again, positive 
influence of the natural trajectory, Spencer deems to be ineffective (Silberman 2003, 
99). Drawing from the theory of recapitulation he writes: 
 
Do not expect from a child any great amount of moral goodness. 
During early years every civilized man passes through that phase 
of character exhibited by the barbarous race from which he is 
descended. […] Hence the tendencies to cruelty, to thieving, to 
lying, so general among children - tendencies which, even without 
the aid of discipline, will become more or less modified just as the 
features do. (Spencer 1889, 207) 
 
What Spencer emphasises here, again, is the ineffectiveness of positive 
educational intervention as discussed above and demand for an educational 
practice that does not intervene, but merely maintains the conditions for the 
development of higher moral faculties via natural consequences (Aleck 1931, 208). 
In this "natural system of discipline" pure justice would be the leading principle and 
only “the ultimate standards by which all men judge of behaviour.” (Spencer 1889, 
175) 
 
Spencer assumed, based on the Lamarckian underpinnings of his 
evolutionism, ideal morality would eventually become organic (Spencer 1850, 87). In 
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every generation, humankind would move one consecutive step away from the 
moral constitution which fitted man for his original predatory state and align 
increasingly better with the social state. Yet, this improvement of human nature 
relies on the negative selection of individuals that are less successful or in any way 
prove to be ‘undesirable’ in the free competition with others. Trying to help less 
fortunate individuals, therefore, is immoral – learning the moral self-restraint to not 
do so, therefore, is a core aim of moral education. This, of course, from a current 
perspective has to be described as barbaric. In Spencer’s educational vision that is 
founded on “a most extreme form of laissez-faire liberalism” (Trompf 1971, 204) 
children would grow up learning to not feel empathy for others – at least no empathy 
that does beyond the ‘law of equal freedom’ – and perceive other’s failures and 
struggles as a sign of progress. 
 
3.3.4 Education for ‘Complete living’ 
 
Spencer translated his evolutionarily derived moral philosophy into a theory 
of education. He uses the evolutionary-cosmological perspective on education, to 
justify a methodical standard, a "measure of value" (Spencer 1889, 30) to determine 
what knowledge education is supposed to transmit. This measure of value is 
opposed to the immediate empirical evaluation of the knowledge taught in families 
and schools, or 'traditional' knowledge. For Spencer, this measure is the 
evolutionary principle itself. Following the laissez-faire philosophy, Spencer (1889) 
argues that "to prepare us for complete living is the function which education has to 
discharge; and the only rational mode of judging of any educational courses is, to 
judge in what degree it discharges such function." (31) 
 
Complete living, for Spencer, consists of five hierarchically structured core 
activities of the human condition. These activities are 1) direct self-preservation, 2) 
indirect self-preservation, 3) the rearing of offspring, 4) maintenance of social and 
political relations, and 5) leisure. For his theory of education, Spencer defines the 
kind of knowledge that the full expansion of these activities requires. Predominantly, 
this knowledge consists of recognising one’s cosmological role and embracing one’s 
moral duties within the evolutionary trajectory. This entails learning about healthy 
living in order to avoid becoming a burden to society by committing "physical sins" 
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(Spencer 1889, 283), become able to gain one’s own livelihood, learning how to rear 
children effectively – by understanding the laws of growth and learning – and 
appropriately – by understanding their role within the cosmological trajectory –, and 
learn how to live completely without neither infringing the ‘law of equal’ freedom, or 
suspend the evolutionary trajectory by practising “sympathy [that] is shown, without 
any regard to ultimate results” (Spencer 1850, 203). 
 
Spencer’s notion of ‘complete living’ as the aim of education aligns with his 
theory and concept of evolution and the crucial role that allowing free movement 
and competition between individuals during the necessary period of mal-adaptation 
inherits therein. Free striving for happiness of all individuals, only limited by the law 
of equal freedom, in Spencer’s theory of evolution, makes progress not only likely, 
but a matter of natural law. Conformable to this law, the movement causing the 
social organism to restructure, would cease gradually and eventually result in social 
equilibrium. This equilibrium – which functionally comes about through the natural 
“weeding out” (Spencer 1850, 203) of the weak, allowing human nature increasingly 
being improved by the increased propagation by the more desirable – manifests in 
the ideal adaptation of human nature to the structure of society. 
 
3.4 Key themes of Spencer’s approach to education 
 
In this chapter I have analysed the evolutionary foundation in Spencer’s 
educational theory based on the analytic framework developed in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. In concluding this chapter, I summarise the findings of this chapter regarding 
these theoretical connections made and discuss the contribution of Spencer’s 
perspective to educational theory. 
 
3.4.1 The ‘ultimate man’ and the impossibility education 
 
Spencer’s evolutionary educational theory can be characterised by its triadic 
connection of Spencer’s concept of evolution, the normative and moral assumptions 
he derives from that concept, and the concomitant location of education within 
evolution: Spencer constructs his naturalistic moral philosophy as a direct derivate 
of his scientific concept and theory of evolution. He then locates the purpose and 
aim of education as a social practice is functionally within his moral philosophy. The 
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way Spencer uses his evolutionism to naturalise his moral philosophy, and to 
develop his educational theory is interesting as it shows us one distinct way of 
evolutionary concepts influencing educational theorising. 
 
From his conception of evolution as a process guided by biological laws of 
growth and inheritance, Spencer derived a normative account of what 'natural' 
society looks like and how human nature constituting this society manifests. He 
used his normative account of the ‘natural’ for a general critique of the ‘unnatural’ 
socio-political apparatus that forms an 'unnatural', artificial human environments. 
According to Spencer (1889), as individuals "find [their] place in the societal order 
and in that give in to its rule" (26), they are adapting to this artificial environment. 
This causes a halt in the natural progressive trajectory. 
 
Informed by this critique of contemporary national education, Spencer 
developed an account of education as a social practice that complies with his vision 
of evolutionary progress. For Spencer, national education, instead of seeking to 
reproduce artificial culture by integration the young generation into the socio-cultural 
reality they growth up in, shall ensure that a period of genetic transformation – in the 
form of temporary re-barbarization in ruthless competition of individuals – is possible 
(Spencer 1850, 172). The role of educational interaction, therein, is to morally ‘form’ 
the younger generation according to Spencer’s utilitarian morality, which is aligned 
with the wider evolutionary trajectory towards societal equilibrium. 
 
Spencer deemed any kind of positive educational intervention futile. For 
Spencer (1850), the purpose of education was non-interference. Trying to take 
influence on the biological processes underlying the unfolding progressive trajectory 
of society is ineffective, and ultimately harmful as it disregards the law-guided 
evolutionary trajectory: “Reforming men’s conduct without reforming their natures is 
impossible; and to expect that their natures may be reformed, otherwise than by the 
forces which are slowly civilizing us, is visionary.” (172) The central role that 
Spencer assigned to Lamarckian inheritance and the law-like conception of the 
evolutionary process present a key problem in a Spencerian educational theory. 
Because he located the change-effective mechanisms on the level of biological 
evolution, education’s role is reduced to the maintenance of these closed 
processes. 
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The aim of education for Spencer, following this chapter’s analysis, is the 
formation of the individual according to the law of equal freedom. Spencer’s law of 
equal freedom is the result of the synthesis of Spencer’s teleological evolutionism 
with a utilitarian moral philosophy describing everyone’s right to strive for happiness 
only limited by the other’s rights to do the same. If the law of equal freedom is 
upheld, the evolutionary laws of progress can proceed freely and, over the 
generations, lead to the moulding of human nature into a form that allows for 
societal restructuring to cease in equilibrium. At the heart of this progress is the 
‘weeding out’ of the weak, which due to Lamarckian inheritance leads to the gradual 
overall improvement of humankind. Within that process, as I see it, education takes 
the role of short-term preparation, and long-term attainment of the ‘right kind’ of 
human nature, for the ‘right kind’ of society. In contrast to other utilitarian thinkers, 
arguably due to the teleological evolutionism he used to frame it, Spencer thought of 
this human nature as fixed. Spencer writes on that fixed shape of the ideal human 
nature in connection to the ‘ultimate man’: 
 
The ultimate man will be one whose private requirements coincide 
with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in 
spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the 
functions of a social unit; and yet is only enabled so to fulfil his 
own nature by all other doing the like. (Spencer 1850, 256) 
 
Spencer’s idea of ‘the ultimate man’, I argue, can be associated with the idea 
of the ‘educated man’. Putting the gendered language aside, the idea of the 
‘ultimate man’ describes human existence after the end of evolution. The ‘ultimate 
man’ is fully compliant with a utilitarian morality and, thus, does not require any 
further adaptation. The ‘ultimate man’, therein, is also, in a sense, the ‘educated 
man’: He does not need any further moral education towards that compliance as he 
has been fully integrated into the structures of societal equilibrium. 
 
At the same time, the ‘ultimate man’, is not directly a result of education. 
Education can – by natural law – not influence the formation of the ‘ultimate man’, 
as the ‘ultimate man’, in Spencer, is the product of biological inheritance over many 
generations. ‘He’ cannot be shaped by educational efforts. Education, I thus argue, 
on Spencer’s view only has a preparatory and preventative role. While it is a 
practice with crucial significance on an evolutionary/cosmological scale by ensuring 
the undisturbed unfolding of the evolutionary trajectory toward equilibrium, 
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education does not have any objectives concerning the individual’s life in its own 
right. The formation of the individual in the sense of the law of equal freedom is 
instrumental to the construction of the conditions necessary for the biological 
process of selection to occur. 
 
3.4.2 A Spencerian theory of education? 
 
I argue that Spencer's interest in education is founded in his broader quest to 
formulate a naturalistic ideology of progress. In Spencer’s philosophy, education – 
as a societal practice manifesting both in the context of the family and the state – 
takes the role of maintaining the law of equal freedom that allows societal structures 
to move freely, and eventually substantiate in equilibrium. Due to the Lamarckian 
underpinnings in Spencer’s thinking, and the lawful concept of evolution, education, 
had no influence on the development of individuals or society. The aim of education 
is to ensure the conditions of a ‘natural order’ by adapting the young generation to 
the status quo in society, as well as morally educating them to not interfere with the 
law of equal freedom. Although merely passive, education is in direct servitude to 
the evolutionary progressive trajectory by allowing it to run its natural evolutionary 
course. 
 
There are several issues with Spencer’s educational theory. First of all, 
because of the reductionist ontology, and the concomitant bottom-up epistemology, 
it is unclear whether Spencer’s educational theory is ‘truly educational’, or whether 
the perspective on education that it provides is in fact ‘alien’ and therefore, 
educationally speaking, useless. At the heart of this issue is the vast epistemological 
expectation that Spencer ties to his evolutionism – he sought to provide a theory of 
everything that can be summarised in "the most abstract conception, to which 
science is ever slowly approaching, [...] that merges into the inconceivable or 
unthinkable, by the dropping of all concrete elements of thought." (Spencer 1892c, 
104). This breadth comes at the price of considerable generalness. As Silberman 
(2004) points out, "Spencer's evolutionary naturalism overreaches" (104) leaving no 
space for culture, diversity or contingency. By naturalising the whole educational 
process in this manner and neglecting a functional notion of culture, Spencer did not 
leave any space for education as a cultural process (Silberman 2004, 108). 
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Second of all, Spencer’s evolutionary perspective on education lacks an 
educational subject. Spencer’s take on the subject and its role within the societal 
organism is ambiguous. At times, he indeed emphasises that "society exists for the 
benefit of its member, not its members for the benefit of society." (Spencer 1876, 
119) However, in his later writings, Spencer articulates: 
 
 
We are met by a fact which forbids us thus to put in the 
foreground the welfares of citizens, individually considered, and 
requires us to put in the foreground the welfare of the society as 
a whole. The life of the social organism must, as an end, rank 
above the lives of its units. (Spencer 1893b, 133) 
 
This quote illustrates the important impact of utilitarianism on Spencer’s 
thinking; the subject is defined exclusively regarding the function it inherits within the 
social organism. From an educational standpoint, this dissolved subject is a 
problem. It leaves the question of the nature of pedagogical relationships between 
teachers and learners unresolved; in a sense, they are entirely irrelevant to 
Spencer’s notion of education. While Spencer focuses on the idea of the 
evolutionary trajectory towards societal equilibrium, he leaves pedagogical practices 
with immediate of long-term educational objectives for a learner unspecified; any 
immediate educational objectives are always oriented toward something outside of 
the individual’s lifetime and pedagogical practices are rendered invisible. 
 
The formation of the individual according to the moral and social standards 
of the ideal society – which, in Spencer is a society following the utilitarian law of 
equal freedom – is instrumental to the overarching societal aim. Consequently, the 
educational subject dissolves leaving no basis for a pedagogic relationship. This has 
profound consequences for pedagogic responsibility. Spencer writes: 
 
After home education has ceased, and […] the youth is entering 
upon the business of life idles away his time and fulfils slowly and 
unskilfully the duties entrusted to him, there by-and-bye follows 
the natural penalty: he is discharged, and left to suffer for a while 
the evils of relative poverty. (Spencer 1889, 176) 
 
I argue that what we see here is the direct implication of Spencer’s dissolution of the 
individual within societal purposes. Due to Spencer’s evolutionary informed 
omission of an educational subject, combined with the cosmological purpose of 
education – which is, as worked out in this chapter, ‘equipping for battle’, and 
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‘maintaining an even battlefield’ – no responsibility for the learner’s success or even 
well-being exists. Responsibility exists only for the evolutionary principles to be 
respected and enabled. 
 
A third issue is that in Spencer’s conception of education as mere adaptation 
and acceptance of the natural order, individual agency on a societal level becomes 
not only unfathomable, but also undesirable. Compliance with the status quo 
becomes part of Spencer’s notion of progress itself. This holds a strong inherent 
conservative potential. Adapting to societal demands by learning ‘useful’ skills to 
participate in society is worthwhile and undoubtedly contributes to a good life. 
However, from a critical humanist standpoint, this notion of education driven by 
economic demand seems all too familiar as it touches upon the issue of the broader 
aims of education and the independence of educational institutions from economic 
and political agendas. Spencer’s concept and theory of education provide no 
grounds for sheltering educational institutions against such instrumentalising 
tendencies, which puts them on shaky ethical territory. As Eddy (1969) points out, 
evolutionary theory and educational theory share the common characteristic of 
being neutral in principle, which makes their potentiality for ideological charging an 
inherent issue. Muhri, in an attempt to detach Spencer’s theory from the Social 
Darwinist legacy claims: 
 
It would not be misguided to think of Spencer as an outstanding 
pioneer of modern educational theory. However, after he was 
increasingly associated with social Darwinist ideology […] not 
only himself, but also his fruitful and educationally not fully 
exhausted evolutionary theory faded into obscurity. (Muhri 1991, 
309) 
 
Muhri implies that Spencer was unjustifiably associated with social Darwinist 
idea in retrospect. Based on what we learned about his evolutionism in this chapter, 





Due to the underlying utilitarian morality, the epistemological nature, the lack 
of any notion of contingency, openness, or diversity, and the absence of a subject 
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that Spencer’s evolutionism inherits, I conclude that Spencer fails to provide a 
desirable framework for educational theorising. Based on the understanding of 
Spencer’s evolutionism developed in this chapter, and the analysis of how it 
translates into his educational thought, I argue, that in its application to the 
educational context, Spencer’s evolutionary epistemology fails to provide a useful 
account of education – both regarding practice, and the philosophy of education. 
The severe lack of intricacy and openness, combined with the absence of any 
functional concept of culture inherent to his overreaching naturalism, means that it 
must fail to grasp the complexity of educational practice. 
 
Because Spencer denies education any transformative power for either 
individual or society, in his works, education is reduced to the passive preparation of 
predefined conditions. Spencer’s notion of moral education has the aim of 
preventing disturbances of the evolutionary movement; it does not only refute the 
efficacy of educational practice in influencing said evolutionary trajectory – which, 
following his Lamarckian evolutionism, is a process driven by adaptation and 
biological inheritance – but also it denies the possibility of transforming the learner in 
a meaningful way. In Spencer, the formation of the individual is a biological process 
that, if undisturbed, unfolds naturally. Education does not have any direct impact in 
the individual’s formation, which cannot be accelerated or influenced in its trajectory, 
but, at most, be ensured to unfold freely and undisturbedly. 
 
Spencer, instead of being concerned with the development of the learner in 
his theory of education, focuses on the disabling of the individual’s learning- 
transformation, which he fears would hamper natural selection. While, seemingly, in 
his concept of ‘complete living’ an educational objective emerges, in the light of the 
evolutionary framing of his concept of education, ‘complete living’ transpires as a 
concept not concerned with the individual learner, or even the broader society the 
learner moves in. Rather, ‘complete living’ finds its purpose in preparing free 
competition, and thus enabling the biological process of natural selection to work as 
efficiently as possible. 
 
Connected to Spencer’s instrumental concept of education is the lack of an 
educational subject in Spencer’s evolutionary educational theory. Spencer leaves 
the pedagogical relationship utterly undefined. By instrumentalising educational 
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objectives for his utopian vision of the ‘ultimate man’ brought about by a biological 
process ‘purifying’ society, Spencer does not only sacrifice any notion of culture and 
human agency, but also human dignity by degrading individuals into organs with 
their worth defines regarding the function they inherit within the organism. Spencer’s 
idea of the ‘ultimate man’ further underlines the futility of education; education is 
nothing more than preventing interferences with a utilitarian hedonistic morality 
fostering individualism and ruthless competition. Human nature can only improve 
through physical inheritance and the ‘ultimate man’ is a product of that inheritance. 
Education ceases to be necessary at this stage of human phylogeny because the 
evolutionary movement has ceased and, therein, made further adaptation 
unnecessary. Educational formation, however, in Spencer, has nothing to do with 
the end of education, with the formation of the ‘ultimate man’; the end of education 
is biologically determined. 
 
In the following chapter, Spencer’s approach will be contrasted with Dewey’s 
educational philosophy. Dewey, just like Spencer, applied an evolutionary 
framework to questions of human nature, development, and the nature of learning 
and education. In both their approaches, the evolutionary concept of adaptation 
takes a crucial role informing their perspectives on the meaning and role of 
education for the development of the individual and social evolution. Adaptation, 
however, is also the concept that sets these two thinkers most apart. Dewey, as I 
will argue, expands Spencer’s conservative, one-sided concept of adaptation with 
his notion of growth, focusing on the open-endedness of development and individual 
agency in the process of sociocultural evolution. This difference yields important 
implications for how we can think of the concept of education, the aim and purpose 
of education, the relationship between education and learning, as well as the role of 
teaching in those processes. 
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In this chapter I will use the analytic framework developed in chapter 2 to 
draw out and analyse the evolutionary notions influencing Dewey’s educational 
thinking. These evolutionary foundations are still widely neglected in the educational 
discourse around Dewey, which has led to, as some have argued, the evolutionary 
underpinnings in core Deweyan concepts being “overlooked, underappreciated, or 
denied.” (Rogers 2012, 4; see also Popp 2007, Perricone 2006, Fesmire 2015). 
Specifically, I will study Dewey’s concept of growth. 
 
Growth is one of the core concepts of Dewey’s educational philosophy 
(Stitzlein 2017; Popp 2007). Growth is also, as I will argue in this chapter, 
fundamentally Darwinian and therein of particular interest for this study (Nardo 
2018). I argue that growth captures Dewey’s account of human adaptation and 
embodies the way he came to think of the relationship between the subject and 
her/his environment based on a Darwinian worldview embracing contingency, anti- 
dualism and open-endedness. With his concept of growth, I contend, Dewey sought 
to expand the way evolutionary frameworks, and the concept of adaptation in 
particular, can be used to think about human development, sociocultural evolution, 
and education in particular. Just like in Spencer’s approach, education as a social 
practice facilitating adaptation through the integration of the younger generation into 
a certain societal reality – or, to be more precise, an imagined ideal social reality in 
the case of Spencer – received a key role in Dewey’s philosophy. While for 
Spencer, however, ‘adaptation’ described the subject’s adjustment to predefined 
externalities, Dewey understood adaptation to be more complex, involving the 
individual’s ‘adaptation to’ the environment as well as the individual’s ‘adaptation of’ 
her/his surroundings. This more intricate understanding of adaptation also enriches 
Dewey’s concept of education which, in growth, describes the individual’s becoming 
in formal education, as well as in everyday experiences and interaction. 
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In this chapter I aim to draw out the essential evolutionary quality of Dewey’s 
particular evolutionary concept of education. This analysis shall enlighten the 
epistemological mechanisms of the synthesis of evolutionary concepts and 
educational theory and, therein, make an important contribution to this thesis’ aim to 
enhance our understanding of the workings of evolutionary theorising in the context 
of education. First, I situate Dewey’s evolutionary thinking historically and 
philosophically. I will argue therein that Dewey’s opposition to Spencer is a 
frequently forgotten factor in the development of Dewey’s evolutionary thought, and 
his turn away from Hegel towards Darwinism. After having explored what Dewey 
was ‘up against’ with his concept of growth, I will discuss the theoretical foundations 
of growth, namely a Darwinian worldview, and, specifically, the way William James 
applied Darwinism to his theory of mind. Second, I unpack the nature of Dewey’s 
concept of education as growth. Therein, I focus on the meaning of education in the 
context of individual growth, introducing Dewey’s notion of educative experiences 
and their social dimension. Then I will lead over to the ways in which different 
elements of Dewey’s philosophy of education – such as educative experiences and 
habit reconstruction – connects individual development with the progress of society, 
and, shed particular focus on the evolutionary underpinnings of that connection. 
Third, in terminating this chapter I discuss the pedagogical dimension of education 
understood as growth. This will entail an examination of what follows from Dewey’s 
understanding of growth for the pedagogical construction of educational 
environments as well as a discussion of the role of the teacher within the process of 
growth. 
 
4.2 Dewey’s evolutionism 
 
In this first part of the chapter I will contextualise Dewey’s evolutionism by 
discussing the major intellectual traditions that informed the integration of Darwinism 
into his philosophy, and the conceptualisation of growth in particular. First, I will talk 
about Dewey’s turn away from Hegel and his rejection of Spencer. Adding on to 
these areas of criticism that set the stage for the construction of Dewey’s 
philosophy, secondly, I will talk about how Darwinism and James’s pragmatism 
influenced the formation of his concept of growth. 
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4.2.1 The Hegelian deposit in Dewey’s thinking 
 
It is not this thesis’ aim to provide a comprehensive account of the detailed 
nature of Hegelian traces in Dewey’s work, or even to display the wide array of 
different positions within that discourse. What is of interest here, are some of the 
particular points in Hegel’s philosophy that Dewey took issue with and that informed 
his shift away from Hegel, towards Darwinism. 
 
It is a matter of broad agreement that Hegel influenced Dewey’s thinking 
profoundly. In his early years as a scholar, Dewey studied Hegel intensively. In that 
period, Dewey adopted a set of Hegelian ideas that would remain of fundamental 
significance in Dewey’s thought, even after he “drifted away from Hegelianism” 
(Dewey 1930/2008, 155) later in his intellectual biography. Dewey (1930/2008) 
emphasises “that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my 
thinking.” (155) This deposit is visible in the uncompromising focus on process and 
“dialectical change and development” (Greene 1988, 42) that Dewey derived from 
his studies of Hegel and later incorporated in his concept of growth (Renault 2016, 
225). Furthermore, according to Metz (1961, 181) and Good (2008, 579), Dewey’s 
fundamental rejection of Cartesian duality – which presents another central pillar of 
growth – can be traced back to his studies of Hegel. What Dewey disagreed with in 
Hegel, was the “perfect telos to development” (Reich et al 2016, 1001) that Hegel 
presupposed and the way this notion of development reduced development to an 
internal process of unfolding, rather than through interaction. For Hegel, 
development is the “movement of Spirit to the Absolute end of history” (Reich et al 
2016, 1002). Dewey opposed to this teleological notion of development. 
 
Dewey’s shift away from Hegel has been associated with a number of reasons, 
namely the historical context of WWI and his associated turn away from German 
philosophy (Renault 2016), and also his increasing intellectual involvement of 
Dewey with James’s pragmatism (Hickmann 2008). The factor I want to explore 
more closely here, is Dewey’s shift away from Hegel in relation to his increasing turn 
towards Darwinism. The compatibility of the Hegelian deposit in Dewey’s thinking 
with his attempts to integrate Darwinian framework is a point of controversy 
(Bellmann 2007a, 16; Saito 2005, 21; Biesta 2016, 162; Garrison et al 2012). But 
even amongst Dewey scholars who assign Hegel a key, or even dominant role in 
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Dewey’s thought, Darwinism is characterised as significant influence in Dewey’s 
philosophy (Good 2008; Good&Garrison 2010). It is broadly agreed upon that 
Dewey to some extent or the other set out to "translat[e] Hegelian insights into the 
naturalistic terminology that was coming into vogue because of the influence of 
Darwinian biology and experimental psychology" (Good 2008, 578). Rorty (1979) 
argues that Dewey used a Darwinian framework in order to “construct a naturalized 
version of Hegel’s vision of history” (5). This estimation of the relationship of Dewey 
to Hegel in his later works, also resonates in Greene’s (1988, 42) reading of Dewey 
that associates Dewey’s ‘drifting away’ with the incompatibility of Hegel’s notion of 
world spirit and the concomitant idea of a cosmic order with, what Good (2008) calls 
"the challenge of Darwinian biology" (578). 
 
What transpires regarding the relationship between Dewey and Hegel is the 
narrative that Dewey employed a Darwinian framework to ‘answer’ to the lack of a 
scientific base to Hegelianism (Bellmann 2007a, 49), as well as to deconstruct some 
teleological and absolute elements in Hegel (Reich et al 2016, 1001). Looking at the 
discourse outlined above, this characterisation of the intellectual context of Dewey’s 
evolutionary thinking is doubtlessly valid and crucial. However, in this chapter, I 
want to add to this narrative that associates Dewey’s shift from “absolutism” towards 
“experimentalism” (Biesta 2016, 165) with his turn away from Hegel, by exploring 
Dewey’s opposition to Spencer. 
 
4.2.2 Dewey’s criticism of Spencer 
 
Dewey’s explicit and repeated opposition to Spencer is often lacking from 
accounts of Dewey’s evolutionary thinking (Bellmann 2007a; Dalton 2002; Popp 
2007). Greene (1988) is one of the few to point towards Spencer, without 
mentioning him by name, in her statement that Dewey found “different meanings in 
Darwinian theory than had […] the so-called Social Darwinians” (42). I want to 
reinforce this point that Greene raises by showing that Dewey opposed to virtually 
all of Spencer’s claims regarding the theory of evolution and its bearings on ethics, 
social philosophy, and education. The recurring and unequivocal opposition is a 
widely overlooked element influencing the development of Dewey’s evolutionary 
thought. This neglect has led to confusion, especially so in a recent educational 
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discourse stirred by Egan’s book Getting it Wrong from the Beginning (2002), where 
it is claimed that Dewey and Spencer are ideologically interchangeable contributors 
to the Progressive Education Era. Zebrowksi (2008) has pointed out that such a 
characterisation of the two thinkers happens in absolute disregard of their diverging 
ideas of evolution. Therefore, the focus on how Dewey’s opposition to Spencer 
informed his evolutionary thinking is a new and important contribution to the 
discourse within educational Dewey scholarship, and, in particular, to the 
understanding of the evolutionary underpinnings in Dewey’s thinking. 
 
Throughout Dewey’s works, Spencer is a recurring point of critical reference. In 
his essay The Philosophical Works of Herbert Spencer (1904/2008), Dewey delves 
into the depths of his disagreement with Spencer. In parts, the essay conveys 
Dewey’s contempt with Spencer as a scholar, which resonates in his verdict of 
Spencer’s scholarly inability stemming for “the straightforwardness of Spencer’s own 
life, and its seclusion, its remoteness, its singular immunity from all intellectual 
contagion” (Dewey 1904/2008, 196). Mainly, however, the essay is a critical review 
of Spencer’s philosophy. Dewey (1904/2008) contends that “Spencer’s system was 
a system from the very start. It was a system in conception, not merely in issue. It 
was one by the volition of its author, complete, compact, coherent” (196). He 
deemed Spencer’s evolutionary philosophy to be artificially constructed, overly 
abstract, and ultimately, from a Darwinian perspective, false (Dewey 1904/2008, 
209; 1922, 205). I will now look into Dewey’s disagreements with Spencer in more 
detail in order to clarify the differences between these thinkers’ educational 
concepts related to their diverging concepts of evolution. 
 
Spencer and Dewey were part of a specific development in intellectual history 
that contributed significantly to their opposing views on the process of evolution. On 
the verge of the so-called ‘Darwinian revolution’ (see chapter 2), Spencer was pre- 
Darwinian, Dewey, on the other hand, Darwinian. Spencer accepted the premise of 
Lamarckism suggesting the heritability of acquired characteristics from generation to 
generation. Individual conduct, on that view, is biologically effective in evolutionary 
change. Dewey, as a Darwinian, accepted the principle of natural selection as the 
basis of his own evolutionary thought (Popp 2007). In a natural selection paradigm, 
traits that the individual acquires are not heritable; evolutionary change is affected 
by adaptations only indirectly, regarding the functional advantage they grant in a 
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specific environment. This paradigmatic misalignment – between Lamarckism and 
Darwinism – set the two thinker’s concepts and theories of evolution apart 
fundamentally in terms of how they conceptualised evolution. 
 
The first point of disagreement is Spencer’s and Dewey’s opposing ideas of 
evolutionary trajectory and the related notion of progress. For Spencer, progress is 
not only a biological fact – due to the lawful nature of the evolutionary process and 
Lamarckian inheritance – but it is also a pre-defined, and, most importantly, leading 
to an attainable final state (Spencer, 1893, 31). Dewey rejected contemporary 
evolutionary theories like Spencer’s that presuppose the existence of a pre- 
determined end to the evolutionary process, fostering "ideals of a Utopian 
millennium" (Dewey 1908/2008, 57;). In Ethics (1908/2008), Dewey deconstructs 
the teleological premise of Spencer’s evolutionism and the way it translates into 
social theory and ethics. He describes Spencer’s attempts to formulate an 
evolutionary theory of ethics as “literary versions of science” and a “parody of the 
real facts” (Dewey 1908/2008, 335). Spencer used an evolutionary framework to 
conceptualise progress as a natural law and normative force in order to justify an 
idealisation of competition and laissez-faire social policy. The process of evolution, 
in Spencer, receives a certain inevitability; if undisturbed in the present, evolution is 
an unfolding process towards a final future end-state. Dewey, rather than thinking of 
evolution as a path toward attainable perfection, conceptualises evolution with 
focused on the process of perfecting itself; a back and forth between the attainable 
and unattainable: “Perfection as perfecting with no fixed ends.” (Saito 2005, 53). 
With this notion of ‘perfection as perfecting’ at the core of Dewey’s evolutionary 
thinking, the process, rather than the end state, moves to the centre of attention. On 
Dewey’s view of evolution, moral activity is not a fixed category: "The better is the 
good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good." 
(Dewey 1922/2008, 193). Thus, being situated in the Darwinian line of thought, for 
Dewey, instead of progress meaning approximation of a fixed endpoint, progress 
means the continuous enhancing of functionality and flexibility, ‘discovering the 
good’ in interacting with the environment. 
 
The second main feature of disagreement that follows from Dewey’s and 
Spencer’s diverging concepts of evolution, and the way these set up the relationship 
between the subject and her/his environment is the process of adaptation. For both 
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thinkers, adaptation is a key principle of the evolutionary process. Dewey and 
Spencer are, what Godfrey-Smith calls ‘externalists’, meaning, they accept the 
premise that the environment – to varying extent – defines the development of the 
organism (Godfrey-Smith 1996, 4). Spencer was an “extreme externalist” (Godfrey- 
Smith 1996, 45); in his conception of the evolutionary process, the environment has 
a direct, causal influence on behaviour. Adaptation, on that view, knows two 
modalities – either objectively ‘good’, or objectively ‘bad’ in relation to an all-powerful 
environment. Even though Dewey, in accordance with Spencer, thought that “life 
activities flourish and fail only in connection with changes of the environment.” 
(Dewey 1916/2008, 133), he had a highly different concept of what that meant. In 
contrast to Spencer, Dewey is, in Godfrey-Smith’s (1996) words, a “very moderate” 
(60) externalist, defining adaptation as “quite as much adaptation of the environment 
to our own activities as our activities to the environment.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 53) In 
The Quest for Certainty (1929/2008), Dewey lays out these two sides of adaptation 
that grant stability in a contingent world. First, “appeasement with those powers that 
decide our fate”, and second, “changing the world (rather than oneself) through 
practical action” (120). Notably, throughout his works, Dewey uses four terms to 
describe human adaptation: ‘adaptation’, ‘adjustment’, ‘assimilation’, and 
‘accommodation’. What remains a consistent motive, however, is the dialectic 
nature of adaptation describing both the individual’s adaptation to the environment 
and the individual’s adaptation of the environment to him- or herself. In this definition 
of adaptation lies one of the most fundamental differences between Spencer’s and 
Dewey’s evolutionary approaches. 
 
Following the significant differences in their concepts of adaptation, Dewey and 
Spencer developed opposing views on the mind, cognition, and knowledge. 
Associated with Spencer’s concept of adaptation exclusively meaning the 
adjustment of the “inner to outer relations” (Spencer 1892a, 389), is the idea of 
correspondence between mind and nature. Spencer’s correspondence-hypothesis 
stood in line with what Dewey had come to reject in contemporary American 
materialism, namely the sharpening of the Cartesian divide between mind and body, 
making the recourse into metaphysical explanation necessary (Dalton 2002; 
Fesmire 2015). Dewey notes: 
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If one starts with the assumption that mind and matter are two 
separate things, while the evidence forces one to see that they 
are connected, one has no option save to attribute the power to 
make the connection, to carry from one to the other, to one or the 
other of the two things involved. (Dewey 1925/2008, 210) 
 
What Dewey criticises here is how traditional materialists reinforced the dualism 
between the mind and ‘the world’, or matter, leading them to consequentially 
integrate a notion of inherent correspondence between mind and matter to explain 
cognitive developments as results of adaptive processes triggered by the external. 
The same is the case for Spencer, who thought of the environment as a causal 
stimulus to the organism and therein rendered nature, on Dewey’s view “teleological 
all the way through” (Dewey 1886/2008, 104). On Dewey’s assessment, Spencer, 
by breaking-up “a continuity of historical change into two separate parts” with his 
concept of evolution had to bring forth “some device by which to bring them together 
again.” (Dewey 1925/2008, 211). 
 
This act of rekindling mind and matter “at the naturalistic bent in American 
thought” (Hatfield 2001, 1) was undertaken by the psychology of behaviourism. 
Behaviourist psychologies focused on behaviour “as an objective expression of 
mind” (Hatfield 2001, 2). Mind was “understood as a linear causal sequence, with 
external sensation stimulating the inner image or idea, which in turn caused the 
motor response.” (Bredo 1998, 452) In the context of his opposition to all ‘reflex arc 
psychologies’, Dewey also came to criticise Spencer, because, as Bredo (1998) 
points out: “Any psychology that begins with entities defined independently of 
organismic activity […] is subject to his [Dewey’s] criticism.” (462) Spencer’s 
acceptance of the correspondence-hypothesis which thinks of the mind as, in 
Godfrey-Smith’s (1996) words, “a mirror of nature” (166) furnished a mechanistic 
premise in his own account of psychology and learning. For Spencer, “knowledge is, 
in a sense, simply the result of one structure imprinting on another.” (Bredo 1998, 
449) Dewey criticised how Spencer ”unconsciously assumed that scientific 
knowledge could be communicated in a ready-made form.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 230) 
He also disagreed with the normative implications of a conception of knowledge as 
‘objective’, or ‘true’ in relation to the idea of correspondence. While Dewey indeed 
agreed with the behaviourist notion that behaviour is an expression of the mind, he 
rejected the mechanistic underpinnings of this first-generation behaviourism that 
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rendered the relationship between mind and behaviour teleological. For Dewey, 
purpose arrives from the need of the organism to adapt; mind, thus, had to be 
integrated into an explanation of human evolution (Hatfield 2001, 12). Dewey thus 
opposed to a psychology based on the idea of a “stimulus-response ‘reflex’” (Bredo 
1998, 452) and sought to break this causal chain with the notion of purpose. Dewey 
thought of purpose in evolutionary terms. 
 
For Spencer, evolution was “largely a mindless process” (Bredo 1998, 450) 
assuming an unfolding the trajectory without the interjection of an intelligent agent. 
For Dewey, in contrast, “the method of intelligence in discovering and utilizing new 
methods, tools, and resources” (Dewey 1909/2008, 336), forms the heart of human 
evolution and adaptation. While adapting, the organism actively transforms its 
environment; thoughts are instruments to action in a complex environment, breaking 
up the chain between environmental stimuli and individual response with the 
element of intelligent selection: “Purely external direction is impossible. The 
environment can at most supply stimuli to call out responses. These responses 
proceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 
31) Humans, in Dewey, have evolved the intellectual capacity to “direct our activities 
with foresight and to plan according to ends-in-view, or purposes of which we are 
aware." (Dewey 1933/2008, 125) The mind, therein, is an agent of adaptation in this 
ongoing process as it allows “the adult [to use] his powers to transform his 
environment, thereby occasioning new stimuli which redirect his powers and keep 
them developing. Ignoring this fact means arrested development, a passive 
accommodation.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 56). The mind functions not only as a 
connecting instance between the individual and the environment, but is a stimulus 
itself: "The physical process awakens the mind, it incites it to action; the mind, 
thereupon, spontaneously and by its own laws develops from itself a sensation." 
(Dewey 1886/2008, 107) The body functions as a stimulus for the self-developing 
activity of the mind, which in consequence transcends it (Dewey 1898/2008, 45f.). 
“Given this goal-directed view of behaviour, stimulus and response are mutually 
constituted”, Bredo (1998, 454) points out. In contrast to a behaviourist account of 
‘stimulus’, in Dewey, stimuli are not merely external events ‘entering’ the mind, but 
rather “the product of an act of perception” (Bredo 1998, 454). The conception of the 
mind as the heart of the subject’s relating with her/his environment breaks up the 
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Cartesian dualism, while at the same time assigning agency to the individual outside 
of mere adaptation understood as aligning with the environment. Rather than being 
forced to follow our first impulse, we are able to bring it “into connection with other 
possible tendencies to action so that a more comprehensive and coherent plan of 
activity is formed.” (Dewey 1938/2008, 41) This ability is, what allows us to act 
intelligently, select stimuli, and not based on trial and error alone – it is at the basis 
of our ability to learn, and, ultimately, our ability to be educated. 
 
4.2.3 Dewey’s integration of Darwinism 
 
I have argued above that Darwinism was a significant contribution to 
Dewey’s deconstruction – and reconstruction – of Hegel. Yet, the influence of 
Darwin on Dewey’s philosophy, and whether his adoption of Darwin was in fact 
‘Darwinian’ at all, are matters of ongoing disagreement in Dewey scholarship. 
Fesmire (2015), Dalton (2002) and Popp (2007) present comprehensive Darwinian 
readings of Dewey’s thought. They consider Darwinism to have been of 
fundamental importance for the development of Dewey’s thinking. Similarly, with 
specific regards to Dewey’s concept of adaptation, Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues 
that “Dewey was (as far as I can tell) a straightforward Darwinian.” (114) 
 
In contrast, while Saito (2005), Noddings (1998), and Biesta (2016) 
acknowledge Dewey’s interest in Darwin, they put up for question the compatibility 
of the ‘Hegelian deposit’ in Dewey’s thinking with his attempt to integrate Darwin. A 
key point of controversy regarding Hegel and Dewey is the compatibility of idealistic 
Hegelian elements in Dewey’s thinking with Dewey’s Darwinian conceptualisation of 
ethics, psychology, and society (Bellmann 2007a, 16; Saito 2005, 21; Biesta 2016, 
162; Garrison et al 2012). 
 
Throughout his works, Dewey uses Darwinism to scientifically re-enforce 
what he already thought to be true from reading Hegel, namely the focus on process 
rather than telos. In The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy (1910a/2008) he 
writes: "Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, 
the greatest percipient of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one 
effected by the scientific revolution that had found its climax in the Origins of 
Species." (14) What Dewey verbalises here is the profound ideological impact that 
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Darwin yielded on philosophical inquiry and the sciences – a point view, which he 
had begun to develop even earlier on in his works: 
 
The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having 
conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, 
and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals 
and life. (Dewey 1910a/2008, 8) 
 
Darwinism, it seems, for Dewey, was the scientific confirmation for a 
philosophy of transition; it was the fundamental underpinning for his philosophy of 
growth. The most central Darwinian concept that informed Dewey’s conception of 
growth was natural selection and the way it informed Dewey’s notion of adaptation. 
 
‘Natural selection’ is the core premise of Darwinian evolution (see chapter 2). 
It replaces the ‘mechanistic metaphysics’ of pre-Darwinian, teleological, lawful 
evolutionary theories in the sense of Spencer, with a functional principle that 
explains the process, yet leaves its trajectory non-predetermined. ‘Natural selection’ 
is the process of certain traits in an evolutionary entity (genes, subjects, groups, 
some even think ideas, or ‘memes’) being negatively selected, and others 
contributing to the entity’s fitness in a way that leads to its ability to survive and 
procreate. What trait is negatively selected, and what trait is relevant for selection in 
the first place, is dependent on the fitness it grants the evolutionary entity in a 
specific environment. What natural selection adds to Dewey’s philosophy, is a 
conception of the evolutionary process as contingent, and driven by functionality. I 
will now begin to explain what I mean by ‘functionality’ in the context of Dewey’s 
idea of social evolution and further expand on it in the context of Dewey’s integration 
of James’s theory of mind and consciousness. 
 
As discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis, in Spencer’s lawful account 
of evolution, there is no account of individual agency. For Spencer, evolution is 
genetic, rather than cultural; it is a matter pre-determined unfolding towards a fixed 
end-point. This is also the case for Spencer’s theory of the evolution of society and 
morality. He assumed that ideal morality was objective and an attainable state that 
would naturally emerge in social evolution. In contrast, on Dewey’s Darwinian 
perspective, social evolution is contingent. This means that its trajectory is non- 
predetermined and dependent on ‘what works’. What is functional, therein, is 
88  
defined within an ever-changing environment. Social evolution is the ongoing 
process of negotiating the value, or ‘functionality’ of activities in a societal context. 
Instead of a movement towards “one end and law” (Dewey 1891/2008, 57), growth 
is the contingent result of “studying the conditions and effects of the changing 
situations in which men actually live” (Dewey 1891/2008, 57) and to intelligently deal 
with these conditions in a social context. Growth is, therein, as Dewey points out, “a 
higher value and ideal than is sheer attainment.” (Dewey 1934/2008, 39). Growth is 
the ongoing process of adapting to a contingent environment that fosters the 
individual’s adaptability. Because it is driven by functionality rather than telos or 
‘attainment’, it grants openness to react to contingency. 
 
Growth incorporates an a-teleological conception of evolution that Dewey 
derives from the Darwinian principle of natural selection. Worth mentioning here is 
Popp’s (2007) work on growth and its relatedness to Darwinian adaptation. While I 
agree with Popp on the way that Darwinian adaptation has informed growth’s open- 
ended nature, I disagree with the way he connects growth to natural selection. Popp 
(2007) argues that natural selection has been replaced by Dewey’s with conscious 
selection. I, in contrast, understand natural selection to be fully compatible with 
Dewey’s notion of growth, particularly if we assume a pluralistic explanatory 
framework with a widened account of evolutionary mechanisms (Nardo 2018). I 
argue that the Darwinian principle of natural selection provided Dewey with an 
understanding of evolution as a contingent, continuous, and open-ended process. 
Dewey had a pluralistic notion of natural selection. He emphasised: “The belief that 
natural selection has ceased to operate rests upon the assumption that there is only 
one form of such selection […]. There is not only the trial by death, but there is the 
trial by the success or failure of special acts” (Dewey 1898/2008, 51). Dewey 
thought that natural selection includes other forms of selection that cannot be 
captured by a narrow understanding of natural selection as a matter of life or death. 
For Dewey, in the case of humans, natural selection manifests in conscious 
intelligent selection. Darwinism, however, was not sufficient to conceptualise 
Dewey’s notion of intelligent conscious selection. While Darwinism provided him 
with the premise of functionality and dialectic adaptation at the core of the subject’s 
being-in-the-world, it was James’s pragmatics that allowed him to conceptualise a 
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conscious, intelligent actor organising re-adaptation in a contingent environment 
(Bredo 1998, 455). 
 
4.2.4 Dewey’s use of James’s pragmatism 
 
As hinted at above, James’s pragmatism is considered to have had a major 
impact on the formation of Dewey’s philosophy. James was a convinced Darwinist 
himself, seeking to integrate core Darwinian notions, such as selection and 
adaptation in his philosophy (Margolis 2002, 119). Based on the dynamic and non- 
dualistic worldview that the evolutionary principle furnished, James developed an 
evolutionary psychology that provided a set of new perspectives on epistemological 
issues surrounding objectivity, object-subject correspondence and learning that 
yielded important influence on Dewey’s thinking. The influence of James on Dewey, 
therefore, is, in a sense, partially Darwinian. 
 
Darwinism furnished the groundwork for a scientific alternative to a dualistic 
perception of “mind and world […] as two independent realms of existence having 
certain points of contact with each other.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 287). Based on his 
understanding of evolution as contingent and driven by functionality and intelligent 
conscious selection, Dewey developed his concept of adaptation as a dialectic 
relationship between the subject and the world, based on the need for “continuous 
reconstruction” (Popp 2007, 39). On that view, functionality is not merely a matter of 
the environment selecting, but also of the organism, who selects intelligently: In a 
“process of constant growth, adjustment to new relations” (Dewey 1886/2008, 112) 
the organism forms purposeful action in relation to the demands of the environment 
as well as its own ends-in-view. What matters is not the approximation of some 
external objective or telos, but the functionality of activities in regard to what can be, 
and wants to be, achieved in the specific environmental context. Individuals are not 
just blindly adapting themselves to whatever comes their way, but rather follow a 
“selective bias in interactions with environing things” (Dewey 1925/2008, 196). 
Dewey (1908/2008) states: “In the end, men do what they can do. They refrain from 
doing what they cannot do. They do what their own specific powers in conjunction 
with the limitations and resources of the environment permit” (49). This process of 
intelligently mediating the individual’s ‘specific powers’ and the environmental 
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constraints, is, what growth as a process of dialectic adaptation, meaning both 
passive assimilation and active accommodation, describes. 
 
With growth, Dewey developed a concept to capture this contingent process 
and rekindle ‘mind and world’. James’s pragmatism was probably the most 
significant theoretical framework for Dewey in constructing growth. Most 
fundamentally, James’s pragmatism supported Dewey in his rejection of speculative 
metaphysics (Barnes-Holmes 2005, 1883). The prevalent Platonian tradition in 
Western philosophy to speculate about “the essential being of all things” (Brinkmann 
2013, 21) was incompatible with an anti-essentialist Darwinian worldview that was 
focused on contingent change, rather than on inevitable necessities and ultimate 
cosmological purposes. In his analysis of Social Darwinist ideology in American 
thought, Hofstadter notes: "Spencerianism had been the philosophy of inevitability; 
Pragmatism became the philosophy of possibility." (Hofstadter 1958, 123) 
Pragmatism, following a Darwinian worldview, provided a sort of ‘lower-level’ 
metaphysics functioning as an antidote to the absolute metaphysics: “Pragmatism 
thus has a metaphysical implication [that] takes us to the conception of a universe 
whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James’ term, ‘in the 
making,’ ‘in the process of becoming,’ of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.” 
(Dewey 1925/2008, 14) Dewey made these “process metaphysics”, as Brinkmann 
(2013, 45) calls them, describing the state of the world as an unceasing and 
contingent process, the foundation for growth. 
 
In constructing growth, Dewey (1920/2008) used James’s theory of mind, 
namely his notion of “stream of consciousness” (211) and his “pragmatic theory of 
truth” (220), to conceptually furnish growth understood as the dialectic adaptive 
process. For Dewey, the mind is at the heart of growth. With reference to these 
‘pragmatic metaphysics’, Dewey (1920/2008) rejected the absolutist ontology of 
“empiricism which takes knowledge to be completely passive and external” (215). In 
the same text, he notes: “James is not concerned with knowledge as a copy of the 
original thing, but with its usefulness as an instrument.” (218) Following the 
“pragmatic theory of truth” (Dewey 1920/2008, 220) knowledge is an adaptive 
activity, rather than the result of a process of the external reality ‘imprinting’ on the 
mind. Knowledge, following James, is what connects stimulus and response, it is 
what allows the subject to intelligently mediate - or, intelligently select – stimuli to 
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action. In The Principles of Psychology James writes: “The mental life seems to 
intervene between impressions made from without upon the body, and reactions of 
the body upon the outer world again.” (James 1890/1919, 6). The mind, on that 
view, and the knowledge it constructs, is what connects the subject and the world. 
The mind is, what defines human adaptation. This connection that the mind offer, 
goes both ways, effecting change in the subject as well as the environment. 
 
Dewey integrated James’s theory of truth and his notion of knowledge into his 
concept of growth. He writes: 
 
We can gain knowledge only by controlling the stimulus on the 
one hand, and by selecting our response on the other. The 
importance of knowledge conceived thus as a mediating process 
lies in the fact that it ‘slows down’ both the stimulus and the 
response, so that the organism can take time to plan. (Dewey 
1920/2008, 210) 
 
What Dewey describes here, is the process of intelligent conscious selection. 
As discussed above, intelligent conscious selection, in accordance with Darwinian 
natural selection, underlies the principle of functionality. Knowledge, on James’s 
view, is not concerned with objective truth, but with functionality. Dewey uses 
James’s theory of truth and his concept of knowledge to describe the way in which 
the mind is involved in the process of dialectic adaptation. 
 
4.2.5 Key themes of Dewey’s evolutionary thinking 
 
I have argued that Dewey’s turn away from Hegel and his criticism of Spencer’s 
evolutionism formed the foundation of Dewey’s evolutionary approach. Dewey’s 
relationship to Hegel, therein, was both positive and negative: While some persisting 
ideas in Dewey’s philosophy – like the focus on process (Renault 2016, 225), 
dialectic change (Greene 1988, 42), and the rejection of Cartesian duality (Metz 
1961, 181; Good 2008, 579) – are to be indebted to Hegel, others – namely the 
absolutist trajectory (Biesta 2016, 165) and the notion of world spirit (Greene 1988, 
42) – are key elements of what Dewey sought to critically address with his own 
philosophy (Reich et al 2016, 997). 
 
Within this narrative that positions Dewey’s Darwinism in contrast to what he 
came to reject in contemporary Hegelianism, growth is a key point of reference. 
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Saito (2005), for example, highlights growth, specifically, as a key component of this 
Darwinian shift away from Hegelianism in Dewey’s thinking: “Unlike his former 
concept of self-realization directed toward a final end-point, Hegel’s Absolute, 
growth came to be seen later as a contingent and endlessly evolving natural 
process.” (5) Similarly, Greene (1988) notes that Dewey “found in the very notion of 
natural evolution suggestions for a view of open-ended development enhanced by 
our conception of dialectical interchange that would overcome old dualisms and 
discontinuities.” (42) 
 
Less equivocal than his relationship to Hegel is Dewey’s position on Spencer. 
Dewey’s criticism of Spencer’s evolutionary ideas of mind, ethics, and conduct can 
be bundled in the fundamental, paradigmatic disagreements that divide the thinkers 
on the matter of the ontology of evolution. For Spencer, evolution is based on 
natural laws and, if visualised, takes on the shape of an upwards leading trajectory 
with a pre-determined end-point. Dewey disagreed with Spencer’s concept of 
evolution, namely, his ideas of how the evolutionary process works, and, even more 
far reaching, what kind of process evolution is in the first place. While for Spencer 
evolution is a process leading towards an end-point, in Dewey, evolution is an 
ateleological process. For Dewey, Spencer’s ideas were false, in fundamental 
disagreement with Darwinism, and dangerous as they fostered Social Darwinist 
perspectives on individuals and their position in a laissez-faire social environment 
focused on competition (Reich et al 2016, 1008). I have argued above that Dewey’s 
criticism of Spencer’s evolutionism has been underestimated as a factor of influence 
for Dewey’s evolutionary thinking. In my reading, it was not merely Dewey’s 
grappling with Hegel, but also his opposition to Spencer that significantly informed 
Dewey’s evolutionary thinking, and, in particular, Dewey’s concept of growth. 
 
To construct growth as an alternative to these areas of criticism, Dewey relied 
on a Darwinian worldview and James’s pragmatist theory of mind (Brinkmann 2013, 
19; Biesta 2016, 161). Dewey combined these intellectual pillars to rethink the mind 
and body, organism and environment, as well as individual and society as part of 
one “long process of past growth” (Dewey 1932/2008, 31). From the Darwinian 
principle of natural selection, Dewey derived the premise of functionality that he 
used to conceptualise growth. He combined said premise of functionality with 
James’s idea of the mind as an intelligent mediator between the mind and the world 
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(Barnes-Holmes 2005, 1884). As a result, mind, in Dewey, is at the core of human 
evolution and adaptation. Dualistic role-assignment of stimulus/response, and even 
native/acquired, on that view, become futile as they are all entangled functionally 
and historically. With growth, Dewey provided an alternative to Spencer’s neglect of 
“the role played by organic transformation of the world.” (Godfrey-Smith 1996, 71) 
and scientifically ‘translated’ what he retained from Hegel. 
 
4.3 Dewey’s educational theory 
 
In the first part of this chapter, Dewey’s evolutionary thinking, and in particular 
his notion of growth have been situated within the intellectual context of his time. It 
transpired from that contextualisation how in the light of the ‘Darwinian revolution’ 
Dewey deconstructed the absolutist and teleological Hegelian elements in his 
thought and positioned himself in opposition to Spencer. Within that opposition, 
Dewey came to criticise Spencer’s theory of evolution virtually in its entirety. Core 
element of his critique was the “false idea of growth or development” that Spencer 
propagated on Dewey’s (1918/2008) view, namely, “that it is a movement toward a 
fixed goal.” (55) On that view, according to Dewey (1886/2008) "the whole complex 
structure of man […] was virtually contained in the germ" (277). “Growth”, Dewey 
(1886/2008) adds critically, “was not the addition of anything from without, but 
simply the unfolding and magnifying of that already existing.” (277) 
 
His own concept of growth, based on the premise that “there is nothing to 
which growth is relative save more growth” (Dewey 1917/2008, 57), stands in 
contrast to an understanding of growth and development as a predetermined 
‘unfolding’. Dewey (1916/2008) defines growth as the “continuous self-renewal” of a 
community of social group, taking place “by means of the educational growth of the 
immature members of the group.” (15, emphasis mine). Growth, in this definition, 
occurs through the ongoing, contingent process of “reconstruction and 
reorganisation” (Dewey 1916/2008, 78) of endowed tendencies and experiences 
that is education. With this definition, Dewey puts organisation and process at the 
centre of interest and rejects any notion of predetermined aim or telos within 
evolution – both of the individual and society. Growth describes human existence as 
a matter of adaptation, as an ongoing dialectic relationship involving the individual 
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and her/his surroundings, rather than leading toward an attainable aim. This has 
profound implications for Dewey’s concept of education that I seek to unpack in this 
chapter. 
 
The analysis shall be divided into individual growth and societal growth, both 
of which are informed by Dewey’s evolutionary theory addressed above. First, I 
discuss individual growth and examine its connection to Dewey’s notion of educative 
experiences. Second, I will discuss how Dewey relates culture and society to the 
process of individual growth, and how, based on that relationship, he defines 
education both as purposeful, pedagogical direction and “as an individual’s 
educative formation that happens through interactions with the world.” (Benner 
2017, 263) 
 
4.3.1 Individual growth 
 
Dewey (1918/2008) defines education as the ongoing, contingent process of 
“reconstruction and reorganisation” (78) of both endowed tendencies and 
experiences. He emphasises that this process of reconstruction occurs both 
“unintentionally and designed” (Dewey 1916/2008). This means that Dewey’s 
concept of education as reconstruction implies two concepts of education that, 
following English and Doddington (2018) can be understood with reference to the 
German words for education: Bildung, emerging from our “capacity for self-growth” 
(English&Doddington 2018, 3), and Erziehung, the pedagogical practice answering 
to “our fundamental need for others to aide our productive interaction with the 
environment” (English&Doddington 2018, 3). This German terminology, which is 
also adopted by Benner (2017, 266), shall be of use temporarily in this section on 
‘individual growth’ in order to increase clarity about different, and yet connected 
meanings of Dewey’s notion of education. On the one hand, Dewey uses the term 
education to describe the process of Erziehung, meaning the interaction between 
generations with the aim of maintaining the “social continuity of life” (Dewey 
1916/2008, 6). This purposeful reorganisation and reconstruction of experience 
happens in formal or informal settings, such as school, the family, and other 
moments in society that demonstrate a “pedagogical interaction” (Benner 2017, 266) 
between generations with the purpose of societal transmission, or enculturation. 
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“Intentional education signifies […] promoting growth in the desired direction.” 
(Dewey 1916/2008, 44) On the other hand, Dewey uses the term education to mean 
the reconstruction of experience that is detached from the pedagogical premise of 
Erziehung. In that second concept, Dewey’s education means Bildung: the 
reconstruction and reorganisation of experiences within social interaction, through 
communication, and in relating to and acting with the things of the world. Bildung is 
not purposefully organised, and not with the intent of ‘teaching’, ‘instructing’, or 
‘inducing’ the younger generation. In Dewey’s theory of growth, Erziehung and 
Bildung are inseparably connected: Pedagogical interaction enables and furthers 
Bildung – understood as “the learner’s engagement in educative processes of 
formation” (Benner 2017, 266) – beyond pedagogical contexts. 
 
In sum, Erziehung and Bildung, in the light of Dewey’s growth, merge into an 
ongoing process of reconstructing and reorganising experience. Therefore, with the 
nature of experience, is where this analysis of education in the context of individual 
growth shall begin. Experience is a key concept in understanding how Dewey, in his 
concept of growth, defined his view of the evolutionary, adaptive relationship 
between the subject and her/his environment. Experience is how individuals connect 
to their environment; experiences make the process of simultaneous adaptation 
possible within that connection. 
 
4.3.1.1 Educative experiences 
 
Human existence, for Dewey, is defined by the individual’s relationship to 
his/her environment and the need for adaptation at the heart of that relationship. He 
writes: “The first great consideration is that life goes on in an environment; not 
merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it. […] in order to live, it [the 
subject, AN] must adjust itself, by accommodation and defence, but also by 
conquest.” (Dewey 1938/2008, 20) Living, in Dewey, means adapting. Our ability to 
adapt is based on the anthropological fact of immaturity. Immaturity is “the primary 
condition of growth” (Dewey 1916/2008, 47). In Dewey, it receives a positive 
meaning, instead of signifying “a mere void of lack” (Dewey 1916/2008, 47). Rather 
than being understood comparatively to a fixed idea of ‘maturity’, Dewey 
understands immaturity to be “the power to grow” (Dewey 1916/2008). It consists of 
dependence and plasticity. Dependence I will discuss later in the context of the 
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social dimension of growth. Plasticity signifies “essentially the ability to learn from 
experience; the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in 
coping with the difficulties of a later situation.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 50). 
 
Experience, for Dewey, is not merely the environment ‘entering’ the subject’s 
consciousness via sensual impression. Dewey understands experiences as 
“transactions of living organisms and their environment” (Biesta 2007, 13). It is what 
connects the individual and the environment in activity and, thus, what puts 
adaptation at the centre of human existence in the world. The transaction between 
the subject and her/his environment consists of an active and a passive element, of 
doing and undergoing; we try something, we experiment, and undergo the 
consequences of what we tried (Dewey 1916/2008, 147). Doing and undergoing are 
co-dependent, which means that they stand in a quasi-causal relationship. To learn 
from experience means to gain insight into that relationship between doing and 
undergoing, “to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to 
things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 
147). 
 
Learning from experience means the “discovery of the connection of things” 
(Dewey 1916/2008, 147). We are able to learn – and therefore grow – from 
experience only if we think about these connections reflectively. Processing this 
connection, in Dewey, is what makes an experience educative. It is “thinking”, 
Dewey maintains, that “is the method of an educative experience” (Dewey 
1916/2008, 170). Reflective experiences that involve inquiry into the exposed 
relationships, contribute to growth because they are useful in assigning meaning to 
potential relations exposed in future experiences. “Growth within experience” 
(Dewey 1938/2008, 272) is the increase in ability to learn further from future 
experience. On that understanding, an experience is "an act is outwardly temporary 
and circumstantial, but its meaning is permanent and expansive. The act passes 
away; but its significance abides in the increment of meaning given to further 
growth." (Dewey 1910b/2008, 379) Experiences that allow the individual such 
insights grant “the possibility of having richer experience in the future” (Dewey 
1938/2008, 12) and, therefore, contribute to growth. 
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Rather than a linear accumulation of knowledge, educative experiences are, 
to use the words of Saito (2005), a “circular expansion” (77). By grappling with new 
experiences, the subject consulates previous experiences, challenges them and 
forms new relationships between the new and the old (Rogers 2012, 85). Both new 
and old experience, in this mental process, transform and become part of the same 
‘compound’: 
 
The later outcome thus reveals the meaning of the earlier, while 
the experience as a whole establishes a bent or disposition 
toward the things possessing this meaning. Every such 
continuous experience or activity is educative, and all education 
resides in having such experiences. (Dewey 1916/2008, 85) 
 
An activity or experience is ‘educative’, we gather from Dewey’s quotation 
above, if it is integrated with previous experiences, if it is put in continuity with 
previous experiences. Dewey defines continuity as a criteria "by which to 
discriminate between experiences which are educative and those which are mis- 
educative." (1938/2008, 20) For Dewey (1916/2008), “the measure of value of an 
experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up.” 
(148) The reorganisation of existing experiences in order to make them continuous 
with new experiences, is, what Dewey means by ‘education’. 
 
Not every event in the individual’s surroundings initiates educative 
experiences on Dewey’s account. Only that which brings the individual into doubt or 
perplexity induces the reflective process associated with educative, reflective 
experiences. This is where discontinuity and its accompanying experiences of 
“negativity” (English 2013, 55f.) come into play. Discontinuity refers to the pre- 
reflective interruption in experience that, upon reflection, can be understood as a 
‘problem’ (English 2013), that is, as a subject of further inquiry based on “careful 
observation of the given conditions” (Dewey 1916/2008, 109). While discontinuity is 
not explicit in Dewey’s own words, it emerges implicitly and has been drawn out by 
Dewey scholar English (2013; see also Benner&English 2004). Discontinuity in 
experience occurs on account of a ‘tension’ or ‘resistance’ between a new and a 
previous experience. Such ‘tensions’ emerge when, in interaction with the 
environment, a gap opens up between the individual’s past experience and the new 
experience (Benner&English 2004; English 2013). Discontinuity occurs, in other 
words, within the individual’s interaction with the world (both social and material) 
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and can be considered the beginning of the process of the reorganisation of 
previous experience designed to make sense of the relations underlying the 
‘problem’. In such moment that demand reorganisation, existing knowledge, habits, 
assumptions and strategies no longer suffice and are thrown into question (Rogers 
2012, 65). Once the realisation sets in that current abilities and knowledge have 
become insufficient, or, in other words, continuity in experience is broken up, the 
individual has to grapple with the accompanied perplexity and begins to try and re- 
establish continuity. These experiences of negativity are “moment[s] when a person 
experiences a limit to his or her present ability or knowledge” (English 2013, xxii). In 
producing these experiences of negativity, discontinuity is a key element in 
experience understood as an ongoing, and reflective process. Discontinuity, as the 
counter-part of continuity, is crucial for our understanding of truly educative 
educational environments: they have to allow for perplexity, confusion or the like 
(English 2013; Saito 2005). Educative experiences depend on ‘real’ moments of 
perplexity, or more specifically various forms of negativity, that urge the subject to 
readapt and allow for the re-establishment of continuity through the integration of 
what has been learned from the experience. 
 
Only experiences that involve insight into the connection between doing and 
undergoing in a way that is able to inform future experiences can be described as 
‘educative’: “Every experience should do something to prepare a person for later 
experiences of a deeper and more expansive quality.” (Dewey 1938/2008, 29) 
Experiences become significant, or educative, when they allow the individual to 
learn something ‘meaningful’, something that contributes to further learning 
processes. When and individual experiences a limit to his or her knowledge or ability 
– an experience of negativity of English’s account – that new object or ideas has 
potential for gaining meaning and thereby allowing the individual to growth; the 
individual can integrate new insights into his/her established understanding of the 
world (on this point see English&Doddington 2018). In that process, this established 
understanding of the world, is continuously restructured. This process is what 
growth describes. The reflective process between doing and undergoing that 
constitutes experience, is the process of learning itself. Thinking and reflection, on 
Dewey’s view, however, are not only involved in making these connections between 
doing and undergoing in experience, but they are also involved in the individual’s 
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perception of events, and the activity that this perception induces (Garrison et al 
2016, 42f.). In evolution, according to Dewey (1933/2008), humans have developed 
an intellectual capacity that allows for them to “direct our activities with foresight and 
to plan according to ends-in-view, or purposes of which we are aware." (125) In that, 
the simplistic temporal structure of stimulus-response is broken up and the dualistic 
perception of subject and environment dismantled. Instead of environmental 
triggering behaviour, the individual develops a “selective bias in interactions with 
environing things” (Dewey 1925/2008, 196). What stimuli become important, and 
how an experience is shaped in the light of past experiences and ends-in-view is the 
result of a process co-created by the subject. 
 
This process of co-creation, in Dewey, is called mediation. Dewey 
(1925/2008) writes: "It is not the sensation in and of itself that means this or that 
object; it is the sensation as associated, composed, identified, or discriminated with 
other experiences; the sensation, in short, as mediated." (184) Mediated here 
means that experiences, according to Dewey, are shaped by the meaning that has 
been assigned to past experiences, by the knowledge gained about the relations 
defining the environment. Knowledge is what steps in between stimulus and 
response, both interpreting the first and directing the latter: “The importance of 
knowledge conceived thus as a mediating process lies in the fact that it ‘slows down’ 
both the stimulus and the response, so that the organism can take time to plan.” 
(Dewey 1920/2008, 210) Knowledge and experience, in Dewey’s description, are 
understood as mental activities rather than depictions of objective reality (Biesta 
2006, 13). The selection of stimuli to action, it follows from Dewey’s notion of growth 
through experience, is not merely an external affair, something ‘happening to’ the 
subject, but rather a process of conscious selection. 
 
Experience, on this perspective, has to be understood as a cognitive activity 
in the sense of embodied cognition (Johnson 2015; English&Doddington 2018) 
involved in the individual ‘making sense’ of the world. Over time, the individual’s 
experiences do not only change current and future ways of relating to the 
environment, they also change the meaning assigned to past experiences due to 
the confrontation with new experiences. This process of increasing meaning is what 
the concept of growth describes. In that, growth can be put in direct lineage to 
Dewey’s concept of adaptation, which, in a Deweyan understanding, describes the 
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subject’s active being-in-the-world. In the context of the movement between 
continuity and discontinuity, experiences of negativity lead to the need for re- 
adaptation, or in the case of humans, learning. Growth is the concept that describes 
this ongoing process of experiences being integrated and new meaning being 
created. 
 
4.3.1.2 The social environment and the socialised mind 
 
Thus far, growth has been talked about with respect to an individual. From 
Dewey’s theory of experience, we derived a concept of individual growth focused on 
processes of the intelligent mediation by the mind. Our ability to assign meaning to 
our experiences in a way that makes them significant for future experiences, i.e. our 
ability to learn from experience and use what is learned in a purposeful way, is 
based in intelligence and the anthropological conditions of immaturity and plasticity. 
Educative, reflective experience, in sum, is an activity of intelligently mediating the 
relationship between the subject and the environment. This entails mediating 
between stimuli, mediating ends-in-view, and mediating meaning between past and 
present experiences. However, Dewey’s conception of growth is not individualistic, 
as I will argue now. Our ability to learn from experience and purposefully direct the 
meaning we derive from past, current and future experiences defines and is at the 
foundation of our cultural existence in nature, and is therefore deeply social 
(Fesmire 2015, 60). Education, both as the reconstruction of experience, in Dewey, 
is a, if not the, key component of this cultural existence that defines human 
adaptation as an intelligent activity within the context of society. This positioning of 
education presupposes that learning is not merely an isolated and singular act of an 
individual experiencing the world on her/his own terms. Rather, there has to be a 
social element to growth that makes educational relationships and interactions 
possible in the first place. 
 
In Democracy and Education (1916/2008), Dewey defines education, as the 
“reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of 
experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent 
experience.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 83; see also 1915/2008, 211; 1934/2008, 196) 
What Dewey describes here is education as the process of learning about the world 
by experiencing it and increasing one’s capacity to gain more meaning from future 
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experiences – both through intergenerational pedagogical interaction (Erziehung) of 
experiences and through experiences made and formed in interaction with the world 
(Bildung). In both cases, it is experiences made within material or social 
environments that educate. To that point, Dewey (1916/2008) emphasises: "We 
never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment." (23) 
Experiences are what connects the subject and her/his environment. Education, 
therefore, both understood as pedagogical direction, and formation/Bildung, 
happens via the environment. 
 
4.3.1.3 The educational environment 
 
The significance that Dewey assigns to the environment in processes of 
education, however, does not mean that he portrays education as a solipsistic 
endeavour of the sole self, interacting with material. Dewey (1916/2008) defines 
environment as the conglomerate of "conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or 
inhibit the characteristic activities of a living being." (15) Besides the material 
environment, i.e. the “nature and the relations of things” (Dewey 1891/2008, 355), 
the human environment is predominantly shaped by other people, existing 
institutions and prevalent agreements which define not only the stimuli inducing 
human activity, but also the ends and means in sight. From the vantage point of an 
evolutionary reading of his works, in defining the human environment as primarily 
social, Dewey, consequentially, also thinks of the individual’s adaptation in social, 
rather than mere individualistic terms. He emphasises that individuals are “also 
interested, and chiefly interested, upon the whole in entering into activities of others 
and taking part in conjoint and cooperative doings.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 29) The 
psycho-cognitive reason for this interest in others, on Dewey’s view, is the 
anthropological fact of dependence (Dewey 1916/2008, 48). Dependence, as 
discussed above, is one of the “chief traits” (Dewey 1916/2008, 48) of immaturity. 
Dependence allows us to understand the key role of social interaction in growth; it 
emphasises the social nature of individual growth. Dewey positively reframed 
prolonged human dependency as a prolonged phase to make use of their plasticity 
– in particular to progress socially (Stitzlein 2017, 39). 
 
For Dewey (1916/2008), the “mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to 
understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialised mind is the power 
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to understand them in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint of shared 
situations.” (40) The socialised mind develops in the child who while growing up in 
society learns “to understand the wishes and ideas of others and accommodate 
himself to them." (Dewey 1902/2008, 260) This accommodation happens through 
“the friction engendered meeting resistance from others […] forcing a line of action 
contrary to natural inclinations.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 39) Such ‘friction’, or resistance 
experienced in interaction with others, as Benner and English (2004) have 
discussed, point to the negativity of experience constitutive of learning whether with 
objects and with other human beings. How we interpret these experiences of 
negativity, is, in important ways, socialised: 
 
Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and 
resist. Even letting a man alone is a definite response. Envy, 
admiration and imitation are complicities. Neutrality is non- 
existent. Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between 
it and a physiological process. (Dewey 1922/2008, 16) 
 
In gauging a balance between natural inclinations, individual, and social 
ends, over time, just like habits guiding general activity, individuals develop 
“conscience” and moral habits "through language, literature, association and legal 
custom." (Dewey 1891/2008, 355) The socialised mind means developing 
conscience, which, in Dewey, functions as “an important safeguard and directive 
force of growth.” (Dewey 1932/2008, 306) What allows us to learn with and from 




Communication is what transforms an individual experience into a shared 
experience. Dewey (1925/2008) writes: Communication “is a means of establishing 
cooperation, domination and order. Shared experience is the greatest of human 
goods.” (158) Communication, therefore, is a key component of the social 
environment. When we communicate experiences, they change, as they “are re- 
adapted to meet the requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or 
that preliminary discourse termed thinking. Events turn into objects, things with a 
meaning.” (Dewey 1925/2008, 133) Our ability to "come to possess things in 
common" (Dewey 1916/2008, 8) through shared experience in communication 
makes an evolutionary, rather than idealistic conception of society possible. That is 
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because of the negotiating character that Dewey assigns to the co-construction of 
common meaning, engendering a contingent, evolutionary movement rather than an 
idealistic trajectory. “Communication is a process of sharing experience till it 
becomes a common possession. It modifies the disposition of both the parties who 
partake in it.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 12) In that, communication alters both the 
experiences of the individuals and what meaning they derive from it. 
Communication, in summary, is educative. It is part of deliberate pedagogical 
interactions in Erziehung, as well as within processes of Bildung happening in the 
context of informal social interaction. Dewey notes on that point: “Not only is social 
life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine 
social life) is educative.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 9) 
 
4.3.2 Societal growth 
 
So far, I have argued that with his concept of growth Dewey sought to 
redefine the relationship between the subject and her/his environment consistent 
with a Darwinian worldview. Growth is based on Dewey’s concept of dialectic 
adaptation, combining efforts of the subject adapting to the environment, and the 
subject adapting the environment to it. This combined movement takes the form of a 
contingent, unceasing process of “transaction”, to use to words of Biesta (2006, 13). 
This process of transaction, in Dewey, is mediated by the mind, and its ability for 
foresight, planning, and taking ends-in-view. The educative experiences that allow 
for this process of transaction emerge both in the context of pedagogical direction of 
the younger generation, and in everyday interaction of the subject with her 
surroundings. Through intelligent conscious selection within the active part of 
experience, the subject participates actively in the adaptive process – it selects 
environmental stimuli and responses in accordance with a plan for conduct. Growth 
describes the increasing ability to direct this process. 
 
Despite the significance of the socio-cultural environment for growth 
elaborated upon above, in this chapter, growth has been merely described as the 
increasing capacity of the individual to adapt to environmental demands by learning 
from experience. The other part of the dialectic adaptive movement, i.e. the 
subject’s purposeful transformation of her surroundings, has only been touched 
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upon. However, education, in Dewey’s (1989/2008) view, is not merely an internal 
process of individual learning and developing, but also “the fundamental method of 
social progress and reform" (94). In growth, Dewey combines individual 
development with societal progress in a shared movement. I will now ensue to 
analyse the evolutionary nature of that link between individual and society. In the 
first part, I aim to explain the shortcomings arising from a reading of growth that 
disregards its dialectic nature, simultaneously involving the subject and her/his 
environment. In the previous parts of the chapter I have argued that growth 
incorporates processes of Erziehung and Bildung. 
 
In the following, by addressing the societal dimension of growth, I seek to 
draw attention to the ways in which an understanding of growth as merely a process 
of individual development falls short on capturing the richness of Dewey’s concept 
fo growth. To that end I will contrast growth with the German concept of Bildung and 
problematise an equalisation of the two. While I agree with some scholars (Biesta 
2016; Rorty 1979; Benner 2017) that there is a certain connection between growth 
and Bildung, I argue that there is a specifically evolutionary addition to growth that is 
key for understanding its full potential that some concepts of Bildung fail to account 
for. 
 
First, drawing primarily from the theories of Bildung of Gadamer (1960/1075) 
and Litt (1957; 1960), I discuss the meaning of Bildung and highlight a few points of 
criticism directed at a certain ‘inwardness’ that some ideas of Bildung incite. 
Second, I will introduce the critical arguments of Saito (2005) and Greene (1988) 
problematising readings of Dewey’s growth that focus on individual development 
and neglect the aspect of societal transformation. Based on the consensus of the 
criticism that disparages the neglect of societal transformation both in Bildung and 
growth, I argue that an equalisation of the two concepts can potentially reinforce a 
problematic reduction of Dewey’s growth. Furthermore, I contend that the 
evolutionary perspective developed in this chapter enlightens some of the ways in 
which growth might go beyond Bildung. 
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4.3.2.1 Growth as Bildung 
 
Bildung is defined by Biesta (2016) as the “broad process of cultivation of the 
person towards virtue” (152). This process of cultivation, the ongoing transformation 
of the self, happens in the interaction of the individual with her/his environment via 
experience and communication – both inside formal education settings, and outside. 
In strong resemblance to the process of establishing continuity in Dewey’s theory of 
experience, Gadamer (1960/1975) defines “the essence of Bildung” as the active 
engagement and interaction with the environment leading to “the return to oneself, 
which presumes a prior alienation.” (15, emphasis mine) Gadamer’s notion of ‘the 
return to oneself’ after ‘alienation, I argue, reflects Dewey’s notion of continuity, 
which is presumed by discontinuity. Both continuity and the ‘return to oneself’, thus, 
are foreshadowed by an experience of negativity. Following Gadamer, the ability to 
render negative experiences made in interaction with the ‘external’, i.e. the world, 
into something internal, i.e. to make it ‘into one’s own’, to use the motive of 
Gadamer is what ultimately constitutes Bildung. A similar idea is found in Dewey’s 
concept of growth, which describes the process of the individual constantly 
developing “a more varied, complex, better organized system of ideas or meanings 
to bring to bear upon its sensations, and thus to transfer to these its own content of 
significance.” (Dewey 1886/2008, 192, emphasis mine) Accordingly, educative 
experiences lead to the integration of meaning assigned to relations in the world 
(both material and social) into the individual’s further experience. In growth, in a 
sense, these relations in the world are made ‘into one’s own’. 
 
An extensive critique of the concept of Bildung with a focus on this motive of 
‘the return to oneself’ can be found in the work of Theodor Litt, a German 
educational philosopher of the late 19th and early 20th Century. In Litt’s 
characterisation, Bildung, as a transformative process focuses on “das 
Seinsollende” (the should-be; translation mine) rather than “das Seiende” (Litt 1957, 
6; the existing, translation mine). Bildung, following Litt, is focused on distant future 
aims, rather than on the individual’s present experience. Due to this distance from 
present experience, so Litt (1960), Bildung causes an inward turn and becomes 
“eine Ordnung des inneren Lebens” (23; an ordering of internal life; translation 
mine), an internal refuge for the individual to distance her/him from the present 
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experience. As a result, the existing socio-political reality is subordinated and the 
process of self-cultivation becomes removed from the real circumstances of the 
individual’s life. In consequence Bildung, so Litt’s view, becomes concerned 
exclusively with the (predominantly intellectual) growth of the individual. This focus 
on the “Innerlichkeit” (Litt 1957, 8, inwardness; translation mine), rather than the 
relationship with the world, following Litt’s critique, causes a rise in individualism and 
decline in communal activity which ultimately leads to the deconstruction of the 
potentiality for change in the world. The subject, in other words, in finding refuge 
within, gives up her/his agency in changing her/his environment. 
 
To emphasise the applicability of Litt’s criticism of Bildung to this discussion 
of Dewey’s concept of growth, I will now bring in Maxine Greene’s (1978; 1988) and 
Naoko Saito’s problematisation of a reading of growth as merely an internal 
process. Following Litt’s criticism, thinking growth as Bildung – at least under a 
certain understanding of Bildung – runs the risk of neglecting the constitutive 
societal dimension in the individual’s formation, which entails an undue focus being 
laid on the internal, intellectual dimension of growth. According to Greene (1978) 
and Saito (2005), a reading of Dewey’s concept of growth as mainly internal, 
intellectual progress prevailed in Dewey scholarship – for example in Rorty – 
perpetuating a reading of Dewey’s theory of education “tainted as it has become 
with the aura of naïve optimism.” (Saito 2005, 26) Experimental thinking and 
scientific inquiry, on such a view, are seen as the means for improving society. On 
both Greene’s and Saito’s perspective, this characterisation of growth is simplistic 
and falls short. 
 
On Saito’s (2005) view, what is lost from that reading of growth is the “tragic” 
(69) dimension of growth, the unattainability of perfection because of the continuous 
resistance experienced in interaction with the world. Growth, on that view, means 
the individual’s participation in the transformation of the world, and the ‘tragic’ 
element of unattained perfection within that task. In this point made by Saito, I 
argue, also resonates Litt’s criticism of concepts of Bildung that think of Bildung 
only, or at least primarily, as a ‘return to oneself’. On Saito’s perspective, if we think 
of growth as the internal transformation of the individual, as a process of individual 
learning, then the transformation of the ‘external’ as a constitutive part of the 
individual’s own formation is lost. 
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Similarly, Greene (1988), in her assessment of Dewey’s concept of growth, 
underlines the dimension of continuous struggle with the world in growth, which 
means “the overcoming of the determinate, [the] transcending of moving beyond in 
the full awareness that such overcoming can never be complete.” (6) This struggle, 
according to Greene (1988), the transformation of the world that is inherent in the 
educative experience transforming the individual is a particular kind of experience 
constitutive to the process of growth. There is, in other words, no individual growth 
without the individual’s active participation in the transformation of the world. 
 
Greene thinks growth as grounded in freedom. Freedom, following Greene 
(1988), means full involvement and participation in the social environment and 
embracing experiences of otherness and resistance. This kind of freedom is not a 
human apriori condition, but rather a “distinctive way or orienting the self to the 
possible, of overcoming the determinate, of transcending or moving beyond in the 
full awareness that such overcoming can never be complete.” (Greene 1988, 5) 
Exercising freedom is an activity tied to a specific kind of experience that goes 
beyond “experimental thinking” and an “abstract understanding of problems” 
(Giarelli 2016, 8). Following Greene (1978), freedom is the continuous experience of 
“conscious endeavour on the part of individuals to keep themselves awake, to think 
about their condition in the world, to inquire into the forces that appear to dominate 
them, to interpret experiences they are having every day.” (43) Freedom, it seems, 
is dependent on educative experiences, on negative experiences of resistance and 
otherness that urge growth in the shape of internal and societal transformation. 
Therefore, if growth is reduced to the ‘inwardness’ of internal transformation, it is 
also drastically reduced in the rich meaning that Dewey developed. 
 
Reading of growth as Bildung, I argue based on Saito’s and Greene’s 
analyses, at least under some definitions of Bildung with a primary focus on the 
transformation of the self that Litt’s criticism addressed, falls short. Equalising 
growth with Bildung potentially neglects the social dimension of growth, the 
‘struggle’ and ‘unattainability’ stemming from the individual’s embeddedness in the 
social and material reality of her/his actions. Greene (1978) emphasises that “there 
can be no such phenomenon as an objectless consciousness, that there is no 
refuge within.” (16, emphasis mine), In this point made by Greene echoes the Litt’s 
criticism of the ‘Innerlichkeit’ (inwardness) of Bildung. To find refuge within 
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dismantles the ability for freedom, which, in Greene, means the ability to transform 
the world for the better. To seek refuge within, she writes, “may well be to disarm 
oneself as a social being” (Greene 1978, 16) and deprive the individual of a whole 
dimension of educative experience that are ultimately constitutive of growth in a 
Deweyan sense. 
 
Growth entails, as elaborated above, not only ‘undergoing’, but necessarily 
also the active, intervention that is ‘doing’; human adaptation, or growth, means the 
simultaneous acting and participating in shaping the world while also undergoing 
and suffering from it. That moments of “negativity” (English 2005; 2013), or, as 
described by Gadamer (1960) ‘alientation’ are also part of the concept of Bildung, 
has been established above. In certain connotations of Bildung, however, alienation 
is ‘solved’ in a ‘return to oneself’ – the return is, therefore, understood to be internal. 
Discontinuity in growth, in contrast, leads to both a ‘return to oneself’ and a ‘return to 
the world’ in the form of participation and intervention. This dialectic nature of the 
‘return’ after the discontinuity of ‘alienation’ in interaction with the world, I argue, has 
its foundation in Dewey’s dialectic concept of adaptation. Adaptation, for Dewey, 
means the simultaneous transformation of the individual and the world; it means 
‘adaptation to’ and ‘adaptation of’. 
 
In summary, it seems that many regards, growth can effortlessly be 
connected to the German concept of Bildung. Both Dewey’s notion of growth and 
Bildung describe a process of cultivation of the self through experiences with ‘the 
other’. Biesta (2016) suggests that “Dewey’s understanding of education fits within 
the German tradition of Bildung which itself goes back to the Greek idea of paideia.” 
(152) Both growth and Bildung also entail a moment of negativity, or ‘alienation’, in 
the words or Gadamer. Despite this aspect of growth that reflect’s ‘the essence of 
Bildung’, i.e. the ‘return to one’s own’, this motive of the ‘return’ also precisely point, 
where, as I have argued, growth is different from Bildung. Informed by Litt’s criticism 
of the concept of Bildung as a reduction of human existence to mere self- 
transformation on the one hand, as well as the criticism of Saito (2005) and Greene 
(1988) of certain, non-dialectic readings of growth on the other hand, I problematise 
an equalisation of growth with Bildung. I argue that reading growth as Bildung, even 
though in many regards fruitful and consistent, has to be done with caution due to a 
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potential risk of unduly reducing the societal dimension in Dewey’s growth, and 
perpetuating a reading of growth as first and foremost an ‘internal affair’. 
 
I argue that, based on the evolutionary underpinnings to his thinking, Dewey 
developed a much richer account of growth that is at risk to be lost in an 
equalisation of growth with Bildung. It seems to me that in an evolutionary reading, 
the societal dimension inherent to growth receives an emphasis and a constitutive 
role that is not necessarily ingrained in every connotation of Bildung. In growth, the 
transformation of the world is not merely a side-effect of the transformed individual 
acting in it. Rather, growth is as much ‘adaptation of’ the world, as it is ‘adaptation 
to’ it. This movement is based on experiences of resistance that urge the individual 
to re-adapt, either in transforming her/his own beliefs, habits, and strategies, or, 
through the transformation of the other. Following the Darwinian underpinnings of 
his thinking, "Dewey saw culture as an outgrowth of the natural capacities of human 
minds to communicate through gesture and language, which furnished common 
meanings needed for shared experiences." (Dalton 2002, 127). On this view, “nature 
and culture are thus mutually intertwined” (Garrison et al 2012, 4), fostering a 
"continued growth of intelligence, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically" (Popp 
2007, 90) With his notion of the “socialised mind” (Dewey 1916/2008, 40) Dewey 
conceptualised human adaptation, and the human mind as significantly shaped by 
the social and cultural environment: 
 
The idea of evolution has made familiar the notion that mind 
cannot be regarded as an individual, monopolistic possession, 
but represents the outworkings of the endeavour and thought of 
humanity; that it is developed in an environment which is social 
as well as physical, and that social needs and aims have been 
most potent in shaping it. (Dewey 1882/2008, 69) 
 
In other words, on Dewey’s view human adaptation is cultural, because the 
‘natural environment’ of the human species is culture. Humans are also the agents 
of culture. Growth understood as adaptation in a cultural context means the subject 
adapting to its conditions, but at the same time being the agent of transforming 
these conditions – therein, growth reflects the dialectic meaning of Dewey’s concept 
of adaptation. The unattainability that Saito and Greene missed in a merely 
intellectualist reading of growth, gets reintroduced in growth understood as cultural 
participation as an unceasing process. In Dewey’s concept of growth as a shared 
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movement of the individual and her/his surroundings in adaptation, the environment 
loses the merely external status that it inherits in the concept of Bildung. Bildung 
relies on ‘the other’ as a counter-pole to ‘the self’; in Dewey, in contrast, the 
environment is what the individual ‘makes’ of her surroundings, it is “developing 
experience of the individual” (Garrison et al 2012, 3). The dualism inherent in 
Bildung, is therefore deconstructed in an evolutionary reading of Dewey’s concept of 
growth. At the heart of Dewey’s concept of growth, and, specifically the process of 
adaptation constituting the dissolution of the individual-environment dualism in 




Habits are, according to Saito’s (2005) analysis, what enable the “gradual 
transformation of culture and society from within.” (70) They “are generated as well 
as generating powers of behaving culture” (Garrison et al 2012, 5), making them the 
key moment in furnishing the connection between individual and societal 
transformation. In Dewey’s theory of habits, he distinguishes individual from social 
habits which co-develop in experience. Individual habits are “an active tendency. It 
only needs an appropriate stimulus to set it going; frequently the mere absence of 
any strong obstacle serves to release its pent-up energy.” (Dewey 1908/2008, 311) 
They are responses to repetitive, or stable demands of the environment, the so- 
called ‘social customs’, making them a highly useful tool for reducing environmental 
complexity. “We may think of habits as means, waiting like tools in a box, to be used 
by conscious resolve.” (Dewey 1922/2008, 23; see also Fesmire 2003, 16) 
Individual habits, therefore, are first and foremost a specific adaptive strategy that 
simplifies activity. They are, in the words of Fesmire (2003), “the neural paths of 
least resistance.” (18) 
 
Individual habits are formed and reconstructed in the context of “social 
custom[s]” (Saito 2005, 70), or social habits: “We grow into social organizations that 
share a complex set of stable habits.” (Fesmire 2003, 10) This process has been 
described above, in the section on the socialised mind: The individual’s activities 
grow out of her/his spontaneous impulses which are then mediated within 
experiences made and shared communicatively in a social context. In the process of 
“unlearned activity” (Dewey 1922/2008, 68) growing into activities based on what is 
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learned in experience, the subject is entirely immersed in a social context. Habits, 
therefore, are inherently social (Huachu 2013, 85; Popp 2007, 40); the expression of 
innate tendencies, therein, is based on culture which renders “native impulses into 
culturally relevant behaviour.” (Garrison et al 2012, 5; see also Popp 2007, 113). 
 
In growth, the individual forms habits, as a kind of secondary, acquired and 
temporary ‘nature’. However, Dewey’s concept of habits is not to be conflated with 
“habituation” as they also entail the “active control of the environment” (Saito 2005, 
70). Habits of conduct are temporary and can be changed if necessary (Stitzlein 
2017, 41, see also Dewey 1916/2008, 58). They are different from responses to 
environmental stimuli, as they, to use the words of Fesmire (2003, 14), “are 
continually reconstituted through coordinated activities.” Rather than re-actions, 
thus, habits are preferences for activities. They are therefore stable as they give the 
individual a certain framework for orientation a “historically developed pattern of 
behaviour” (Fesmire 2003, 15). At the same time, they are not in any way material 
(in a behaviourist understanding), but rather “secondary and acquired” (Dewey 
1922/2008, 66). In that, Dewey provides at a least partial solution to the idealist 
underpinnings of his early, mainly individualistic and rationalist concept of growth 
and the way he connected it with social transformation. 
 
As pointed out above, growth – understood as the process of human adaptation 
understood as a dialectical process – does not only mean the adaptation of the 
individual to her/his environment, but also integrates the modification of said social 
customs and social habits. Individual habits and social custom are part of a shared 
movement, named “transactional holism” by Saito (2005, 69). This means that social 
and individual habits evolve simultaneously. In the description of Fesmire (2003), 
“we are in, of, and about the world” (10). The reconstruction of habits at the heart of 
this process begins with new impulses that deviate from existing social customs. 
These impulses almost seem as if coming from ‘nowhere’, as if emerging from, what 
Saito (2005) called a “natural source of novelty” (70). At second glance, however, 
these impulses to act subversively, to change social customs in action, in Dewey, 
are socialised. Our native tendencies for action gain meaning in a social context: 
Novelty in social customs are based on shared meaning-making; impulses for 
deviation from and modification of existing social customs are reflected on, and 
brought into interaction via communication. Dewey obscures “the distinction 
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between opposites: the inner and the outer, the mind and the body, subject and 
object.” (Saito 2005, 72) He rejects the idea of “the inner psyche as separate from 
the outer world” (Saito 2005, 70) – in that he does not only deconstruct behaviourist 
psychology based on a Cartesian dualism but also redefines how we think of human 
adaptation as Reich et al (2016) underline further: 
 
From a Deweyan perspective, […] habits are not merely passive 
adaptations to an existing environment but, at the same time, 
active powers by which individuals in transactions with others 
influence change, transform, and reconstruct their environments 
as well as themselves. (Reich et al 2016, 1004) 
 
The concept that captures this “holistic view” (Saito 2005, 71) of Dewey’s 
concept of individual development and societal change, is growth. Growth is the 
shared movement of change emerging from the ‘transactional’ adaptive relationship 
of individual and society. Individual habits form and develop in interaction with social 
custom; at the same time the individual is part of the evolution of social customs by 
altering them. Social transformation is therefore part of meaningful interaction with 
the environment – such meaningful interaction means full participation based on a 
movement of dialectical adaptation. The role of education – both in pedagogical 
direction and processes of formation in non-pedagogical interaction with the 
subject’s surroundings – is to support the construction and reconstruction of 
individual and social habits. 
 
The subject relies on educative experiences that allow and foster reconstruction. 
Building on what has been said in this chapter, we know that educative experiences 
are experiences that allow for dialectic adaptation, involving the self and the self’s 
ability to transform her surroundings. Dewey (1916/2008) writes: “Education is not 
infrequently defined as consisting in the acquisition of those habits that effect and 
adjustment of an individual and his environment. The definition expresses an essential 
phase of growth. But it is essential that adjustment be understood in its active sense of 
control of means for achieving ends.” (52) What Dewey emphasises in this quote is 
the dialectic element in educative processes – both within pedagogical interaction 
and outside of it – leading to growth that makes social transformation not only a by- 
product of individual development, but a necessary component of human 
adaptation. Before I draw together the implications of this concept of education as 
growth for pedagogical practice in the last part of this chapter, I will now talk about 
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the societal conditions for growth influencing everyday educative processes 




Dewey believed that as human beings we are capable of producing shared 
meaning, knowledge, practices and beliefs, and thereby transform social habits and 
ourselves simultaneously in growth. This capability he bases on the anthropological 
conditions of immaturity and dependency, as well as the evolved cultural existence 
of the human species that makes education as a social practice necessary (Dewey 
1916/2008, 6) In some readings of growth, such as Rorty’s (1979), idealistic 
assumptions were drawn regarding the possibility of individual learning leading to 
shared meaning, morality, and ultimately social progress. However, as the above 
criticism of reading growth primarily in terms of individual development has 
indicated, it is not sufficient to think of growth merely in terms of an individual 
process focused on individual learning. Arguably, what is lost from that reading is 
the ‘tragic’ and unattainable dimensions inherent in Dewey’s notion of growth. It also 
fails to account for issues with participation of marginalised groups in processes of 
constructing shared meaning. Discussing individual conditions for growth, thus, is 
not sufficient to ensure and explain the growth of society. With his idea of 
democracy, Dewey provides an account of the societal conditions for growth, further 
clarifying how he linked growth with the development of shared moral values in 
society. 
 
Democracy, in Dewey, is not an end-state in the sense of Spencer’s equilibrium. 
Democracy, for Dewey (1916/2008), "is more than a form of government; it is 
primarily a mode of associated living, a conjoint communicated experience.” (94) 
What marks a democratic environment are its openness, changeability, as well as 
the focus on discourse in finding shared meaning. For Dewey, democracy is the 
ideal environment supporting growth: “These more numerous and more varied 
points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to 
respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action.” (Dewey 
1916/2008, 94) Democratic environments allow for more varied experiences and 
more communicative engagement about them – this makes them ideal incubators 
for educative experiences. Democracy, for Dewey (1908/2008), is a necessary 
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condition for freedom: “Modern life means democracy, democracy means freeing 
intelligence for independent effectiveness – the emancipation of mind as an 
individual organ to do its own work.” (230) Growth itself, in this understanding of 
democracy, functions as a normative directive: “Democracy, for Dewey, is a cultural 
ethic that derives its normative force from his conception of growth, which is itself an 
evolutionary notion.” (Popp 2007, 85) 
 
Dewey uses the concept of democracy to envisage a society that moves, or 
progresses, towards increased common meaning. Dewey believed that “if, however, 
they [individuals, AN] were all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it 
so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a 
community.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 5) With the evolution of Dewey’s concept of 
democracy between Democracy and Education (1916/2008), and the second edition 
of Ethics (1930/2008), Dewey increasingly moved away from individual to communal 
intentionality (Popp 2015, 50). By participating in societal institutions, the subject 
actively shapes them and is shaped by them; I-intentionality, thus, shapes and is at 
the same time shaped by communal intentionality (Rogers 2012, 238). Shared moral 
values, after this shift, are thus the result of a common process, rather than mostly 
solitary intellectual inquiry. In the same conceptual evolution of growth, democracy, 
as Biesta (2016) argues, changed from something ideal to an experimental space 
forming ideal circumstances for individual growth to align with communal 
intentionality. In that, the individual is seen as an “acculturated organism” (161), 
which itself is “understood as the outcome of participation” (161). On that view, the 
“mind, consciousness, thought, subjectivity, meaning, intelligence, language, 
rationality, logic, inference, and truth are all see as outcomes of such participation 
rather than their condition.” (Biesta 2016, 161) With democracy, Dewey 
conceptualised an ideal environment for this ‘transactional holism’ that forms 
growth. That is because democracy allows participation in reconstructing social 
habits, which is a key element of dialectic adaptation. Democracy, thus, is the ideal 
environment for processes of growth, or, in other words, for human adaptation. 
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4.4 The pedagogical dimension of growth 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed the evolutionary underpinnings in Dewey’s 
educational thought in the context of his concept of growth. It has been established 
how the evolutionary framework informed the concept’s ateleological, processual 
nature and how the anti-dualistic conception of mind and matter has informed 
Dewey’s theory of experience and learning. We have also reached a definition of 
education as growth meaning the individual’s ‘reconstruction and reorganisation of 
experiences’ within the movement between continuity and discontinuity leading to 
an increasing ability to make meaning of the world and simultaneously transform the 
surroundings according to ends-in-view. It has transpired that in both of these 
educative processes, growth has to be read as this dialectic movement that unites 
internal and external transformation in order to expands its full conceptual potential. 
I have presented the argumentation in this chapter, that one possible perspective 
that accounts for this complexity in growth is an evolutionary reading of the concept. 
 
Educative experiences, which allow for this dialectic reconstruction, happen in 
everyday interaction and communication throughout a person’s life as well as in 
pedagogical settings. In the previous part of the chapter, I have discussed the 
societal conditions for educative experiences happening in non-pedagogical 
interaction. It has been established therein that educative experiences are not only 
dependent on internal conditions, which, if met, lead to societal progress, but, that 
growth also relies on a certain societal environment, namely democracy, to thrive. In 
a democratic society, educative experiences are possible in everyday interaction 
within communicative processes, fostering growth – both of the subject and society. 
In the following, I will focus on the pedagogical dimension of growth. 
 
In terms of the pedagogical dimension of growth the first key point is that 
education cannot be understood in terms of instruction as any direct ‘insertion’ of 
knowledge into the learner’s mind. Even causally inducing particular learning 
processes and outcomes via the environment is considered impossible in Dewey’s 
psychology of learning. Dewey’s concept of education as growth has its foundation 
in experience and the reconstruction of individual tendencies and previous 
experiences. On that understanding, learning and knowledge are a matter of 
construction rather than instruction. And yet, part of what Dewey means by 
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education, is cultural transmission and purposeful social practice. For education as 
purposeful direction to be possible, a certain pedagogical availability of the process 
of growth to be externally controlled or at least influenced has to be assumed – 
otherwise Dewey’s concept of education would become utterly useless for 
educational practice. Dewey was, arguably, aware of the problematic conditions that 
his theory of growth poses for such a notion of pedagogical interaction: "The child 
will never realize a fact or possess an idea which does not grow out of this 
equipment of experiences and interests which he already has. The problem of 
instruction, therefore, is how to induce this growth." (Dewey 1989/2008, 174) 
 
Dewey addresses the problem of instruction in the light of an understanding of 
learning as not externally controllable by defining education, in the sense of 
pedagogical interaction, as "concerned with their [experiences’, AN] proper 
direction, not with creating them." (Dewey 1910b/2008, 205). The creation of 
experience, as it has been discussed at length in this chapter, is an activity of the 
learner. Educational practice can direct experience by arranging educational 
environments that provide the context for reframing experience (Hansen 2002, 271). 
Dewey’s concept of environment, however, is particular as well. Environment, in 
Dewey, is an active construction of a subject, rather than ‘surroundings’ that are 
detached and external to her. “Environment is what an organism experiences; that 
is, what they incorporate into their functioning.” (Garrison et al 2012, 43). According 
to Dewey (1916/2008), “in brief, the environment consists of those conditions that 
promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being.” 
(16) The environment defines what experiences become possible, not which are 
deemed relevant. According to Hansen (2002, 67) Dewey’s conception of the 
environment derives directly from Dewey’s anti-dualistic notion of growth and 
specifically the renewed definition of stimulus and response at its core. Environment 
and experience, in Dewey, become one. The individual’s process of integrating 
certain experiences into his or her activity, underlies the individual’s intelligent 
conscious selection. 
 
The educational environment, in Dewey, is not anti-cultural in a Spencerian 
sense. As opposed to Spencer’s division between the natural and artificial 
environment, in Dewey, culture is natural. Culture emerges from nature; it is not its 
deviation. Participation in culture – as emphasised by Greene (1989) and Saito 
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(2005) – is what allows for meaningful human adaptation. Culture is human’s natural 
habitat, so to speak; cultural existence, is natural human existence. Culture, or, what 
Spencer deemed to be ‘artificiality’, therefore, is key in Dewey’s conception of 
education. To use the words of Garrison et al (2012): 
 
From a Deweyan perspective, learning environments can never 
be reduced to external conditions supposed to work by 
themselves. They have to be constructed in ways that allow for 
genuine transaction between organized contexts of education 
and the experience of learners.  
 
For Dewey, I gather, legitimate pedagogical interaction lies in both the 
preparation of relevant educational environments and the support of the learner in 
reconstructing her/his previous experiences. In the case of humans, relevant 
environments reflect and incorporate culture in a way that allows learners to 
experience current societal and cultural problems and undergo the reconstruction of 
their existing knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions, as well as form critiques of 
existing social, cultural conditions. The preparation of these environments in formal 
educational settings, as well as the pedagogical interaction within them, therefore, 
necessary directives of growth: 
 
The very importance of thought for life makes necessary its 
control by education because of its natural tendency to go astray, 
and because social influences exist that tend to form habits of 
thought leading to inadequate and erroneous beliefs. (Dewey 
1910b/2008, 205) 
 
Because Dewey sees growth as a process that has to be directed by culture, he 
introduces a pedagogical dimension that was missing in Spencer. “The only way in 
which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by 
controlling the environment in which they act and hence think and feel.” (Dewey 
1916/2008, 24) The lessened influence of direct instruction in processes of learning 
emerging from Dewey’s theory of mind, contributes to a redefinition of a more 
‘traditional’ understanding of the role of the teacher. Since mainly the environment 
educates, in Dewey (1934/2008), teachers become "mediators of experience" (545). 
They mediate experience by providing “a specially selected environment, the 
selection being made on the basis of materials and method specifically promoting 
growth in the desired direction.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 44) Considering the complexity 
of educative experience and the numerous necessary pieces – such as continuity, 
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interaction, openness, present-focus, flexibility, and life-relevancy – it consists of, 
teaching, understood as organisation of an environment that allows for that 
particular kind of experience, has to challenge learners. Dewey (1913/2008) 
emphasises: "Good teaching, in other words, is teaching that appeals to established 
powers while it includes such new material as will demand their redirection for a new 
end, this redirection requiring thought-intelligent effort." (180) 
 
Dewey’s education as growth is an ongoing process of the simultaneous 
reconstruction of experience and reconstruction of social habits. It transforms both 
the individual and the environment in the same movement. Growth has no end 
beyond itself. Growth, if we look at current educational practice based on external, 
predefined aims, appears increasingly precarious. Educational practice that arises 
from predefined aims independent of particular learners needs, on Dewey’s view 
fails to allow for educative experiences because they limit the possibility of the 
necessary experiences of discontinuity that spark the process of intelligent 
adaptation. “An educational aim must be founded upon the intrinsic activities and 
needs (including original instincts and acquired habits) of the given individual to be 
educated.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 115) Furthermore, education that falls short on 
flexibility due to prescribing learners’ pre-defined outcomes, on a Deweyan 
perspective, also falls short on enabling educative experiences which necessarily tie 
on to the learner’s previous experience: “We set up this and that end to be reached, 
but the end is growth itself. To make an end a final goal is but to arrest growth.” 
(Dewey 1932/2008, 307) 
 
The current idea of formal education as a means for fulfilling political, economic, 
as well as social and environmental agendas puts the very conditions for growth in a 
potentially precarious position (Benner 2017). A critique of the way these external 
agendas impose external, pre-defined standards on educational practice resonates 
surprisingly timely in Dewey’s estimation that “the act of learning or studying is 
artificial and ineffective in the degree in which pupils are merely presented with 
lessons to be learned.” (Dewey 1916/2008. 143) Furthermore, considering the 
relevancy of the environment within educational practice and the pedagogical 
attentiveness that the preparation of said environment demands, growth relies on 
teacher agency. However, what Dewey understood to be ‘good teaching’ in the light 
of growth, namely the practice of appealing to learners’ established powers and 
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providing experiences that foster their further growth, has also been reduced in the 




In closing this chapter, I aim to pull together the evolutionary foundations of 
Dewey’s concept of growth and look at its implications for the practice of education, 
and, with special focus, for the pedagogical dimension in education as growth. I 
have defined growth as the result of the ongoing shared movement of individual 
development and societal transformation and argued that individual development, or 
individual growth describes the process of learning from experience. From this 
characterisation it has transpired that rather than accumulation of knowledge, 
learning, in the context of growth, signifies increased meaning. 
 
Meaning arises from educative experiences. Educative experiences, in 
Dewey, are considered educative because they allow intelligent insight into relations 
in our surroundings; they allow the individual to learn about things and their relations 
to other things. Through such insight single events gain meaning in the broader 
context of what was learned from past experiences, and our ability to assign 
meaning to future experiences is elevated. Therefore, in Dewey, individual growth 
means enhanced insight into relations between things, and the accompanied 
increased capability to deal with new experiences. Growth, thus, is a form of relating 
to the environment by learning that fosters further growth. Therein, as I have argued 
throughout this chapter, growth describes the process of adaptation and the 
concomitant increase in adaptability. 
 
Adaptation, in Dewey, is what defines the relationship between the intelligent 
individual and a contingent environment. It is also what drives change in both of 
these entities. Adaptation, following Dewey’s Darwinian/pragmatist concept of 
evolution, describes a constant and continuous process of integration. This 
integration is based on both assimilation and accommodation, meaning both the 
individual’s and the environment’s transformation. On Dewey’s anti-dualistic account 
of human existence subject and environment functioning simultaneously as cause 
and effect, and as stimulus and response. Growth understood as adaptation is a 
capacity “in servitude of other ends” (Huachu 2013, 84), rather than an aim in itself. 
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Adaptation, and re-adaptation, begins with experiences, or, specifically, experiences 
of discontinuity that demonstrate a misalignment between the subject and the 
environment. Dewey’s concept of evolution as contingent, anti-dualistic, and 
unceasing movement furnishes a complex concept of experience understood as an 
activity, a creation of continuity rather than a mere reaction to external stimuli. 
 
At the heart of human adaptation is the mind, the intelligent creation, 
organisation and restructuring of experience. Education – in the context of Dewey’s 
theory of growth understood as the reconstruction and reorganisation of 
experiences (Dewey 1916/2008, 78) – contributes to individual growth as it 
increases a person’s adaptability via fostering mental abilities for further growth: "A 
person who has gained the power of reflective attention, the power to hold 
problems, questions, before the mind, is, in so far, intellectually speaking, 
educated." (Dewey 1909/2008, 202) Education, in the context of Dewey’s concept of 
growth entails both pedagogical direction and processes of formation in everyday 
interactions of the subject with her environment. The educated person, as Dewey’s 
statement allows us to conclude, is the person able to gain meaning from 
experiences and use this meaning whence forth in their life. To be educated, 
therefore, means the capability for further education, i.e. further reorganisation and 
reconstruction of experiences, as Dewey (1916/2008) emphasises in his statement 
that “education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself.” (59) 
 
The evolutionary framework crucially informed Dewey’s conception of human 
existence – in particular regarding the aims of education. He (1898/2008) states: 
“The doctrine of evolution has brought a new point of view for considering the 
organic world and human institutions. Education has come to be regarded as both 
the necessary condition for the safety of society and as the right of every human 
being.” (154) Education, in the context of Dewey’s notion of individual growth, 
means both the purposeful direction in a pedagogical relationship that ensures 
society’s over-generational renewal and the self-directed process of life-long self- 
transformation through the interaction with society. Reading growth in the context of 
Dewey’s notion of adaptation cannot be understood as a merely private, internal 
endeavour. The mind, in Dewey’s understanding, is socially mediated. Knowledge, 
values, and ideas, Dewey followed James, “are characteristics of practical activity 
and not of the world as it is, totally detached from human occupation.” (Brinkmann 
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2013, 36) With pragmatism’s focus on ‘human occupation’, it presented an 
alternative to the individualism that a Cartesian epistemology suggested (Brinkmann 
2013, 22). In a pragmatist perspective, knowledge and ideas are not individualistic, 
but necessarily tied to experience in a social context – ‘human occupation’ is social, 
thus, individuality constituted through the experiences made in that occupation, is 
social as well. With growth, meaning the process of dialectic adaptation of an 
intelligent agent, inducing and guiding both intellectual and societal development, 
Dewey described this process. Dewey tied on to a pragmatist epistemology and the 
concomitant emphasis on the subject’s learning and acting in a social context. In 
that, according to Stitzlein (2017, 38), with his notion of growth as an account of 
intellectual development, Dewey differed from the prevalent behaviourist 
psychological thinkers of his era. In growth, Dewey tied intellectual growth 
functionally to society’s development and therein captured this evolutionary idea that 
 
Mind cannot be regarded as an individual, monopolistic 
possession, but represents the outworkings of the endeavour and 
thought of humanity; that it is developed in an environment which 
is social as well as physical, and that social needs and aims have 
been most potent in shaping it. (Dewey 1899/2008, 69). 
 
The significance of retaining the dialectic nature of growth has been pointed 
out by Greene (1989) and Saito (2005) in their criticism of a one-sided, 
individualistic understanding of Dewey’s notion of growth that neglects its societal 
aspect. Such active participation in social customs means the access to varied 
cultural experience and the communicative process of constructing shared meaning 
within society. Only if the individual is involved in both processes of reconstruction – 
of the self and the other – is dialectic adaptation achieved. Education as growth, 
therefore, goes beyond the idea conveyed by the German concept of Bildung. It 
necessarily implies the reconstruction of both the individual’s constitution, as well as 
the intelligent transformation of society. Growth describes inward and outward 
transformation as a fully intertwined process; by being in the context of society and 
participating in communication, the individual also constantly contributes to the 
transformation of their environment including the social world. When we learn from 
experience, we construct shared meaning, and construct ends-in-view based on 
foresight. Simultaneously, based on what we learned we reconstruct social customs. 
This reconstruction is not merely a side-product, but a constitutive element to 
122  
human existence based on dialectic adaptation. Growth, therefore, is dependent 
both on the individual’s opportunity to grow intellectually, while at the same time 
participating actively in the construction and reconstruction of social customs. 
Education as growth refers to educative experiences in the context of both everyday 
interaction – ideally in a democratic society, which fosters the plurality, resistance 
and discursive interaction that educative experiences require – and in the form of 
pedagogical interaction via a pre-selected environment opening a certain spectrum 
of educative experiences. 
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In the preceding chapter on Dewey’s concept of growth, I examined a theory of 
education derived from a Darwinian concept of evolution. Its main focus lied on the 
simultaneity of individual and societal transformation, the contingency and open- 
endedness of this transformation, and the dialectic nature of adaptation that 
emphasises the individual’s agency. Dewey stood in stark opposition to Spencer’s 
reductionist Lamarckian and teleological concept of evolution. This opposition on the 
level of evolutionary concepts also translated into their vastly different educational 
concepts. Dewey’s criticism of Spencer emerged as an important motive in the 
genealogy of evolutionary educational theory developed in this thesis. 
 
Spencer and Dewey share certain ontological convictions. Most importantly, they 
both hold a unilinear evolutionism, assuming that biological and cultural evolution 
are functionally the same, connected by one line of quantitative, accumulative 
growth. Furthermore, for both Spencer and Dewey, adaptation played a major role 
in their evolutionary theories. These commonalities on the level of the evolutionary 
ontology, however, must not conceal the vast differences between the two thinkers. 
While Spencer used the evolutionary framework to dismantle education’s role within 
the broader evolution of human culture and nature, Dewey used his evolutionary 
concept of growth to integrate educational processes involving the simultaneous 
transformation of the individual and society into the centre of human evolution. To 
enrich this study’s scope, I now aim to introduce an educational thinker who does 
not share these ontological commonalities: Lev S. Vygotsky. 
 
Vygotsky presents an ontologically perspective on human existence in nature 
and the role of education that is fundamentally different to both Spencer’s and 
Dewey’s. There prevails a severe underappreciation of the relations between 
Vygotsky’s particular concept and theory of evolution and his thinking about 
educational concepts (Stetsenko 2012). It is the objective of this chapter to 
contribute to this gap and re-narrate Vygotsky’s popular educational concepts within 
the philosophical context of an evolutionary framework. 
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The core argument of this chapter is that Vygotsky’s educationally relevant 
conceptions, such as development, learning, teaching and, in particular the Zone of 
Proximal Development (ZPD) are directly related to his particular ‘brand’ of 
evolutionism. In contrast to Spencer and Dewey, Vygotsky’s evolutionism is not 
unilinear, but based on the negation, rather than the integration of adaptation. While 
Dewey’s growth integrates a dialectic concept of adaptation – including both the 
passive ‘adaptation to’ an environment and the active, transformative ‘adaptation of’ 
an environment –Vygotsky, according to some recent reading of his works 
(Stetsenko 2012; Roth&Jornet 2017; Dafermos 2018), fundamentally redefines 
human development as a process unravelling outside of the dominance of 
evolutionary natural laws and principles. On Vygotsky’s view, at the evolutionarily 
unique intersection of nature and culture, socio-cultural mechanisms of 
transformation emerge, creating a novel, specifically human way of relating to the 
world that cannot be found in any other animal. This functionally novel socio-cultural 
realm is the result of a leap from biological evolution to history enabled by the one- 
of-a-kind cognitive structural disposition evolved in the phylogeny of the human 
species. These evolved cognitive abilities furnished the human capacity to make 
history, i.e. to collaboratively transform environmental conditions and biological 
inherited tendencies through labour, positioning human existence outside of the 
need for externally defined adaptation. 
 
It is the core argument of this chapter that Vygotsky’s educationally relevant 
conceptions, such as development, learning, teaching and, in particular the Zone of 
Proximal Development (ZPD) are closely connected to his particular ‘brand’ of 
evolutionism. I seek to demonstrate that reading Vygotsky’s theory of education in 
an evolutionary focus allows for novel insights into his educational concepts that are 
being obliterated by the dominant psychology-focused reading of Vygotsky in 
educational discourses. I argue, following Derry (2013, 2), that the predominantly 
psychological perspective on Vygotsky adopted within the constructivist educational 
discourse, disregards relevant philosophical underpinnings informing his concepts, 
and therein eradicates the inherent potential of Vygotsky’s for thinking equality and 
social activism as a constitutive part of human existence in general, and educational 
practice in particular. I argue further that these relevant philosophical underpinnings 
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are evolutionary in nature – a perspective that is still largely unaccounted for in 
Vygotsky-scholarship (Stetsenko 2012). 
 
Vygotsky’s conceptualises the development of “higher mental functions” 
(Vygotsky 1930/1987, 22) as the result of ‘revolutionary’ processes, based on 
negation. In this, Vygotsky diverges from Dewey’s concept of growth, which 
describes an evolutionary process. I will argue in this chapter that this difference 
between the two thinkers is inseparably connected to Vygotsky’s Marxist rejection of 
the Darwinist adaptation paradigm. In Vygotsky, what makes humankind unique, 
besides the connection between cognitive development and socio-cultural 
participation is the transcendence of a relationship between the individual and the 
world based on through collaborative cultural practice. Forms of individual activity, 
on Vygotsky’s view, first emerge within communicative, socio-cultural practices and 
are then, through complex processes of integration, integrated into the individual’s 
own activity and thinking. This perspective is perhaps most prominently reflected in 
Vygotsky’s works, on “thinking and speech” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 39), which he 
sees as genetically connected with the former, e.g. thinking, or consciousness, only 
graspable in its connectivity to speech, e.g. communication. 
 
Processes of historical learning, i.e. learning throughout the individual’s lifetime, 
are at the heart of the heart of Vygotsky’s idea of an artificial, socio-cultural 
development of the child, which, ultimately allow for the developmental leap from 
adaptation to collaboration, and from evolution to history. Education, “as the most 
important” (Kozulin 2015a, 17) amongst all social relations in Vygotsky’s theory, 
inherits a special role in his account of human cognitive development, and, in 
particular, in the formation of developmental leaps. That is because, according to 
Vygotsky, there is a qualitative difference between processes of learning occurring 
in everyday experience, and the developmental leaps that educational practice 
aspires to. On Vygotsky’s view, it is through “the human mediator” (Kozulin 2015a, 
19) within the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) that the individual is able to 
make the leap from merely learning in interaction to the development of novel, 
higher cognitive functioning. Pedagogical interaction and instruction by a teacher, on 
that understanding, are constitutive parts of human development; teaching and 
instruction make the qualitative difference between accumulative historical learning 
occurring throughout the individual’s life, and developmental leaps happening at 
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particular points in life that fundamentally alter the person’s being-in-the-world. It is 
through education, as the “the artificial development of the child” (Vygotsky 
1931/1987, 110) taking place at the intersection of inherited tendencies and their 
negation in cultural processes of learning and instruction, in Vygotsky, that the 
growth of the individual, biological evolution is transcended by revolutionary 
developments in human’s relationship to the world. The qualitative difference 
between everyday-learning and learning enabled through pedagogical practices like 
teaching, I will argue in this chapter, unfolds its full implications for Vygotsky’s theory 
of education only, if the evolutionary background to Vygotsky’s idea of the leap is 
fully appreciated. 
 
In this chapter, after having given an introduction in the broader philosophical 
context of Vygotsky’s anti-dualistic thinking and his vision for societal and cultural 
progress, I will explore educational concepts emerging from Vygotsky’s notion of 
evolution, individual development and growth as a discontinuous evolutionary 
process involving both biological inheritance and their socio-cultural transcendence. 
In particular, I will discuss the specific role that Vygotsky assigned to pedagogical 
interaction, instruction, and teaching within these processes of transcendence and 
present an in-depth analysis of their philosophical underpinnings in Vygotsky’s 
evolutionism. In concluding this chapter, I will discuss the repercussions of an 
evolutionary reading of Vygotsky’s concept of education for a philosophy of teaching 
and instruction as well as the broader social political implications of Vygotsky’s 
thinking for education. 
 
5.2 Vygotsky’s evolutionism 
 
It was Vygotsky’s project to develop a history of individual consciousness; a 
psychology that would account for the uniqueness of human cognition in nature, 
while, simultaneously, locate the human species within evolution (Kozulin 2015b; 
Stetsenko 2012, 2017). This psychology furnished his concept and theory of 
education in fundamental ways and set the groundwork for his notions of learning 
and development. In particular, it informed the emphasis on social and inter- 
generational learning. Vygotsky opposed contemporary idealistic psychologies built 
on the supposition of a metaphysically pre-defined correspondence between the 
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individual and the social. He also disagreed, however, with the prevalent subjectivist 
psychologies that portrayed society either as a mere conglomerate of individuals, or 
as an organism in its own right that is entirely independent from the individual 
(Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 56). Vygotsky wanted to develop an alternative that 
“proceeds first of all from the unity of mental and physiological processes” (Vygotsky 
1925-30/1987, 112). By embedding cognition in social relations, Vygotsky reinstated 
a unity between individual, mind, and society, whose fragmentation other 
contemporary perspectives had reinforced. To develop that particular perspective, 
alongside the rich empirical resources underlining his argumentation, Vygotsky drew 
from various philosophical traditions that I will now introduce. 
 
5.2.1 Historical and philosophical contextualisation 
 
5.2.1.1 Secondary influences – Hegel and Spinoza 
 
According to Dafermos’ (2008, 75) actualised reading, Vygotsky’s 
overarching aspiration to develop a materialist history of individual consciousness 
can be understood as inspired by Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). In his 
phylogenetic (i.e. concerning the species’) history of consciousness, Hegel had 
studied the “transition from sensory consciousness to rational consciousness” 
(Dafermos 2018, 75; Derry 2013) not as biologically or metaphysically pre- 
determined, but as historically shaped. This idea of “the self-creation of Man as a 
historical process” (Dafermos 2018, 77) was highly influential for Vygotsky’s concept 
of consciousness and informed, in particular, his emphasis on the embeddedness of 
consciousness in the societal context (Derry 2013, 110). In Vygotsky, there is no 
abstract reasoning, no Kantian apriori; thinking and the formation of concepts about 
the world emerge only in a societal context. 
 
Following this historical and anti-dualistic worldview, Vygotsky adopted a 
dynamic epistemology, thinking of reality not as objective, but rather as a temporary 
result of the ideas about the world formed historically in a process of “successive re- 
formation of thought.” (Derry 2013, 113) Relevant for his anti-dualistic mindset was 
Baruch Spinoza, a Dutch philosopher and religion-critic of the 17th Century, to which 
Vygotsky turned especially in his later works (Roth&Jornet 2017, vii). From 
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Spinozism Vygotsky adopted a monist materialism. On that perspective, different 
things and phenomena are not fundamentally, or qualitatively different, but rather 
different “modes of one, single, and indivisible substance” (Dafermos 2018, 70). 
This idea set the groundwork for Vygotsky’s understanding of individual 
consciousness and society as different manifestations of the same. Individuals, on 
that view, become individuals only in their role as social actors (Stetsenko 2017, 
112). This means that, to tap into that Spinozian framework, individual 
consciousness emerges from ‘the matter’ of society, and, therefore, on a genetic 
perspective, shares the same origin. Mind and body too, on that view, are different 
manifestations of the same substance. The monistic conception of these former 
duals entails that they can only be studied in unity; individual consciousness is not 
thought of as an individual possession, but rather as part of a common 
consciousness (Roth&Jornet 2017, 8). This monistic foundation had a significant 
influence on Vygotsky’s genetic approach to the development his aspired non- 
dualistic psychology as it connects all things and phenomena in their genesis. 
 
5.2.1.2 Vygotsky’s Marxist Darwinism 
 
As mentioned above, it was Vygotsky’s core aim to develop a non-idealistic, 
non-individualistic psychology that would overcome the prevailing dualisms between 
mind and body, and individual and society. This psychology built the foundation to 
his educational concepts. While Hegel and Spinoza were important influences 
hereto, Vygotsky’s focus on the “genetic roots of thinking and speech” (Vygotsky 
1934a/1987, 39) both phylogenetically – i.e. regarding the emergence of human 
consciousness and in cultural evolution – and ontogenetically – i.e. the development 
of higher mental functions in individual learning – also points toward the key role of 
an evolutionary perspective in Vygotsky’s thinking (Stetsenko 2012, 148). 
 
While the influence of Darwinism is more implicit than other references in 
Vygotsky’s works, a Darwinist worldview yielded an important influence on his 
thinking in terms of the anti-essentialist dynamic idea of nature, and the historical 
perspective (Stetsenko 2017, 128; 2011, 27): “Vygotsky’s theoretical perspective 
was grounded in precisely this worldview and as such […] was profoundly indebted 
to Darwin’s idea of evolution.” (Stetsenko 2017, 133) Informed by a Darwinian 
worldview, Vygotsky developed a fundamentally dynamic ontology based on 
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“collective, relational, and historicized dynamics” (Stetsenko 2017, 133). While these 
ontological considerations of Vygotsky do not reflect Darwinism in any ‘pure’ form, 
but, as mentioned above, are also commonly associated with influences by Hegel, 
Spinoza, or Marx, there is at least one concept clearly identifiable as ‘Darwinian’ at 
the heart of Vygotsky’s philosophy that I will discuss now: The concept of 
adaptation, and, specifically, in the context of his Marxist reinterpretation of 
Darwinism, its negation. 
 
5.2.2 Vygotsky’s negation of the adaptation paradigm 
 
Vygotsky defines adaptation as “the fundamental and universal law of 
development and life of organisms” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 57). The human mind, 
on Vygotsky’s view, is only comprehensible in the light of the principle of Darwinian 
adaptation: 
 
The biological expediency of mind here serves as the basic 
explanatory principle. Mind is understood as one of the functions 
of the organisms similar in its most important and essential aspect 
to all other functions, i.e., like all of the functions of the organism 
it is a biologically useful vital adaptation to the environment. 
(Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 153) 
 
While, following Vygotsky’s characterisation, the emergence of mind can be 
fully explained within the framework of Darwinian adaptation, that very framework is 
insufficient to distinguish human mind qualitatively from any form of animal 
cognition: 
 
Somewhere, in some specific stage of animal development, a 
qualitative change in the development of brain processes took 
place, which, on the one hand, was prepared by the whole 
preceding course of development, but, on the other hand, was a 
leap that could not be mechanically reduced to more simple 
phenomena. (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 113) 
 
This qualitative leap in phylogeny that furnished the novel relationship 
between the human animal and the world, is the core characteristic of Vygotsky’s 
evolutionism distinguishing from both Spencer and Dewey. I will argue in this 
chapter, that the rejection of an adaptation-paradigm on the level of human 
cognition and culture was crucial for the way Vygotsky defined education in its close 
relationship to instruction and teaching within the ZPD. Before I get to that, it is 
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necessary to understand the nature of the Vygotskian leap from evolution and its 
relation to the human mind. 
 
5.2.2.1 Vygotsky’s Marx and the revolutionary mind 
 
Vygotsky wrote extensively on the development of human consciousness in 
evolution. Consciousness supposedly received its prominent status in Vygotsky’s 
thinking because it is directly ‘responsible’ for the human qualitative leap from 
evolution on to the “new plane” (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 34) of history. For Vygotsky, 
consciousness was not an apriori, or a fixed state of human existence, but rather a 
dynamic mental process oriented at directing activity (Dafermos 2018, 57). As 
touched upon above, for Vygotsky, there is no abstract, or “pure thought” (Vygotsky 
1934a/1987, 77); all thinking, and all forms of intelligence emerge in the context of 
the subject’s relationship to the environment as a result of practical, active 
adaptation: 
 
One need only to consider the development of thinking within the 
general framework of biological evolution to be convinced that the 
first form of intellectual activity is active, practical thinking. This is 
thinking that is directed toward reality. It is a basic form of 
adapting to new or changing conditions in the external 
environment. (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 63) 
 
On the level of phylogenetic evolution, i.e. on the level of the development of 
species during natural history, Vygotsky locates human consciousness within the 
human species’ active adaptation to the environment. Thus far, this perspective is 
consistent with Dewey’s. On an ontogenetic level, i.e. on the level of individual 
development, however, Vygotsky negates this connection between thought and 
adaptation: “In our view, a fundamental difference distinguishes the product of 
biological evolution (i.e. the natural form of thinking) from the historically emerging 
forms of human intellect.” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 160) Vygotsky makes a clear 
distinction between ‘the natural form of thinking’ brought about through biological 
evolution, and ‘human intellect’ as a product of history (Derry 2013, 134). Therein, 
“human nature is seen as superseding these origins and transcending any biological 
imperatives, allowing for a leap into the realm of freedom and self-determination.” 
(Stetsenko 2011, 26) In order to conceptualise this difference between evolution and 
history, Vygotsky had to partially reject a Darwinian account of evolution. While he 
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fully accepted the historical perspective and the anti-dualistic viewpoint it 
engendered, Vygotsky rejected the idea of evolution being a continuous and 
unilinear path, combining biological and cultural revolution within the same process 
(Dafermos 2018, 188) While accepting an understanding of development as a non- 
mechanical, fundamentally contingent and environment-dependent process, 
Vygotsky also wanted to put stronger emphasis on the “dynamic relations between 
organisms and their world as the driving force of evolutionary change” (Stetsenko 
2017, 115). In order to do so, Vygotsky integrated a Marxist perspective into the 
Darwinist foundations of his thinking. 
 
Following his own words, Vygotsky aspired to develop a psychological 
equivalent to Marx’s Das Kapital (1867), i.e. an approach to psychology 
methodologically equivalent approach to Marx’s materialistic history of economics 
(Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 331). Based on that theoretical fundament Vygotsky’s 
psychology received a clear trajectory: it had to be concerned first and foremost with 
explaining what makes humans unique in evolution, while at the same time locating 
them within evolution (Roth&Jornet 2017, 28; Elhammouni 2010). To that end he 
synthesised a Marxist anthropology and dialectics with the Darwinian theory of 
biological evolution. Dialectical negation, Vygotsky (1925- 30/1987) defines, is a 
development that “includes all the positive achievements of its predecessor which 
have stood the test of time, but it itself strives in its constitutions and conclusions to 
transcend its predecessor’s boundaries and the conquer new and deeper layers of 
phenomena.” (175) 
The idea of negation marks a major difference to Dewey’s idea of evolution 
as a continuous process of growth. Vygotsky used this dialectic logic to rethink 
adaptation in evolution by the principle of negation: He argued that the human 
species, by building culture, was no longer submitted to biological adaptation in the 
same way all other animals are, but has actually transcended its own biological 
origin. This transcendence results in a developmental difference between other 
animals and humans (Kozulin 2015b, 322). This developmental difference is 
qualitative, in the form of “a drastic leap away from biological laws and regularities 
that govern the animal world” (Stetsenko 2011, 33), rather than a mere quantitative 
accumulation within evolution. Through that qualitative leap, humans establish a 
new mode of existing and relating to the environment that is unique in nature. 
Despite the first impression that Vygotsky’s evolutionary discontinuity hypothesis 
might evoke, it is important to note that with this claim Vygotsky did not reject 
biological evolution, let 
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alone deem it as ‘over’. Instead, he argued that the qualitative difference is a 
product of evolution itself, which has established itself outside of its origin by 
negating it: 
 
The transformative collaborative practice supersedes adaptation 
and natural selection, that is, dialectically negates, without 
eliminating them. The notion of superseding conveys the sense 
of something being taken over by a new process and integrated 
into it so that the former process continues its life, yet now in a 
subordinate role. (Stetsenko 2012, 149) 
 
The way that dialectic negation preserves its origin in a subordinate role, 
while at the same time superseding it evokes the influence that Spinozian monism 
had on both Marx and Vygotsky. All things and phenomena are different 
manifestations of the same matter; they do not exist as ontological duals but are 
rather connected by a common root. 
 
Vygotsky presents a theoretically complex manoeuvre in which he combines 
Darwinism with Marxism. The combination of Marx and Darwin allowed Vygotsky to 
argue for a qualitative developmental leap that distinguishes evolution from human 
history – evolution follows the Darwinian principles of natural selection and 
adaptation; history does not. After having established the intellectual influence 
Marxism had on Vygotsky’s adoption of Darwinian evolutionism, I will delve more 
deeply into the more detailed, conceptual nature of this Marxist reinterpretation of 
Darwin. 
 
5.2.2.2 The nature of the leap 
 
In line with his Marxist view of nature and culture, Vygotsky located the leap 
into history in the emergence of the division of labour (Dafermos 2018, 83). 
Vygotsky follows a Marxist definition of labour. On that view, it was through the 
emergences collaborative labour that the human species has ended the need for 
immediate, reactive adaptation to the environment and instead transcended into the 
realm of purposeful transformation of the environment, “a realm where forces of 
history, cultural, and society reign.” (Stetsenko 2011, 33) While this qualitative jump 
in human development is itself the result of adaptation, it also brings forward a new 
relationship of human beings with their environment that is no longer defined 
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“through adaptation but through the social practice of human labour – the 
collaborative (and therefore socio-cultural), transformative practice unfolding and 
expanding in history.” (Stetsenko 2011, 32) This new relationship has important 
implications for human activity as it shifts the impetus for action from reactivity to 
external pressures, to collaborative labour that is purposefully forming the 
environment. How, if at all, is this different from Dewey’s understanding of 
adaptation as a dialectic process? 
 
As pointed out above, to think of the mind in the context of its role in 
adaptation is also key to understanding Vygotsky’s concept of evolution and its 
relation to education. In defining adaptation as “the struggle of man with nature” 
(Vygotsky 1925/1987, 110), Vygotsky establishes the relation between humans and 
their environment as the ground premise of adaptation. This relation seems to be of 
the nature that the environment receives a certain power, with which ‘man’ is 
deemed to struggle. Human cognition, on that view is understood to be the result of 
biological adaptation to the demands of the environment. However, simultaneously, 
human cognition, in Vygotsky, contributes to the human species superseding the 
modus operandi of adaptation and natural selection with the help of “historically 
emerging forms of human intellect.” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987160) Consciousness, 
following Vygotsky, is a “higher form of adaptation” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 57) 
inducing a leap from evolution to history. 
 
In the context of Vygotsky’s idea of evolutionary leaps, a difference between 
him and Dewey begins to emerge. Dewey understands evolution to be a continuous 
process, Vygotsky’s understanding of evolution puts emphasis on the 
discontinuation of developmental paths. Human consciousness, in Dewey, has 
emerged gradually, and as the result of a qualitative leap, in Vygotsky. To use the 
words of Garrison (1995), “for Deweyans, individual minds emerge without 
discontinuity when natural organisms having the capacity to learn to participate in 
social activities involving labor, tools, and, above all, language.” (719, emphasis 
mine). The key words in this thought of Garrison are ‘without discontinuity’. In this 
quotation, it is crucial to mention, Garrison does not refer to discontinuity as the 
implicit counterpart to continuity in Dewey’s theory of educative experiences as it 
was discussed in the last chapter. What Garrison describes here, is Dewey’s 
concept of evolution; ‘without discontinuity’ means that for Dewey, growth is a 
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‘smooth’ process in which the individual reacts to adaptive pressures with 
integration – both through the transformation of the self and the environment. In 
contrast, in a Vygotskian perspective, developments consist of ‘breaks’ and ‘leaps’ 
onto new ‘planes’. Evolution is, thus, on an ontological level, discontinuous. ’Leaps’, 
in Vygotsky, are the discontinuation of developmental paths in which the 
“subsequent stage in development of behaviour […] negates the preceding stage.” 
(Vygotsky 1931/1987, 111; emphasis mine) The preceding stages of development, 
in that process, are “removed, eliminated, and sometimes converted into an 
opposite, higher stage.” (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 111) In this higher stage, Vygotsky 
suggests, “we must now view mind a [consisting of] special processes, which 
supplementary exist on top of and alongside the brain processes” (Vygotsky 1935- 
30/1987, 113). In the process of negation, following Vygotsky, hereditary forms of 
cognition are superseded. This superseding, however, is not the continuous 
integration we see in Dewey’s growth, but is characterised by negation. In the 
capacity for negation of hereditary forms of cognition and behaviour, in Vygotsky, 
lies the unique human capacity for labour (Dafermos 2018, 120). And this capacity 
for labour, in turn, means a qualitatively new way of humans relating to their 
environment that ‘lays’ outside of adaptation. On Vygotsky’s dialectic materialist 
perspective, it is the ability for collaborative labour that allows the human species to 
construct their own environmental conditions and therein superseding the need for 
adaptation understood as the constant ‘struggle’ against nature. Vygotsky writes on 
that point: “In animals we have passive adaptation to the environment, in human’s 
active adaptation of the environment to oneself” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 68). 
 
Vygotsky’s tapping into an adaptation-terminology, as he does in the 
quotation above, is confusing – if adaptation is negated and superseded by 
something ‘higher’, then why are we still talking about ‘active adaptation’? It would 
be necessary to look into the Russian original here in order to rule out the possibility 
of the confusion stemming from issues with the English translation. The next best 
thing, it appears to me, is to refer to the estimate of Anna Stetsenko – a renowned 
Vygotsky scholar working with both the Russian original and the English translations 
– who argues that the term ‘active adaptation’ “could be more precisely termed 
active collaborative transformation of nature.” (Stetsenko 2012, 148) She 
unequivocally supports the reading of Vygotsky that I have presented thus far in this 
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chapter, namely, as a theory of cultural evolution widely detached from 
environmental adaptation. On Stetsenko’s (2017) view, “human development is a 
collaborative and creative work-in-progress by people acting together in pursuit of 
their goals while, in the process, always moving beyond the status quo and its 
existing conditions and limitations.” (35) In that, human development is not 
understood as defined by a reactive struggle with the environment, but rather by 
what is “taken up by people” (Stetsenko 2017, 35). As a consequence, in the 
context of Vygotsky, Stetsenko (2012) wants to move away from the term 
adaptation all together. On her view, Vygotsky’s concept of the leap describes 
precisely this “shift away from adaptation” (148), away from the notion of human 
development as “shaped by imperatives of survival and competition for what is 
typically taken to be limited resources available in the present, by individuals acting 
in solitude, each on one’s own, in maximizing individual gains while adjusting to the 
status quo.” (Stetsenko 2017, 36). Human existence according to Vygotsky, in 
contrast, for Stetsenko (2017), is a matter of “transcending them [environmental 
conditions, AN] in collective moving forward and jointly co-constructing these 
practices and, simultaneously, themselves.” (36) A similar perspective is presented 
by Marginson and Dang (2017, 120) who argue that in a Vygotskyan perspective, 
“humans created culture, their own artificial environment, which modified 
evolutionary determinism.” Based on this recent scholarship on Vygotsky’s rejection 
of an adaptation-paradigm, combined with the study of Vygotsky’s evolutionary 
ontology I come to the conclusion that the replacement of adaptation with labour 
through the conception of a ‘leap’ from evolution to history is a key characteristic of 
Vygotsky. 
 
5.2.3 Key themes of the evolutionary foundations in Vygotsky’s 
work 
Thus far it has been established that Vygotsky redefines human 
development as a process unravelling outside of natural laws, at the intersection of 
nature and culture. At this intersection, socio-cultural mechanisms of transformation 
with a different functionality emerge. In this understanding I am following the just 
presented reading of Stetsenko (2017), which is built on the assumption that 
Vygotsky defines human existence not in terms of biological adaptation, but as 
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unique due to the capacity for collaborative transformative activity, i.e. labour. On 
that view, natural selection and its pressures for adaptive activity is negated; it is 
superseded by “transformative social practice as the foundation of human existence 
– the very fabric of life, development, and human subjectivity.” (Stetsenko 2017, 
110) Human history begins with this negation of adaptation and the concomitant 
emergence of the purposeful transformation as the human modus operandi. 
However, in a Spinozian fashion, in the process of negation, adaptation is preserved 
in culture. Culture, thus, is not disconnected from nature, as it were, but has 
negated its previous relationship by reinstating a new form of relating (Roth&Jornet 
2017, 310). This functionally novel socio-cultural realm is the result of a leap from 
biological evolution to history enabled by the one-of-a-kind cognitive structural 
disposition evolved in the phylogeny of the human species. These evolved cognitive 
abilities furnished the human capacity to make history, i.e. to collaboratively 
transform environmental conditions and biological inherited tendencies through 
labour, positioning human existence outside of the need for externally defined 
adaptation. 
 
This perspective aligns with Vygotsky’s view that contemporary psychology, 
by being predominantly concerned with the study of reflexes and the establishment 
of a commonplace with other animals in evolution, underappreciated “the 
development of human behaviour beginning where the line of biological evolution 
ends – the line of historical of cultural development corresponding to the whole 
historical path of humanity.” (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 16) The nature of the leap, first in 
its occurrence in phylogeny, and then it its ongoing manifestation within individual 
ontogeny, is thus, what Vygotsky appears to have been concerned mainly. It also 
furnished Vygotsky’s concept of education, which, on Vygotsky’s perspective, is a 
core component of, in Stetsenko’s (2012) view, “the beginning of a uniquely human 
life in phylogeny (and the advent of the human species as such)” (167). Instead of 
conceptualising human activity as fully consistent with other animals, as being 
centred around a reactivity to the environmental demands – as it is the case in 
purely Darwinian, adaptation-centred accounts of human existence – Vygotsky 
thought of human existence as focused on purposeful transformation through the 
mastering of “auxiliary means (language, letter, number, sign, and symbols) that 
mankind has created.” (Dafermos 2018, 128) 
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5.3 Vygotsky’s theory of education 
 
5.3.1 Education as artificial development 
 
Vygotsky directly applied his concept of evolution to the study of individual 
development, learning, and the nature and significance of educational, pedagogical 
processes. He (1930/1987) writes: “Evolutionism in the study of development of the 
child’s behaviour must yield to more adequate ideas that take into account the 
completely unique dialectical character of the processes of formation of new mental 
forms.” (43) Thus, analogously to the dialectic relationship between evolution and 
history in phylogeny, in the life of each individual, the innate hereditary experience is 
transformed in an ongoing process marked by negation, leading to the emergence 
of higher psychological functions and conceptual thinking. Within this ongoing 
process of the reformation of hereditary experience in relation the socio-cultural 
reality through the integration of cultural tools and social relations, is precisely, 
where Vygotsky locates education (Dafermos 2018, 101). 
 
Vygotsky (1931/1987) defines education as “the artificial development of the 
child.” (110) Education, in that conception, describes the negating process at the 
heart of the individual’s lifelong transformation based on the integration and 
elaboration of cultural, social, and psychological tools. It “is the artificial mastery of 
natural processes of development. Education not only influences certain processes 
of development but restructures all functions of behaviour in a most essential 
manner.” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 88) Education, on this perspective, is the 
development of the artificial relationship mediated by tools and collaborative labour 
that the individual establishes with the world (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 110). It is the 
process of reforming unconditional hereditary experiences into conditional historical 
behaviour; the process in which “the child arms and re-arms himself with widely 
varying tools” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 88). 
 
I will now explore the developmental leap on the level of ontogeny in its relation 
to Vygotsky’s notion of learning and labour. From that analysis I will draw out 
Vygotsky’s concept of education as artificial development and locate within the 
broader framework of Vygotsky’s psychology and evolutionary philosophy. To that 
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end I will first ‘zoom-in’ to the ontogenetic dimension of the negation of adaptation 
through processes learning. Secondly, I will discuss the wider philosophical 
implications of Vygotsky’s concept of learning in relation to his theory of cultural 
evolution, respectively revolution. In concluding this analysis on Vygotsky’s concept 
of education as artificial development I will talk about the Marxist notion of labour 
and its bearings for a Vygotskian theory of education. 
 
5.3.1.1 Vygotskian ontogenesis – the socio-biological development of 
the individual 
 
As discussed above, Vygotsky thought of human phylogenetic evolution as 
distinct from other animals in that it entailed a developmental leap from evolution 
into the particular realm of human history-making. Within that leap, through the 
emergent functionality of human cognition, the human species superseded the 
adaptation paradigm and entered a novel sphere of existence in the world. As 
mentioned above, Vygotsky directly applied these insights, and in particular his idea 
of a leap, to the study of individual development and education. 
 
Ensuing from this theoretical foundation, in Vygotsky, individual development – 
and with it the developmental leap allowing humans to exist outside of the 
parameters of adaptation – is to be understood as a process of sociogenesis. 
Following the definition of Roth and Jornet (2017), sociogenesis means that “higher 
psychological functions originate as, not merely in social relations, thereby 
generating both social facts and social persons.” (viii) In Vygotsky’s (1931/1987) 
own words, “the mental nature of man represents the totality of social relations 
internalized and made into functions of the individual and forms of his structure.” 
(106). Stemming from Vygotsky’s Marxist heritage, he sees social interactions as 
the origin of the higher mental functions that allow for the particular human relating 
to her/his environment. It is in social interaction that the inherited adaptations, i.e. 
the innate tendencies and capacities, are negated and replaced with the new, and 
qualitatively different, historical experience. Human’s higher mental functions, thus, 
emerge in the context of collaborative practice; human cognition is, from the very 
beginning, “thinking-for-doing” (Roth&Jornet 2017, 18) rather than thinking for 
reacting to adaptive pressures. 
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5.3.1.2 The role of learning 
 
Learning, in Vygotsky’s theory, takes up a key role within the human 
individual’s existence and development outside of the realm of adaptation. 
Vygotsky’s concept of learning, I contend, is closely associated with his idea of 
‘historical experiences’ in contrast to ‘inherited experiences’. 
 
Vygotsky (1925-30/1987) believed that human development essentially has 
two components. The first is biological, based on what he called “hereditary” (58) or 
“physically inherited experience” (68). Hereditary experience is “formed by the 
change in their organs under the influence of certain environmental influences” 
(Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 57) and, therein, submitted to the Darwinian principle of 
natural selection. Hereditary experiences are transmitted through physical 
inheritance. The second form of development “consists in the change in the animal’s 
behaviour without a change in the structure of the body.” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 
57, emphasis mine) It is non-hereditary, “historical experience” (Vygotsky 1935- 
30/1987, 58) made by the individual. It is from historical experience that the 
qualitative change, this leap that Vygotsky conceives of emerges. 
 
Historical experiences are not physically inherited but based on experiences 
made by the individual in her/his life. Inherent to the concept of historical 
experience, is Vygotsky’s idea of learning meaning the acquisition of historical 
experiences and their negating properties in regard to innate tendencies. Historical 
experience allows humans to overturn their hereditary experience, to negate them in 
relation to the socio-cultural reality they inhabit. Historical experience, or learning 
understood as the acquisition of historical experience, is different from biological 
evolution in the relationship it enables between the organism and the environment – 
it is more flexible, and, naturally, much faster than physical adaptation. Educational 
practices that are aimed at the facilitation and direction of such experiences, are a 
key component of non-hereditary adaptation, i.e. the making and consolidating of 
experiences made in culture and society. 
 
This conception of learning as the acquisition of historical experiences and 
the concomitant negation of hereditary experiences as the result of learning can be 
analysed philosophically or psychologically. Philosophically, I argue, the process of 
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the negation of adaptation through learning as an underlying existential principle 
describes Vygotsky’s concept of Bildsamkeit. The renewed relationship to the world 
that the human species was able to establish based on the emergence of mind, 
following Vygotsky, is what makes the human species unique amongst other 
animals. The mind allows for a ‘higher form of adaptation’ which involves the 
formation of a new relationship between humans and their environment. The mind 
also mediates between the individual’s cultural formation in relation to its 
hereditary experience. This grounding of human existence within the socio-culturally 
contextualised negation of the individual’s inherited tendencies builds the foundation 
for human Bildsamkeit, i.e. perfectibility (English 2013, 373). Bildsamkeit is a 
Herbartian concept defined by English (2013, 373) as the idea that “all human 
beings are capable of being formed by the world and also forming the world around 
them.” In Vygotsky’s evolutionary conception focused on the emergence of the 
human mind and its transcending properties, Bildsamkeit means the human 
capacity for ‘a higher form of adaptation’ that lies outside of the externalism of 
Darwinian adaptation. As a result of this leap outside of the realm of adaption, in a 
Vygotskian perspective, humans are much freer from their innate equipment than in 
a Herbartian notion of Bildsamkeit. Following a Vygotskian conception, Bildsamkeit 
is what makes humans increasingly able to make choices and employ activities that 
are outside of their natural disposition. Even though endowed capacities and 
tendencies play an important role – because of their constitutive impact on the 
process of negation – in Vygotsky’s view, they are secondary to human Bildsamkeit 
(Vygotsky 1931/1987). More important is the potential that collaborative activities 
offer. 
 
Vygotsky’s idea of the capacity for historical experience to overturn inherited 
tendencies being connected to an increase in human self-determination appears to 
expose the important Spinozian heritage in Vygotsky’s thinking. From Spinoza, and 
especially from Marx’s Spinoza, Vygotsky adopted his notion of freedom as self- 
determination (Derry 2013, 85). On that view, freedom is not a given aspect to 
human nature, but rather a developmental achievement, a state of “active self- 
determination” (Dafermos 2018, 17) preceded by struggle. Freedom, therein, is 
understood as an act of reason and purpose, rather than immediate volition, or 
passions emerging from direct external stimuli (Derry 2013, 85). What guides 
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purpose and reason, in Spinozism, is insights gained into the encountered reality 
and the concomitant “mastery of external determinations” (Derry 2013, 90). It is 
through learning, it follows, that humans become free from nature (Dafermos 2018, 
72). The Spinozian notion of freedom crucially informed Vygotsky’s conception of 
the emergence of higher mental functions as a developmental achievement in a 
specific context of struggle. It also contributed significantly to his characterisation of 
how the unique human cognitive capacities constitute the distinguishing human 
ability to make history, i.e. “to make ourselves a space within which we can 
determine our actions” (Derry 2013, 91), rather than to be exposed to the biological 
force of evolution. Furthermore, the Spinozian notion of freedom and its relation to 
learning also had a significant influence on the important of instruction and of 
scientific concepts in the context of his educational theory: insights into the relations 
of the world that allow for purposeful activity rather than activity driven by passion, in 
Vygotsky’s account of development and learning, rely on instruction. This gives 
education understood as a social activity of intergenerational instruction directed at 
supporting learners to gain these insights that allow them to act in freedom a key 
role in Vygotsky’s psychology. 
 
Psychologically, the formability of individuals in relation to the world is a process 
of negation unconditional reflexes with conditional reflexes. Unexpectedly, perhaps, 
if we consider what has been said about radical behaviourism and its reductionist 
psychological implications in the preceding chapter – when it comes to the 
foundation of his psychology, Vygotsky pursued the explanatory framework of a 
stimulus-response logic (DeVries 2000, 188). He (1934a/1987) writes: “The 
mechanism of the conditional reflex is a bridge thrown from the biological laws of the 
formation of hereditary adaptation established by Darwin to the sociological laws 
established by Marx.” (59) On his view, in the process of interacting with others, the 
unconditional reflexes that the child is born with are overturned into conditional 
reflexes, i.e. reflexes that are formed in relation to the immediate experience of the 
individual (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 111). In this, conditional, or environment specific, 
reflexes are, at first instance at least, an important adaptive strategy as they allow 
for an “infinite diversity of the organism’s responses.” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 156) 
Vygotsky (1931/1987) characterises this process of “master[ing] the stimuli” (112) – 
in this notion we recognise the Spinozian notion of freedom as a detachment from 
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immediate urges and passions. In the transformation of the unconditional reflexes 
into conditional ones, the individual gains increasing freedom over her/his activity; 
this freedom manifests in the ability to transform the environment purposefully. 
 
5.3.1.3 The problem of Cartesianism 
 
Above, I have presented the argument that Vygotsky, with his Marxist 
reinterpretation of Darwin, has moved beyond the adaptation paradigm. One might 
justifiably ask, how this understanding, which I share with Stetsenko (2012), and 
Roth and Jornet (2017), is compatible with Vygotsky’s assessment of 
consciousness as “fully and completely reduced to transmitting mechanisms of 
reflexes that work according to general laws, i.e., no processes other than reactions 
can be accepted to exist in the organism.” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 73) Vygotsky 
(1925-30/1987) defines reaction as the “response of the organism, its adaptive 
action to some element of the environment that influences it.” (154) It appears from 
this phrasing, that Vygotsky re-establishes a Cartesian duality between the self and 
the world, and, therein, actually falls back into an externalist adaptation paradigm 
which he, so the argument developed in this chapter, sought to transcend. 
 
One attempt to solve this hermeneutic issue is to think of the Spinozian influence 
In Vygotsky: While the unconditional reactions are negated in relation to the 
environment, in that very same moment, they also continue to exist, “manifested 
and existing only in a different form and different expression.” (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 
111) From this we can take that in Vygotsky, unconditional and conditional reflexes 
do not have to be fundamentally, categorically different, in order to manifest 
qualitatively different. A human activity that is derived from higher mental functioning 
and aims at transforming purposefully, rather than adapting reactively, on a 
Spinozian reading of Vygotsky, can be understood as having emerged as a reaction 
to environmental stimuli, while, simultaneously, can be understood to have 
manifested in a different form, superseding its origin. The leap that occurs as 
negation resulting from processes learning, therefore, has to be looked as in a 
Spinozian idea of negation, where superseding does not mean erasing, or 
detaching. Rather, as we have established above, in the process of negation the 
previous status of existence prevails in a new form. The supposed duality between 
nature and culture in Vygotsky, thus, has to be looked at in the light of the principle 
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of negation. The emergence of the mind in evolution is a necessary condition for the 
emergence of what Vygotsky calls the ‘higher form of adaptation’, or the human 
capacity for labour, which is actually a negation of the parameters of adaptation 
(Stetsenko 2012). Nature, therefore, is a constitutive part of culture, even though its 
workings no longer apply in the same way in the realm of human history-making 
(Vygotsky 1930/1987, 42). 
 
On that dialectic view, the person and the environment are seen “as two 
different, always one-sided manifestations of the same phenomenon, which is that 
of a transactional relation.” (Roth&Jornet 2017, 16) The achievement of freedom 
from externalism that Vygotsky derived from his Spinozian heritage, thus, has to be 
understood as a process, rather than a telos. The “mastery of external 
determinations” (Derry 2013), I think based on reading Vygotsky’s psychology in the 
broader philosophical context it stands in, is the aim of educative processes. To 
further clarify Vygotsky’s dissolution of the Darwinian adaptation paradigm and how 
it relates to his concept of education, I will now delve further into the nature of this 
transactional relation. 
 
5.3.2 Integration and Mediation 
 
In Vygotsky, higher mental functions are characterised by, what I would describe 
as a general principle of integration. By that I mean the integration of tools into 
purposeful activity, as well as the integration of social relations into mental functions. 
I use the term integration rather than internalization – a term used in the translation 
of Vygotsky’s works - because ‘internalization’ reinforces a dualistic 
misunderstanding of the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ (Roth&Jornet 2017, 19). 
Vygotsky (1925-30/1987) writes on the point of the integration of tools and relations 
into existing, hereditary mental functions: “In the behaviour of man we encounter 
quite a number of artificial devices for mastering his own mental processes.” (85) On 
that view, while conditional reflexes can indeed be conceptualised as reactions to 
external stimuli, the nature of the reactivity has changes dramatically throughout the 
process of integration: While in their unconditional form they are direct, and 





According to Vygotsky, the negation of adaptation takes place through the 
collective invention, elaboration, and ultimate integration of “auxiliary means” 
(Vygotsky 1934b/1987, 56) into the mental activity of the individual. Broadly 
speaking, auxiliary means are tools, such as signs, practices, and language, which, 
in the process of integration transform into psychological capacities or habits 
(Dafermos 2018, 140). In accordance with the primacy of the social as one of the 
main pillars of Vygotsky’s thinking, these auxiliary means first emerge in social 
interaction (intermental) and are later transformed into psychological tools 
(intramental) that allow for the internal direction of activity. Internalised tools, thus, 
mediate the relationship between the individual and her/his surroundings: 
 
In the instrumental act a new middle term is inserted between the 
object and the mental operation directed at it: the psychological 
tool, which becomes the structural centre of focus, i.e., the aspect 
that functionally determines all the processes that form the 
instrumental act. Any behavioural act then becomes an 
intellectual operation. (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 87) 
 
Through the integration of tools into hereditary adaptations, or unconditional 
reactions of the individual, higher mental functions, allowing for doubled experience, 
emerge. As already mentioned above, higher mental functions furnishing doubled 
experience are different from hereditary adaptation in their less “direct structure of 
elementary mental processes” (Vygotsky 1934b/1987, 37). Through the process of 
integration of tools through collaborative labour, however, mental capacities do not 
develop gradually. Rather, analogously to the leap Vygotsky envisaged on the level 
of phylogeny, these emerging higher mental functions demonstrate a new 




As established above, the unique human cognition and its ability for 
transformative collaborative activity emerge from social relations. Higher mental 
functions, to be more precise, fist exist as communication, as “means of association” 
(Vygotsky 1943b/1987, 169). It is through communicative speech that mere 
interaction with others becomes active transformative practice. Speaking, on that 
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view, is inherently connected to thought. It is not, however, a mere representation, 
but rather a constitutive part of the thinking process itself. In his own words, 
Vygotsky (1934a/1987) emphasises: Thought “is not expressed, but completed in 
the word.” (296). Language combines the communicative, interactive function with 
the function of meaning-making. Through language, individual experience is shared 
and thus reveals its meaning “in generalization” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 251) in the 
process of communication and association with other’s experiences. The process of 
generalization causes thought to be “restructured as it is transformed into speech.” 
(Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 251) Thinking, thus, is inherently social in its formation 
connected with language. 
 
Language is also a key component of the leap from animal cognition to the 
unique traits of human consciousness. Vygotsky follows Marx by arguing that 
emerged with the aim or purposefully transforming the environment and therein alter 
the conditions of existence: “Thinking is for acting and speaking and therefore 
marked by needs and affect.” (Roth&Jornet 2017, 6) Language functions as a tool 
connecting the individual with others and enabling and mediating collaborative 
labour. Thinking and language, thus, share genetic roots forming “a unity of thinking 
and communication” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 49). In Vygotsky, there is a 
development from external to internal speech, with what he calls “egocentric 
speech” (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 15) as its intermediate form. Egocentric speech, i.e. 
the audible, external formulation of words and sentences without a communicative 
purpose signify the process of integration, i.e. the process of speech turning inward 
in a metamorphosis from language as a social tool to thought as an internal, 
psychological tool (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 22). While animals have rudimentary forms 
of communication as well, human communication through language is unique 
because of this transitory process from external to internal (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 
113). In its integrated form, speech becomes thinking, “it is converted from the 
reflecting accompanying function into a planning function, shifting to the beginning 
of the process, transferring from one operation to another.” (Vygotsky 1934b/1987, 
114) Language, at the point of adolescence, as the result of the “transition from 
direct, innate, natural forms and methods of behaviour to mediated, artificial mental 
functions that develop in the process of cultural development” (Vygotsky 
1934b/1987, 168) has become a psychological tool mediating the individual’s 
146  
relationship with the world, while at the same time, assigning generalised meaning 
to the world. 
 
5.3.3 Labour and education – human’s second nature 
 
The combination of Marx and Darwin allowed Vygotsky to conceptualise the 
qualitative developmental leap that distinguishes evolution from history – evolution 
follows the Darwinian principles of natural selection and adaptation; history and 
culture do not (Dafermos 2018, 83). The nature of the developmental leap of the 
human species during the evolution of the mind, and how, analogously, ‘leaps’ are 
performed in individual learning is a key foundation of his educational theory. The 
Bildsamkeit of the human animal allows her/him to supersede their own hereditary, 
adaptive tendencies, urges and capabilities through learning. Whilst growing up, the 
individual undergoes the learning negation of its hereditary constitution by 
integrating socio-cultural tools and relations into its own mental activity. This 
formation, i.e. the negating process by the integration of and mediation through 
tools, is how Vygotsky’s defines education. Following his transformative, rather than 
relational ontology, education happens not in relation to socio-cultural reality, but 
rather as socio-cultural reality. On that view, educational processes occur within the 
individual’s collaborative participation in socio-cultural practices. 
 
To define collaborative socio-cultural practice, Vygotsky draws from a 
historical materialist conception of labour. Vygotsky was a convinced Marxist when it 
came to his views of cultural evolution and its relation to nature. Historical 
materialism – which he deemed to be the “most abstract science” (Vygotsky 1925- 
30/1987, 331) –, on Vygotsky’s view, ought to be the foundation of a “natural 
scientific psychology” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 338). Historical materialism is a 
branch of Marxist theory studying the relationship between the material reality and 
the forces of production – i.e. the means and materials accessible to human labour 
– available to a group of individuals who collaborate in their attempt “to alter their 
natural environment to suit their particular needs” (Buchanan 2018). On a historical 
materialist view, “the development of history is not determined by the desires or 
actions of specific human subjects, but instead shaped by the objective facts of 
material existence.” (Buchanan 2018) Marx used the metaphor of ‘metabolism’ to 
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describe the relationship between humans and their environment: Through the 
purposeful intervention and mediation with tools, which alters the immediate 
influence of the environment on the individual, he or she is an agent within that 
relationship, mediating its ‘metabolism’ (Foster 2016, 141). Following a Marxist 
anthropology, the ability to transform the natural environment and its ‘metabolism’ 
through collaborative human labour, forms a unique human capacity that 
fundamentally altered their relationship to nature and evolution. The transformative 
relationship that, on that view, can be understood as a kind of ‘second human 
nature’. 
 
Labour, meaning the purposeful transformation of the natural environment 
that constitutes human’s unique relationship with nature, is directly connected to the 
emergence of human cognition, and, therein, the leap away from adaptation 
(Buchanan 2019). Following a Marxist conception, Vygotsky (1931/1987) thinks of 
consciousness as emerging in social relation: “We could say that the relations 
between higher mental functions were at one time real relations between people. I 
relate to myself in the same way that people relate to me.” (103; see also 
Roth&Jornet 2017, 182) Individual consciousness, we begin to gather from this, is 
not naturally pre-determined or formed individualistically. Rather, it is formed by the 
historical and social reality in which the individual lives and interacts. This rooting of 
Vygotsky’s psychology in the human capacity for collaborative labour centres the 
cultural development of the human species on the collaborative development of 
tools (Stetsenko 2012, 148). While other species also use tools and collaborative, 
culture-like practices to transform their environment, following Vygotsky, they do so 
“only in a rudimentary form” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 68). What makes the 
qualitative difference in the use of tools and culture, in Vygotsky, is the uniquely 
human cognitive capacity for “doubled experience” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 68). 
 
Doubled experience means the ability to ‘play out’ an activity mentally, an in 
that process of testing the activity adjust it and the tools used for its execution. On 
Vygotsky’s perception, animals have an immediate, unmediated relationship with 
the tools that surround them (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 25). They use the tools that 
present themselves to them in the moment and apply them to problems that present 
themselves to them. Humans, in contrast, due to their specific cognitive ability of 
doubled experience can generate “stimuli sui generis” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 73). 
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This means that they can think of tools that are not immediately present, imagine 
and reimagine their application, and administer them in regard to problems they 
chose themselves, respectively, in a collaborative group interaction. “The temporal 
field created for action with the help of speech extends not only backward, but also 
forward.” (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 35) Humans, on Vygotsky’s (1930/1987) view, in 
their particular use of tools create a “completely new psychological field for action” 
(35). Instead of standing into a reactive relationship with the environment, “man is 
cognizant of the developing situation” (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 208), anticipating and 
intervening with foresight in order to achieve a desired result. 
 
5.3.4 From a relational to a transformative ontology 
 
Consciousness, in Vygotsky, has evolved in connection to the collaborative 
active transformation of the environment, and, in that, has led to a new form of 
human evolution in culture and history. Stetsenko (2017), in agreement of Roth and 
Jornet’s (2017) reading of that process, emphasises that “the mind – an all 
individual objectives, that is, processes such as contemplating, goal setting, 
planning, understanding, feeling, thinking, and so on – are viewed in this 
perspective as instantiations of collaborative practices” (159). It has to be 
emphasised again, however, that sociogenesis, in its dialectic nature, is not purely 
cultural. This sort of dualism between nature and culture is precisely what the 
process of sociogenesis, i.e. the negation of hereditary adaptations in collaborative 
practice, might be able to overcome. Vygotsky (1934b/1987) notes on that point: 
“The history of the development of higher forms of behaviour discloses a direct and 
close dependence on organic, biological development of the child and on the growth 
of his elementary psychological functions.” (34) Therefore, when speaking about 
individual development, it is crucial to consider the biological side in its “dynamic 
synthesis” (Vygotsky 1934b/1987, 34) with history, culture and society that takes 
place within the individual’s lifetime. 
 
According to Stetsenko (2017), Vygotsky transcends the relational ontological 
perspective of his predecessors, introducing a new, transformative ontology. 
Therein, human existence is understood in the context of deliberate, transformative 
activity, rather than adaptation. Even though, as discussed above, Vygotsky does 
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use the term adaptation – incongruously perhaps – according to Stetsenko’s (2011) 
reading, its meaning goes beyond the dialectical adaptation that we have seen in 
Dewey’s growth. In Vygotsky, humans relate to the world not in the form of a “bi- 
directional interaction” (34), but rather within a “unified (rather than bifurcated) and 
unique ontological realm” (34) On that view, “the object and subject are seen as 
ontologically (i.e. in their existential status) co-existent and co-determined through 
and as composed of relations between them” (Stetsenko 2017, 124), instead of 
‘being in interaction’ with each other. This interpretation of human existence as non- 
relational, i.e. as not divided into an internal and an external that interact, has 
important repercussions for Vygotsky’s notion of environment and, in particular, his 
throughs on how the environment educates. In Vygotsky, “both culture and nature 
are understood as an inherent dimension of human collaborative practices rather 
than as outside sources of influence.” (Stetsenko 2011, 35) With his transformative 
ontology, Vygotsky moves beyond the “structure-agency dualism” (Dafermos 2018, 
185) inherent in relational ontologies. 
 
Following Stetsenko’s (2017) argumentation, I conclude that in Vygotsky mind 
and body, individual and society are ontologically connected – however, this 
connection is not a relationship between two separates, but they only exist in this 
relation. In contrast to other contemporary evolutionary psychologists and 
philosophers, Vygotsky “moves beyond the relational worldview, in considering 
human development specifically in the context of social and historically evolving 
reality and, in a related move, considering history specifically in the context of 
human social practices.” (161) In order to conceptualise this formative human social 
practice, I contend, Vygotsky drew from the historical materialist concept of labour. 
In collaborative labour, the individual is not adapting to external surroundings in 
collaboration with others, but is collaboratively shaping the environment. The 
relationship is not reactive, but purposeful. In this collaborative activity, the individual 
negates her/his hereditary experience and is ‘artificially formed’. This artificial 
formation is what Vygotsky understands education to be. The human animal, 
figuratively speaking, is ‘artificially’ reformed in the process of education and 
developing a ‘second nature’ based on the socio-cultural reality of the collaborative 
activity he/she participates in. The individual is and becomes in collaborative labour 
by integrating tools and, therein, negating innate tendencies and endowments. The 
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transpiring notion of human nature derived from the individual-environment unit, as 
well as the inherent struggle at the heart of this unit – involving negation and 
reformation –, is a core foundation of Vygotsky’s educational theory. 
 
5.3.5 Vygotsky’s non-externalist concept of environment 
 
The artificial formation of the individual means the negation of hereditary 
experience through learning, or ‘historical experience’. Learning is, following 
Vygotsky’s notion of the primacy of the social, the process of integration of 
behaviours developed within collaborative, social activity (Derry 2013, 33). 
Simultaneously, in the process of transforming the learner, learning processes also 
transform the socio-cultural reality. This, we have mentioned above in relation to the 
notion of Bildsamkeit, is a constitutive part of the human condition. Stetsenko (2011) 
writes that these collaborative activities “also create and constantly transform their 
[the learner’s, AN] very life, consequently changing themselves in fundamental 
ways, while, in and through this process, becoming human and gaining self- 
knowledge about the world.” (33) In this process of existing within the socio-cultural 
reality, this reality receives its meaning, which “continuously and cumulatively 
evolve[s] through time, constituting the realm of social history and culture while 
being enacted” (Stetsenko 2012, 149). 
 
Tools and social relations could easily be misunderstood dualistically to be part 
of an external environment that is shaping the development of the individual 
externally. However, according to what seems to be the common reading of 
Vygotsky, tools and cultural-historical artefacts involved in the process of integration 
are not ontologically static, but rather dynamic and interpretative. As discussed 
above, in Vygotsky, tools and historical artefacts do not hold an inherent, objective 
meaning, or functionality. Rather, they are interpreted in a social group (Stetsenko 
2017). This means that in contrast to an idea of adaptation occurring in an external 
reality that is more or less given in its demands on the subject, the realm of human 
existence in Vygotsky is much more fluid. Reality, we follow Stetsenko (2017), is 
“understood as a unique realm that we not so much dwell or find ourselves situated 
in, but rather, that we agentively enact as co-creators”. (181) Glassmann (2001) 
states, on that point that “it is not the activity that gives meaning to historical 
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artefacts, but historical artefacts that give meaning to the activity.” (7) This means 
that the meaning, use, and applicability of tools and artefacts are not externally 
predefined, but a matter of collaborative interpretation and participation. On my 
opinion, this reading of Vygotsky’s notion of tools not meaning ‘things’ or objectively 
existing structures, but rather a matter of social construction, is correct. Looking at 
Vygotsky’s writings, he states that “psychological tools are artificial formations. By 
their nature they are social and not organic or individual devices.” (Vygotsky 1925- 
30/1987, 85) Through their integration, the innate disposition of the individual is 
altered in accordance with the meanings and purposes developed in social 
interaction (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 158). 
 
In subjecting to his will the process of his own reactions, man 
enters in this way into a substantially new relation with the 
environment, comes to a new functional exploitation of elements 
in the environment as stimulus-signs, which he uses, depending 
on external means, and directs and controls his own behaviour, 
controls himself from outside, compelling stimuli-signs to affect 
him, and elicits reactions that he desires. (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 
63) 
 
These meanings and purposes, I emphasise again with this quote, are not 
externally determined, but rather co-constructed in the social group changing the 
modus operandi of human activity form adaptation to purposeful collaborative 
transformation of the environment, or, in short, labour. 
 
Reality is not a place or environment, but rather “a dynamic field or arena of 
collective practice” (Stetsenko 2017, 192). In Vygotsky, it follows, “social practices 
and their products are not reified at any analytical step in their descriptions.” 
(Stetsenko 2017, 193) This means that in Vygotsky’s argumentation, in which the 
modus operandi of adaptation is superseded in human existence, ‘the social’ is 
never turned into an environment with external demands. The way Vygotsky 
replaces an externalist notion of environment with a notion of participatory reality as 
the ontological realm of existence, I read in the context of his rejection of a 
Darwinian adaptation paradigm. The relationship replacing the adaption paradigm in 
Vygotsky, is closely connected to Vygotsky’s ideas related to processes of 
integration and mediation: Humans, on that view, are no longer forced to adapt to 
the environment, or direct their activities at adapting the environment to them based 
on external pressures. Instead, human integrate the world into their activity, making 
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it a constitutive part of their nature. In the process of integration, not only “the 
natural process undergoes a profound reconstruction, being converted into a 
circuitous, mediated act” (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 55), but also the tools and cultural 
practices themselves are changed. In that very process, according to Vygotsky 
(1930/1987), they are “ceasing to be external” as they are “being reorganized into 
most complex internal psychological systems.” (55). The world and the individual 
move closer together, in that sense that the former becomes increasingly 
constitutive part of the individual’s activity; all that exists in the socio-cultural 
surroundings of the individual – be it material, or not –, is integrated into the 
individual’s mental operations. I use the term ‘socio-cultural’ to describe the 
‘lifeworld’ of the individual because in Vygotsky culture and the social can be used 
virtually interchangeably as, for Vygotsky (1931/1987), “everything cultural is social” 
(106). Tools, therein, are understood to be changing in accordance with, and as an 
inducing entity of cultural development in society. They are changeable in essence; 
they are ontologically ‘in-progress’ and know no static existence (Marginson&Dang 
2017, 119). On that view, tools – both material and psychological – do not have an 
existence outside of the social practices, which breaks up the internal-external 
dichotomy. 
 
I have argued throughout this chapter that the developmental leap is the 
most important component of Vygotsky’s educational theory. In the process of 
participating in the collaborative practice that is labour, as we have established at 
this point, is where the educative process of the individual occurs and where 
humans create their own existence outside of the realm of adaptation. Through the 
integration of social relations into psychological functions, the individual supersedes 
hereditary, adaptive tendencies and develops a new mode of being in the world. 
What is missing from the analysis at this point, is the differentiation between 
learning and education. To that end, I will now focus in on the detailed nature of the 
educative process and its involvement in learning, and developmental leaps of 
individuals by looking at the role of instruction in Vygotsky’s notion of education as 
the artificial development of the individual through collaborative socio-cultural 
practice. 
 
Through labour the human species has created – and keeps on creating – a 
new relationship with the environment. While other animals maintain a reactive, 
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adaptive relationship with their surroundings, humans purposefully create their 
surrounding according not to natural necessity, but within purposeful social practice. 
The emergent mental abilities that allow the leap into collaborative history-making 
are different from “the direct structure of elementary mental processes” (Vygotsky 
1930/1987, 37) because they are supplemented by tools. The cognitive ability of 
doubled experience breaks up the immediacy in tool use found in animals and 
allows for a more flexible and purposeful use of tools in humans, than in other 
animals. This difference between humans and other animals, it is important to note, 
is not a mere quantitative elaboration of the former’s abilities. Instead, Vygotsky 
emphasises: 
 
The history of development of each of the higher mental functions 
is not the direct continuation and further improvement of the 
corresponding elementary functions, but undergoes a radical 
change of direction in development and a subsequent movement 
of the process to a completely different plane. (Vygotsky 
1930/1987, 42) 
 
The leap from evolution to history, from adaptation to labour, marks the 
result of a process of negating the hereditary experience that humans share with 
other animals. It is a qualitative difference. As described above, on my reading, 
Vygotsky applied his views of phylogenetic evolution – and its transcendence 
through labour – to his notions of individual development. This means however, that 
it is yet to be establish what the qualitative leap on the level of ontogenetic evolution 
consist of and how formal education and learning come into play. 
 
5.4 Instruction, teaching and development 
 
Thus far I have outlined the process of negation occurring within the 
individual’s growth through learning. From this it has not yet become clear, how, in 
Vygotsky’s understanding, education differs from learning. In order to arrive at what 
differentiates education from learning, I will now move on to introduce the crucial 
difference that Vygotsky makes between learning and development. After having 
introduced that important distinction, I will advance to specify the relationship 
between education and learning, and education and development with an 
evolutionary re-narration of Vygotsky’s ZPD. 
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5.4.1 Development vs. learning 
 
Learning, in recapitulation of what has been said so far, is the primary 
condition for humans to create a realm of existence outside of adaptation. Through 
historical experiences made in processes of learning, individuals become 
increasingly self-determined in their activity. This self-determination allows for a 
particular form of relating to the environment, which Vygotsky called ‘higher 
adaptation’. What is yet missing, is the clarification of how the leap is different from 
learning, and how educational practices are involved in that difference. 
 
In Vygotsky, there exists an important difference between “development, a 
qualitative change”, and the processes of learning that it arises from, which are in 
themselves “a cumulative change.” (Roth&Jornet 2017, 28) As already discussed 
above, Vygotsky’s concept of development is closely related to the historical 
materialist conception of human existence as struggle. Within this struggle various 
points of crisis give rise to qualitative changes in the way an individual relates to 
her/his socio-cultural surroundings. These qualitative changes, or leaps, are what 
Vygotsky means by ‘development’. They lead to a fundamental change in the 
‘metabolism’ of the individual-world unit. Vygotsky describes this metabolic change 
as: 
 
The new structure of consciousness acquired at a given age 
inevitably signifies a new character of perceptions of external 
reality and activity in it, a new character of the child's perceiving 
his own mental life and the internal activity of his mental functions. 
(Vygotsky 1930b/1997, 199). 
 
Development, on his view, is the result of “drama”, of “living performance” 
(Stetsenko 2011, 32; see also Dafermos 2018, 184). Rather than being a gradual, 
accumulative, and fluid maturation, development emerges within processes of 
negation at the intersection of the individual’s sociogenetic development and the 
social context of its participation (Dafermos 2018, 175). In these processes of 
negation, “not only the use of tools is developing, but also a system of movement 
and perception, the brain and the hands, the whole organism of the child.” (Vygotsky 
1931/1987, 21) Development, thus, in Vygotsky describes a qualitative leap, a 
break, a negation, rather than accumulation. 
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Vygotsky (1931/1987) criticised that amongst his contemporaries, “evolution as 
development by gradual and slow accumulation of separate changes continues to 
be regarded as the only form of child development.” (99) According to Vygotsky 
(1931/1987), the concept of development was confounded in psychology, due to a 
“cryptic evolutionism” dominating a child psychology paradigm in which “evolution 
and revolution seem incompatible” (99). In Vygotsky’ however, evolution gave rise to 
revolution; through the evolved capacity of humans for labour, the species 
superseded the evolutionary, i.e. adaptive, relationship with the world, and 
established a renewed, transformative, i.e. labour-based, relating. Evolution, therein, 
is not merely gradual accumulation, but also inherently dialectic in its enabling of 
breaks, leaps, and new forms of non-evolutionary development. On that point 
Vygotsky wrote: 
 
The history of the cultural development of the child must be 
considered as analogous to the living process of biological 
evolution to how new species of animals developed gradually, 
how in the process of the struggle for existence, the old species 
became extinct, how catastrophically adaptation of the living 
organism to nature proceeded. (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 221) 
 
It is important to emphasise again, that learning as everyday experiences 
accumulated as historical experiences are not what Vygotsky understood to 
constitute the leap. Learning is merely the process of historical experience negating 
hereditary experiences and, therein, giving rise to the leap, or the revolution. 
 
In his own concept of evolution, Vygotsky attempted to merge evolution and 
revolution in the “socio-biological formation of the child personality.” (Vygotsky 
1931/1987, 20) Evolution, therein, means the mixture between structural maturation, 
i.e. physical processes of growth that enable certain developmental processes to 
emerge (Stetsenko 2017, 25), and processes of learning (Roth&Jornet 2017, 28) 
that give rise to developmental leaps. The ontogenetic manifestations of these leaps 
are the result of a process of sociogenesis (Glassman 2011, 4). This means that the 
process of learning can be understood as a process of manifesting, altering, 
negating, and transforming hereditary potentials in relation to the socio-cultural 
context, which then give rise to new forms of individual-environment unity. Learning, 
therein, is entirely context-dependent; this makes development fundamentally linked 
to culture, instead of being biologically predetermined. It is a matter of learning 
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opportunities in combination with spectrums of innate potentials that enable certain 
developmental leaps and, therein, inform the relationship between the individual and 
her/his socio-cultural reality (Stetsenko 2012, 148). Regarding his conception of 
learning, Vygotsky resembles the doing-undergoing character of Dewey’s growth 
understood as gradual development. The two differ, however, in that Vygotsky does 
not think of this process as accumulative, but instead as consisting of leaps: While 
Vygotsky’s concept of learning resembles the movement of Dewey’s growth 
regarding their gradual nature and focus on previous experiences, Vygotsky’s 
concept of development conjures the moment when accumulation is interrupted, 
and a qualitatively different path of ‘growth’, or learning, begins. 
 
Learning, in summary, in a Vygotskian perspective, can be understood as the 
precursor for development. Regarding the nature of the latter, Diaz et al (1990, 127) 
write that "the common denominators of these transformations or developmental 
changes are the decreasing power of immediate environmental contingencies and 
the increasing role of self-formulated plans and goals in the regulation of behaviour 
and cognitive activity." What transforms learning into development, i.e. into a 
qualitative transition from one way of relating to the environment, to another, we 
gather from Vygotsky’s quote above, is ‘another person’. It is not any other person, 
however. Rather, in Vygotsky, development relies on either a peer on a higher 
developmental stage, or, an adult, who can instruct the learner towards a 
development that yet lies outside its current constitution. Vygotsky opposed to 
contemporary psychologies that assumed that the child is fully equipped at birth and 
the environment does not create, but rather "elicit" (Moll 1990, 5) developmental 
paths. This ‘elicitation’, as I will explain in the following, in Vygotsky, is necessarily a 
pedagogical practice. 
 
5.4.2 The Zone of Proximal Development 
 
Instruction and pedagogical direction, we have established in the previous 
section, in Vygotsky, have “productive and unique consequences for development” 
(Derry 2013, 71). The ZPD is where learning, understood as the quantitative 
accumulation of historical experience, is transformed into a qualitative leap: “The 
special social situation that has a crisis-like qualitative change as an outcome is 
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designated in Vygotskian literature as the zone of proximate development.” 
(Roth&Jornet 2017, 148) In order to emphasise the particular role of pedagogically 
directed learning, i.e. instruction or teaching, in Vygotsky’s evolutionary perspective 
on human nature and culture, Vygotsky used an interesting concept in his original, 
Russian writings: Obuchenie. 
 
Obuchenie can be translated as “instruction-learning” (Dafermos 2018, 165). It 
describes the unique processes of individual growth that come from pedagogical 
instruction; the concept, thus, emphasises the pedagogical aspect of development. 
Due to the combining of learning and instruction in one process, obuchenie also 
emphasises the collaborative character of educational practice in Vygotsky, where 
learning is not understood as an individualistic endeavour, but rather a collaborative 
activity (Roth&Jornet 2017, 149). Related to obuchenie is Vygotsky’s idea of the 
Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), which Vygotsky defines as the 
 
distance between the level of his [the child's, AN] actual 
development, determined with the help of independently solved 
tasks, and the level of possible development, defined with the 
help of tasks solved by the child under the guidance of adults or 
in cooperation with more intelligent peers. (Vygotsky 1934b/1987, 
204) 
 
It is in the ZPD that this process of negation takes place. In the instructive 
relationship, the learner is presented with ideas and concepts outside of her/his 
knowledge, or, with known concepts with a not-yet-reached level of abstraction. In 
that process, the child develops “conceptual thinking” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 134). 
At first instance, based on experience, the child reforms unordered “heaps of 
objects” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 134) into complexes based on “concrete-empirical 
thinking rather than on the plane of abstract logical thinking” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 
137). With increasing experience, these complexes are connected amongst each 
other and so-called “pseudo-concepts” are formed. These pseudo-concepts build 
the fertile ground for pedagogical elevation as they are contrasted with scientific, or 
“true concepts” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 167). 
 
These true concepts, according to Vygotsky, seem to present the existing 
meaning of things and tools in the socio-cultural reality of the child’s upbringing. 
They are true in the sense that they demonstrate logical and consistent relations to 
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other concepts (Derry 2013, 73). Scientific concepts do not emerge in everyday 
experience. Rather, they “develop in the process of a systematic school education” 
(Dafermos 2018, 161) Scientific concepts also differ from everyday concepts in the 
way they develop; while everyday concepts are subject to revolutionary negation, 
scientific concepts “do not undergo a process of development in the true sense of 
the word” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 169). Instead, their transformation is gradual, i.e. 
evolutionary, based on the mechanism of cultural inheritance that is educational 
transmission/enculturation. Vygotsky emphasises: “The child does not create the 
complex that corresponds with the meaning of a word but finds it ready made” 
(Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 145). Eventually, however, after this process of 
enculturation, the aim of pedagogical direction is to “free the child from the directing 
influence of the words of adult language with their developed and stable meanings.” 
(Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 143) Only then, after the cultural transmission that preserves 
historical inheritance, can the child engage in the collaborative practice of co- 
construction based on negation of existing meanings. Learned scientific, or ‘true’ 
concepts demonstrate a “readiness for action” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 169), 
meaning, they can henceforth function as a tool in purposeful activity. 
 
The precursor for the transformation of everyday concepts into scientific 
concepts are processes of learning. In the words of Vygotsky (1934a/1987): “The 
development of everyday concepts must reach a certain level for the child to learn 
the scientific concepts and gain conscious awareness of them.” (219) Once the 
developmental threshold is reached, the ZPD comes in place, creating a space for 
obuchenie (instruction-learning) leading to a qualitative leap in the child’s 
development. In the leap, the everyday concepts are negated through the 
integration of their more abstract scientific ‘equivalent’ (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 217). 
Without instruction, the child’s concepts remain everyday concepts based on direct 
experience (Derry 2013, 71; Dafermos 2018, 161). These concepts are inferior to 
scientific concepts in that they do not allow for the developmental leap of the 
individual into a transformation- and collaboration focused relation to her/his socio- 
cultural surroundings. Vygotsky emphasises: 
 
Our data indicate that the weakness of the everyday concept lies 
in its incapacity for abstraction, in the child’s incapacity to 
operative on it in a voluntary manner. Where volition is required, 
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the everyday concept is generally used incorrectly. (Vygotsky 
1934a/1987, 169) 
 
In the ZPD, we follow, the child develops its own mental functions, while at the 
same time is being put into the position “through the adult’s assistance and 
participation” (Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 169) to participate in the collaborative practice 
that is human labour. With the developmental leaps from every day to scientific 
concepts, the child gains increasing voluntary control over the ‘metabolism’ defining 
the individual-world-unit. They are the foundation of developments that allow the 
learner “to act in the world in a new way.” (Derry 2013, 76) 
 
According to Kozulin (2015b, 326), even though the ZPD is one of the most 
popular concepts of Vygotsky, it is often misunderstood to engender a sort of 
pedagogical availability, or an educational instrumentalism – it “denotes a principled 
account of distinctly human activity rather than a special kind of educational 
technique.” (Roth&Jornet 2017, 149). A similar verdict can be found in Chaiklin 
(2012, 58), who notes the emergence of an understanding of an external 
constructability of denoted developmental processes by the teacher in the context of 
discourses employing Vygotsky’s ZPD. Roth and Jornet (2012, vii), and Derry 
(2013) associate this simplified, instrumental perspective with the recent popularity 
of Vygotsky in the context of constructivism. As already transpired from the above 
analysis in the context of Vygotsky’s idea of sociogenesis, development consists of 
a dialectic between biological inherited possibilities and their manifestation in socio- 
cultural realities. As Derry (2013) formulates, on a Vygotskian view, education 
“involves the ‘relocation’ of ideas” (96). In other words, we can only make the 
developments for which we have reached the threshold through sociogenesis. On 
this view, teacher-centred instruction and child-centred learning, top-down and 
bottom-up processes merge. The ZPD does, therefore, not mean that development 
can be externally determined; the ZPD, instead, has to be understood as a zone of 
potential. It is not an artificial construction of the teacher, but rather a result of the 
struggles arising from the individual-world-unit (Roth&Jornet 2017, 247). It is, 
therefore, more about the pedagogical relationship, the collaboration, than about the 
directed processing of subject matter on the side of the students. In the process of 
learning, the learner also co-constructs, together with the instructor, the socio- 
cultural reality. 
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5.4.3 The teacher’s pedagogical expertise and cultural evolution 
 
As noted, Vygotsky believes that development is the result of the pronunciation, 
manifestation, and elaboration of innate hereditary tendencies through processes of 
learning. Processes of learning, on Vygotsky, are inherently social. Vygotsky writes 
on that point: 
 
The whole history of the child’s mental development teaches us 
that from the first days, his adaptation to the environment is 
achieved by social means through the people around him. The 
path from the thing to the child and from the child to the thing lies 
in another person. The transition from the biological to the social 
path of development is the central link in the process of 
development, a cardinal turning point in the history of the child’s 
behaviour. (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 20) 
 
With the idea of ZPD, it seems, Vygotsky sought to translate his notion of 
sociogenesis into an education concept. The ZPD incorporates the nature of 
struggle that human educative processes emerge from, making humans neither 
entirely a product of their circumstances, nor biologically determined. Processes of 
learning happen within a specific socio-cultural reality; “it was always the 
environment that educated” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 160), Vygotsky emphasises. 
The mind, on that view, “cannot be conceived as an attribute of an isolated 
individual.” (Derry 2013, 15) Development is the result of thresholds occasioned by 
learning processes “created by social activity” (Derry 2013, 44), and their negating 
influence on hereditary experiences and established cultural tools. In order to learn, 
and give rise to developmental opportunities, we gather, the individual has to be 
able to participate in collaborative activities. It is through the collaboration with 
others that humans are able to move beyond an adaptive relationship with their 
surroundings and supersede it with a transformative purposiveness. 
 
Relationships amongst peers and experiences made in everyday interaction, are 
important for learning. Development, however, in Vygotsky, relies on pedagogical 
interaction. One of the core implications of obuchenie is that teaching, on a 
Vygotskian perspective does not focus on what the child can already do by itself, but 
instead observes what the child can almost do or achieve with the help of others 
(Vygotsky 1934a/1987, 198): “Determining the actual level of development is the 
most essential and indispensable task in resolving every practical problem of 
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teaching and educating" (Vygotsky 1930/1987, 200) Even though peers could 
technically function as cooperative partners within the ZPD, the teacher does by no 
means become obsolete. On the contrary, within the ZPD and its leading to 
development in the individual, the pedagogical expertise of the teacher is key. It 
cannot be expected from a further developed peer to acknowledge the ZPD and 
exploit it productively (Chaiklin 2012, 43). 
 
While learning in the sense of Vygotsky’s obuchenie, the child makes 
developmental leaps. The ZPD, thus, is important both as a realm for socio-cultural 
evolution, and for the development of the individual level. On Vygotsky’s view, 
developmental leaps understood as the establishment of a new ‘metabolism’ – to 
draw from this Marxist metaphor again – are only possible as the result of 
instruction. That is, because in the words of Vygotsky (1934a/1987), instruction is 
able to move ahead of the learner’s development, and “when it does, it impels or 
wakens a whole series of functions are in a stage of maturation lying in the zone of 
proximal development.” (212) In Vygotsky, the development of new forms of mental 
activity – introducing a qualitatively different manifestation of the individual-world- 
unity – does not emerge naturally in experience but comes in a “qualitative jump” in 
adolescence, “dependent on specific types of social interactions” (Glassman 2001, 
10), namely, pedagogical interactions. On that point Vygotsky (1934a/1987) 
emphasises that the interaction between adult and child forms “the central element 
of the educational process.” (169) This perspective assigns an entirely new value to 
educational practice in the role of development – both of individuals, and society. 
Development, on that view, is not merely learning as an individual experience in a 
prepared educational environment, but a new way of relating to the world within 
collaborative labour (Derry 2013, 15). 
 
Besides the pedagogical expertise that allows for developmental leaps, another 
reason for singularizing pedagogical relationships – i.e. relationships between 
teacher and learner – from other social relations that furnish learning, is the fact that 
the human species’ particular position at the intersection of nature and culture relies 
on cultural processes of evolution to be established. Because non-hereditary 
experience can only become history through the establishment of an alternative, 
non-physical systems of transmission. Consequentially, it follows, that for Vygotsky 
(1925-30/1987), educational practice and “the pedagogical problem stands at the 
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very centre of the new viewpoint on the mind of man.” (148) It is through the 
purposeful direction of the individual’s development towards the integration of the 
meaning of existing cultural tools that the child becomes a member of society, 
participating in the further elaboration of these tools within cultural evolution. 
Teaching, on that view, is the ‘motor’ of cultural evolution; without teaching, and the 
elevation of everyday concepts into scientific abstractions, culture would simply not 
exist over the generations. 
 
5.5 Implications of a Vygotskian theory of education 
 
I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the philosophical implications of the 
evolutionary re-narration of Vygotsky’s educational concepts presented in this 
chapter. Specifically, I aim to discuss the meaning of an evolutionary reading of 
Vygotsky’s concept of development for the question of the aims of education and 
teaching, and how an evolutionary perspective – considering Vygotsky’s particular 
Marxist-Darwinian ‘hybrid’ evolutionism – might promote a new, richer 
understanding of some of the concepts in Vygotsky. Before I begin this final 
analysis, I will reiterate for clarity the findings of this chapter and contrast the 
perspective I have presented here with the current adoption of Vygotsky in 
constructivism. 
 
Vygotsky defined education as the artificial formation of the individual. 
Education, on that view, is the transformation of interpersonal tools into 
intrapersonal cognitive abilities. The socio-cultural reality is, therefore, constitutive to 
the artificial formation of the individual in the sense that it provides the tools for the 
collaborative transformative labour within the community or group. I have described 
this process of integrating tools into cognitive functions in the context of Marxist 
negation. In that process, hereditary experiences are negated by conditional, 
historical experiences. The ability to be formed by education, the ability to go 
through this process of negation, i.e. Bildsamkeit understood as an anthropological 
trait, in Vygotsky presents a uniquely human capacity, which – although an evolved 
trait – in Vygotsky’s perception has led to a phylogenetic leap from an adaptive- 
focused relationship between humans and the world, to a transformative, labour- 
and collaboration-focused relating. In Vygotsky’s post-adaptation evolutionism, the 
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ontological reality, the realm in which the struggle takes place, is not an environment 
understood as something external to the subject, but rather the relationship of 
transformation connecting the individual and the world itself (Roth&Jornet 2017, 36). 
This introduces a fundamentally anti-dualistic perspective on human development in 
and of the world. 
 
On the level of ontogeny, Bildsamkeit manifests in the ability to negate innate 
tendencies and capabilities in relation to the socio-cultural reality. This process 
describes Vygotsky’s concept of learning. The learning process happens through 
the reworking of unconditional reflexes into conditional reactions through the help of 
the mediation of innate activities with cultural tools. Cultural tools as well as social 
relations, within that process, are integrated into the individual’s cognitive activities. 
Based on a combination of these learning processes and structural changes due to 
maturation developmental crises, or thresholds emerge, allowing for qualitative 
leaps into fundamentally different modes of functioning within the individual-world- 
unit. These changes of ‘metabolism’ are, in Vygotsky, what development means. 
They are revolutionary, rather than evolution in nature. The ongoing dialectic 
process of ‘arming and re-arming’ within tool and social mediation, in Vygotsky’s 
Marxist perspective, is understood as a struggle between hereditary and historical 
experiences defining the relationship between individuals and their environment 
(Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 158).  
 
Growing, involving the individual’s maturation, learning, and development, 
Vygotsky (1931/1987) emphasises, “often involves conflict. The old form is forced 
out, is sometimes completely disrupted.” (221) Developments, therein, are thus less 
evolutionary than revolutionary, accompanied by negation, rather than continuity 
and accumulation. Revolution and struggle, however, are not negative concepts. 
Rather, as Vygotsky (1925-30/1987) emphasises, it is the ability to engage in a 
struggle that continuously purposefully transforms the relationship between the two 
that allows humans ‘to step out’ of the laws of biological evolution and create their 
own history: “Man’s behaviour is revealed in all its real complexity, in its grandiose 
meaning, as the dynamic and dialectic process of a struggle between man and the 
world and within man.” (157). As already alluded to above, pedagogy and cultural 
transmission through educational practice are a key component of that process of 
the formation of new mental forms. Learning, or historical experience, in Vygotsky 
is only possible in a 
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social context and particularly relies on the purposeful introduction of the new 
generation into culture. 
 
5.5.1 Education as a cultural practice 
 
Vygotsky’s notion of labour has profound implications for his concept of 
education as a cultural practice. The ability for collaborative labour directed by 
doubled experience – i.e. to direct purposeful transformative activity according to a 
plan, rather than a mere reaction to external stimuli – through the flexible application 
of cultural tools, therefore, is a key component of the particular phylogeny of the 
human species. This gives a central role the cultural initiation of the younger 
generation a central concern in Vygotsky’s evolutionary concept, and, in particular, 
in the context of his idea of the leap through labour (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 1). In 
pedagogical interaction, the younger generation is introduced into culture, learns to 
apply and further develop its tools by participating in collaborative activities with 
other, more initiated members of this culture. This transmission of culture, which 
Vygotsky understands to be entirely disconnected from any notion of biological 
development of maturation, relies on a pedagogical relationship; individual 
interacting with the environment and its tools, on that view, is not sufficient as it is 
the social relation that forms the cognitive ability to apply the tools. Vygotsky 
(1930/1987) writes: “Man, owning to the features of his adaptation (use of tools, 
work activity), the development of artificial organs replaced the development of 
natural organs.” (16) 
 
Learning, we begin to understand form this quote, and its pedagogical initiation, 
receive a special role in the particular place that the human species inherits in 
evolution, and outside of it. Through the unique formability (Bildsamkeit) of humans, 
at first instance, the learning negation of hereditary experience becomes possible, 
elevating the species onto a level of higher adaptation. At second instance, 
however, – and this is the most significant point from an educational perspective – 
obuchenie, i.e. the learning effects achieved in the ZPD as a result of the 
pedagogical recognition and manifestation of developmental thresholds, is what 
furnishes the leap into a novel realm of human existence, outside of adaptation. It 
follows, thus, that educational practices in society directed at the transmission of 
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cultural artefacts and tools is a constitutive part of human phylogeny, i.e. the leap 
from evolution to history. 
 
5.5.2 The pedagogical dimension of development 
 
In Vygotsky, education differs from learning in at least one capacity. Learning 
describes the accumulative process of historical experiences made by an individual 
through the participation in everyday socio- cultural activity. While learning is a core 
element of the educative process, i.e. the artificial development of the individual in 
culture, it is only through the pedagogical direction of the learning process through 
educationally purposeful practices like instruction and teaching, that it can be 
transformed into development. Development, on that view, is the qualitative leap 
into a functionally new realm of existing in the world; it goes beyond learning and 
manifests not as accumulation, but as negation. Development, I have argued, is one 
of the most significant concepts of this evolutionary re-narration of Vygotsky’s 
educational concepts as, considered through an evolutionary lens, its qualitative 
difference to learning becomes more pronounced. Development, in Vygotsky, is the 
ontogenetic equivalent to the phylogenetic emergence of labour as an entirely novel 
way of the human species relating to the world. This is relevant in the context of his 
educational theory because he connects the leap to obuchenie, i.e. instruction- 
learning. Education, understood as the artificial formation of the individual through 
teaching, thus, can be conceptualised as a constitutive part of these qualitative 
developments unique to humans. 
 
The connectivity of teaching to development, rather than learning, fundamentally 
puts up for question a knowledge-oriented conception of teaching (Chaiklin 2012, 
43). As Kozulin (2015a, 25) points out, from Vygotsky, we derive an important 
differentiation between learning understood as “content learning”, and learning 
understood as the “appropriation of tools”. Based on Vygotsky’s idea that cognitive 
development occurs as tools are integrated into mental activity after they have been 
employed in collaborative labour, the focus of teaching objectives has to move away 
from knowledge transmission for acquisition, to mediated collaborative activity 
between teacher and learner. 
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What differentiates the teacher from other peers in the context of learning 
processes and their giving rise to development, in Vygotsky, is the pedagogical 
deliberation. Kozulin (2015a) writes: “if there is no intentionality of the teacher- 
mediator, psychological tools will not be appropriated by the students of will be 
perceived as another content item, rather than a tool.” (26) From this follows that 
cultural initiation as an aim of education is not merely a matter of transmitting 
current knowledge. Instead, on a Vygotskian perspective, the learning processes 
sparked through cultural initiation in teaching only lead to development, if 
knowledge, cultural habits and socio-cultural artefacts are transmitted in their 
capacity as tools. As discussed above, tools do not hold an objective inherent 
meaning. Rather, they receive their meaning in collaborative transformative activity. 
This puts heightened emphasis on the collaborative element in the teacher-learner 
relationship, which, on that view, is constituted by collaborative, tool-mediated 
activity between the teacher and the learner. The teacher, on that understanding, is 
less an instructor, and more a collaborator in mediation. Cultural practices like 
reading and mathematics only go beyond content if they are being taught – 
understood in the just introduced Vygotskian interpretation of teaching – as tools. 
 
5.5.3 A Vygotskian concept of Bildung 
 
The specific evolutionary framework that Vygotsky applies yields important 
ontological differences to the other frameworks introduced in this thesis so far. In 
contrast to Spencer and Dewey, Vygotsky thinks of development primarily in cultural 
terms. While innate dispositions and endowments play a role in the negating 
process that is the educative artificial formation of the individual, it is socio-cultural 
realities and the collaborative interaction with the tools and artefacts of that reality 
that, in Vygotsky, shape learning and enable developmental thresholds. Particularly 
interesting, from an educational point of view, is arguably the high importance that 
Vygotsky assigns to teaching in developmental processes. In the ZPD, it is through 
instruction and pedagogical direction that qualitative developments are made 
possible that negate the ‘old ways’ of doing something and replace them with a new 
relating to the world. I have argued that the leap-character of development and the 
constitutive role of pedagogical direction within educative processes is founded in 
the evolutionary underpinnings to Vygotsky’s thinking. I want to argue further that in 
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an evolutionary reading of Vygotsky’s ideas of learning, teaching, and development 
we can also detect a notion of Bildung. 
 
Vygotsky does not explicitly provide a concept of Bildung. It also appears to me 
that in the educational Vygotsky scholarship, there is not strong association made 
between Vygotsky and a concept of Bildung. I argue, however, that the evolutionary 
perspective that I have offered in this chapter point toward the merit of exploring 
such an association. Learning and teaching, I argue, on a Vygotskian perspective 
are closely linked to processes of life-long formation, or Bildung. In Vygotsky, due to 
the evolutionary underpinnings that inform his educational concepts, learning, with 
the help of obuchenie (instruction-learning) that unravels within a pedagogical 
relationship with a teacher, leads to development. Developments, understood as the 
ontogenetic leaps that negate innate characteristics of the learner and replace them 
with historical experience, are thus closely connected to school-learning. 
Transformation, however, receives such a central role in Vygotsky – and ontological 
role, in fact – that I contend it to be false to reduce Vygotsky’s idea of development 
to school-learning, or even young age. Therefore, despite the potential risk of some 
concepts of Bildung to neglect the societal dimension of individual development, I 
argue that to contemplate Vygotsky as a thinker of Bildung might help to escape the 
connotation of his concepts as mainly focused on academic learning. 
 
The requirements for developments, in Vygotsky, are collaborative practices that 
allow oneself to elevate one’s everyday concepts into abstract, scientific concepts. 
In the case of children, the pedagogical expertise of the teacher is necessary to 
create that zone of development by recognising current developmental potentials. 
Without wanting to suggest a reading of the ZPD as a subjective tool for 
construction, “thus reinforcing the mentalism and dualism” (Roth&Jornet 2017, 13), I 
argue that it is well conceivable in a Vygotskian framework that as adults, we are 
able to create those developmental zones for ourselves. As adults, I want to 
entertain the idea, we do not longer rely on the pedagogical expertise of a teacher to 
create experiences that allow us to negate our existing everyday concepts. I think 
that by recognising and seizing developmental potentials – adults can choose to 
engage with others on whatever matter or problem we want, we can travel, read, go 
to therapy. We can, thus, become true agents of our process of Bildung if we 
understand our Bildsamkeit as so fundamentally connected to the socio-cultural 
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realities we, as children, are exposed to, and, as adults, we expose ourselves to. 
What such a Vygotskian concept of Bildung emphasises is the dimension of 
‘struggle’ in processes of self-formation, yet, without making the inducing of those 
struggles an external matter. Personal growth and transformation of the self, I 
argue, on a Vygotskian perspective can be connected to an agent striving for 




In this chapter I presented a re-narration of some of the core educational 
concepts in Vygotsky’s works with a focus on their evolutionary underpinnings. The 
analysis of those underpinnings has shown the evolutionary lens is indeed able to 
shed some novel light on some Vygotskian concepts like development, learning, 
and, in particular, the ZPD. Informed by the Marxist interpretation and 
supplementation of Darwinian evolution in his social theory, Vygotsky redefined 
human nature in a post-adaptation paradigm focused on the transformation of the 
world through collaborative labour. Following that post-adaptation paradigm, 
Vygotsky believed that development is revolutionary rather than evolutionary. 
Development, on his view, happens in leaps. Humans are formed through their 
participation in collaborative activities. In those collaborative activities, they integrate 
cultural tools and artefacts in their mental operations, making them psychological 
tools. This integration of tools into psychological functions, in Vygotsky, is the 
learning process. In processes of learning, innate tendencies and endowments are 
negated by historical experience. Human Bildsamkeit, in a Vygotskian perspective, 
is based on the negation of innate tendencies and endowed capacities through 
learning. 
 
Through this process of learning, the individual becomes increasingly 
‘artificially formed’ by the socio-historical reality she/he acts in. This artificial 
formation of the individual is what Vygotsky describes as education. Education, in 
Vygotsky, is a broad concept that describes a life-long process occurring both within 
and outside of formal educational settings. Formal education and school, however, 
receives a special role in Vygotsky’s theory of education. At some points in that 
process, resulting from a combination of maturation and learning processes, 
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developmental thresholds emerge. At these thresholds, the individual is able to 
move to a qualitatively different level of activity – this ability, however, relies on 
pedagogical direction to manifest. Developments that emerge from the ZPD are 
different from the ongoing, accumulative learning processes due to their negating 
nature. They only occur as a result of obuchenie, i.e. instruction-based learning in 
the ZPD. The teacher, with her/his pedagogical expertise acknowledges the 
developmental potential of the individual and helps her/him to negate and reform 
her/his everyday concepts with the equivalent abstract scientific concepts. 
 
What a Vygotskian concept of education provides, I conclude based on this 
chapter’s analysis, is an emphasis on purposeful transformative processes through 
collaborative participation. Changes in society and culture, on that view, are the 
result of collaborative purposeful activities, rather than externally induced processes 
of adaptive growth. And the individual’s development is not the manifestation of 
innate tendencies, but their negation and artificial, i.e. cultural, reformation. Perhaps 
one of the most important implications of an evolutionary reading of a Vygotskian 
theory of education is an understanding of human Bildsamkeit as a process of 
negation. In a Vygotskian theory of Bildung, I suggest, Bildung conceptualised as 
the constant struggle to negate our innate tendencies, to be free from the 
environment, to overcome the environmental pressures that force us to adapt. The 
aim of education is to enable those processes of Bildung for the individual by 
supporting her/his successful integration of the socio-cultural tools available, which 
then, in turn, become psychological tools in the increasingly autonomous process of 
self-formation. 
 
Comparing Vygotsky’s use of evolutionary concepts in furnishing his 
educational theory to Spencer demonstrates the versatile nature of an evolutionary 
framework in the context of educational theorising. Moreover, in comparing 
Vygotsky and Dewey to Spencer in terms of the increased intricacy with which 
educational processes are described, and the growing emphasis put on pedagogical 
relationships and teaching, the considerable simplicity of thinking education as the 
subject’s ‘adaptation to’ a pre-determined environment becomes apparent. In the 
following chapter, I will, first, draw the findings of the hermeneutical analyses of 
these three thinkers together with the aim of developing a broadly conceived 
understanding of ‘evolutionary educational theory’, and, second, look at evolutionary 
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ideas and concepts perpetuated in the current educational discourses surrounding 
PISA. 
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6. Evolutionary Educational Theory 
 
The overarching aim of this study is to make a significant theoretical 
contribution to the development of a concept of evolutionary educational theory. To 
that end, in chapter 2 I developed an analytic framework to help the analysis and 
assessment of evolutionary frameworks, which was then applied to the study of the 
evolutionary underpinnings in the educational works of Herbert Spencer, John 
Dewey and Lev Vygotsky. In this final chapter, I summarise the findings of this 
thesis and explore how they are able to inform current educational discourses. 
 
The first question I seek to answer in this summary is how different 
evolutionary frameworks have informed educational concepts. As I have attempted 
to demonstrate throughout the chapters, education looks back on a rich and varied 
history of educational thinkers with a vivid interest in evolutionary theory. The 
purposeful selection of three key thinkers within the intellectual history of 
evolutionary educational theories – based on the criteria of difference – has shown 
that different evolutionary concepts yield highly different consequences on 
educational concepts. Standing out in particular, I argue, is the concept of 
adaptation associated with ideas of learning, and the associated definitions of 
teaching, which I will focus on after the general summary. It is the aim of this thesis 
to contribute to the clarification of conceptual ambiguities surrounding definitions of 
learning as adaptation, which have become particularly popular recently, in the so- 
called learning sciences (Hollis 2012), and are a constitute part of the rhetoric 
displayed in neoliberal discourses in the context of educational policy and 
curriculum reform. 
 
To think about how the studied traditions of evolutionary reasoning continue 
to influence current discourses, in the second part of this chapter I will analyse the 
currently popular and influential concept of learning and adaptation used in the 
documents and publications of the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA). While PISA is an empirical-comparative study, and not an 
educational theory in its own right, its results yield a profound influence on 
educational policy, curriculum, practice, and theory. The way PISA has contributed 
to the definition of learning as a means of a particular kind of adaptation – as I aim 
to demonstrate with my analysis – has a significant impact on how we define the 
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aim of education, as well as teaching, pedagogy, and the aims of schooling (Steiner- 
Khamsi 2012; Grek 2012; Takayama 2012). It will be the contribution of this study to 
provide an analytic framework that allows us to clarify PISA’s concept of adaptation, 
and reflect upon the virtually hegemonial impact that it has on how we think about 
education today. 
 
Lastly, I address the question of what, based on the findings of this study, 
can be said about the potential of an evolutionary framework in educational theory. 
What are the potential benefits and contributions of an evolutionary perspective in 
educational theory? And what can be gained epistemologically from acknowledging 
the evolutionary underpinnings in educational concepts? I contend that the in-depth 
analysis of the philosophical implications of different concepts of adaptation and 
learning presented in this thesis is able to shed some new light on PISA’s 
philosophical implications and open a discussion of alternative views on education, 
beyond PISA. Without developing such an alternative perspective fully, I aim to 
sketch out some of the perhaps not yet fully explored evolutionary perspectives on 
learning, teaching, and educational aims and practices that might be worthwhile 
pursuing in future research. 
 
6.1 The evolution of evolutionary epistemologies in 
educational theory 
In this thesis I have studied the evolutionary underpinnings in the educational 
theories of Spencer, Dewey and Vygotsky. These three thinkers were chosen based 
on their difference in historical, intellectual and philosophical context, epistemology, 
and evolutionary ontology. I have built on those differences in my analysis to show 
how diverging evolutionary frameworks play out in the context of educational 
theorising. Dewey and Vygotsky remain popular figures in educational discourses 
today. Spencer’s utilitarian-evolutionary theory of education, while by no means 
being part of the current mainstream educational discourse, provided an important 
contrast for comparison that enriched not only the analyses of Dewey and Vygotsky 
but also the overarching development of a concept of ‘evolutionary educational 
theory’. Moreover, as I will argue, while Spencer might be a somewhat forgotten 
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figure, his understanding of education as the subject’s ‘adaptation to’, is resonating 
today, in the context of a neoliberal agenda in educational thinking. 
 
In the analyses of the three thinkers I focused on how each of their specific 
interpretation of evolutionary theory informed their concept of education, the 
definition of educational aims, the locating of educational practices within society, as 
well as the pedagogical relationship it envisions or proposes. I now summarise the 
findings of these analyses along the historical and conceptual narrative presented in 
this thesis. 
 
6.1.1 Spencer – A utilitarian-evolutionary theory of education 
 
Spencer was the first to introduce an evolutionary framework to education 
(Muhri 1991, 309). He used his own theory of evolution that he developed over 
numerous volumes in his Synthetic Philosophy (1862-93). He assumed that 
evolution is a pre-determined and lawful movement that manifests in all phenomena 
and things in the cosmos. The evolutionary movement, on Spencer’s view, is pre- 
determined in its trajectory and ceases its movement in reaching equilibrium. 
Epistemologically, his evolutionary theory is ‘bottom-up’ and reductionist, as he 
assumed the laws of biological evolution to apply cosmologically. This means that 
the evolution of society and the evolution of nature, in Spencer, are functionally the 
same. Any conceptual distinctions between different types of evolution are thus 
merely theoretical on a Spencerian perspective (Spencer 1892c, 8). Society and 
culture, on that view, are mere artificial concepts with no inherent qualities on their 
own. 
 
Spencer applied his concept of evolution to a wide range of areas of inquiry 
spanning from the natural sciences, over psychology and sociology, to education 
(Andreski 1971, 7f.). To formulate his social philosophy, Spencer combined his own 
evolutionary theory with utilitarian moral philosophy (Weinstein 1998, 120). His 
understanding of utilitarian morality diverged from contemporaries like Mill in that it 
contained a pre-defined vision of the ideal state. Liberty of action, on that view, was 
instrumental to the free unfolding of the evolutionary movement. Because Spencer 
was Lamarckian he believed that evolutionary change occurs through adaptations 
that are inherited (Spencer 1850, 87). If everyone was able to freely exercise one’s 
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“faculties” (Spencer 1850, 44), natural selection would ensure that the ‘undesired’ or 
‘unfit’, over the generations would be ‘weeded out’, which, ultimately would lead to 
the genetic improvement of human nature. Only once human nature is perfectly 
adapted to the society of equal freedom, struggle and competition come to an end in 
equilibrium. Compliance with his understanding of utilitarian morality, on that view, 
was thus constitutive to the development of ideal society and ideal human nature. 
Charity, welfare, and any other kind of support given to people struggling in society, 
on that perspective, disturbs the evolutionary trajectory, and thus, unnecessarily 
prolongs suffering (Mack 2001, 1637). 
 
Education, both in schools and in the family, on Spencer’s view, are part of a 
potentially detrimental artificial interference with the natural trajectory of societal 
evolution (Spencer 1850, 174). Consequently, his evolutionary social philosophy 
lead Spencer to develop what I have called a theory of anti-education. He used a 
normative idea of the ‘natural’, that he associated with free competition and negative 
selection, to contrast the artificial design of educational intervention practised in 
schools and outside (Trompf 1971, 204). Only if ‘nature’ is allowed to unfold freely – 
which, in Spencer meant unfolding according to the utilitarian law of equal freedom 
– the progressive trajectory of evolution can unfold and lead to equilibrium. The 
positive intervention with that trajectory that he saw practiced in educational 
institutions of his time, he deemed not only seen as futile in the long run, but as 
actually immoral as it merely prolongs suffering in the shorter term. The aim of 
education, as Spencer envisioned it based on his evolutionary social philosophy, 
ought to be to prepare for ‘complete living’ i.e. to prepare individuals to make a 
living, maintain physical health, and rear offspring (Spencer 1889, 30). 
 
Spencer’s evolutionary educational theory, I conclude, lacks two crucial 
elements to make a useful contribution to educational concepts. First, Spencer’s 
social philosophy does not provide an adequate concept of culture (Silberman 2003, 
108f.). The present socio-cultural reality, in Spencer, is conceptualised negatively as 
an artificial, transitory moment on the path towards equilibrium. Because behaviour, 
social customs, and morals are transmitted not through learning, enculturation, and 
pedagogical practices. Instead, all transmission happens biologically. This has 
profound implications for the nature of his concept of education: Instead of 
associating the nature of education with intergenerational learning or cultural 
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transmission, Spencer locates education within Lamarckian inheritance. Therein, the 
aim of education is to prepare the individual in the best possible way to inherit 
certain traits to the following generation. Second, Spencer’s educational theory 
misses a social dimension. Individuals, in Spencer, are seen as organs of the 
societal organism that have no relevant overlap. Collaboration, therein, is irrelevant, 
and potentially even detrimental. At no point in Spencer’s educational writings can 
there be discerned a notion of social learning, or a relationship between learners 
and teachers. The educational subject fully dissolves in the future oriented focus 
and the macro-perspective of Spencer’s teleological evolutionism, that focuses 
solely on the societal organism and its constitution in the future. The ‘educational 
present’ is reduced to the protection of the natural laws of the evolutionary trajectory 
to unfold. The pedagogical relationship, the interaction between learners, the 
methods of teaching, and so forth, remain utterly undefined. 
 
6.1.2 Dewey’s pragmatic Darwinian philosophy of growth and 
education 
Just like Spencer, Dewey wanted to use an evolutionary framework to locate 
humankind in nature. He wanted to explain processes scientifically that fell outside 
of the traditional realm of the natural sciences – the mind, culture, society, and 
education. Dewey shares with Spencer, what Godfrey-Smith (1996, 4) calls an 
‘externalist perspective’, which means that they both think of development to some 
extent defined by the environment. The commonalities, however, end right there. 
Dewey was a candid critic of Spencer, especially regarding his theory and concept 
of evolution (Dewey 1904/2008). Even though categorically, they are both 
externalists, Dewey conceptualised the relationship between individual and world 
fundamentally different. With reference to the competition focus in Spencer, Dewey 
critically asks: “Why should we expect that which counts among the carnivora to 
count with man, social animal?” (Dewey 1898/2008, 43) He thought of the individual 
and the world standing in a relationship of simultaneous adaptation. The ‘world’, or 
the ‘environment’, for Dewey, is both material and social. The social environment, 
however, is particularly relevant for individual activity as in interaction and 
communication with others, common meaning is created. 
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I have argued in the analysis of Dewey, that he used his concept of growth to 
define adaptation as an open-ended, contingent and unceasing process directed by 
functionality. In that process the individual and the world (material and social) 
change actively and passively, in a back and forth of doing and undergoing. At the 
heart of this adaptive process is experience. Experiences are the back and forth 
between actions and consequences that the individual lives through while acting in 
the world. Experiences that are accompanied by reflection – so-called educative 
experiences – allow the individual to connect the connection between her/his 
actions and the consequences that occur in return and learn from it. To learn from 
experience, thus, means the ability to derive something from experience – a skill, an 
insight, knowledge – in a way that benefits the conduct of future activities. Growth 
describes the learning process occurring as a consequence of the ongoing doing 
and undergoing and the concomitant process of transformation of the individual and 
the world. This transformation is fluid and temporal, rather than fixed. It is 
accumulative in the sense that growth always builds upon the present condition. It is 
not, however, accumulative in the sense of an objective improvement. I found 
Saito’s (2005) image of “circular expansion” (77) most helpful to envision this 
movement of growth, and to distinguish it from Spencer’s idea of an upwards 
trajectory. 
 
Dewey defines education as the process of ‘reconstructing and reorganising’ 
experiences. This reorganisation of experience happens both in the context of 
pedagogically prepared learning environments, and in everyday interaction and 
communication (Benner 2017, 266). Therein, Dewey’s evolutionary concept of 
education provides a notion of educative processes, or growth, after maturation from 
a school or family education context. In contrast to Spencer, in Dewey, educational 
institutions and practices play a vital role as they provide ‘concentrated’ educational 
environments fostering the enculturation of the younger generation (Hansen 2002). 
While in Spencer education is not directly involved in the formation of human society 
and culture, but merely indirectly in ensuring the undisturbed process of selection 
that then leads to the biological improvement of human nature, in Dewey, 
educational processes are fundamentally important to development. Educational 
experiences leading to growth are vital both for the development of the individual 
and the transformation of society. 
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Due to the extensive nature of Dewey’s concept of education, a number of 
scholars have associated Dewey with the humanistic concept of Bildung (Biesta 
2016; Rorty 1979; Benner 2017). I have argued, however, that if we read Dewey’s 
educational theory in an evolutionary perspective, the association of education as 
growth with Bildung might actually underrepresent the necessary societal dimension 
in growth. By thinking of growth as an alternative to Bildung, the concept is able to 
shed some light on longstanding points of criticism directed at the concept. To 
illustrate this difference between Bildung and growth I have drawn from Litt’s (1957; 
1960) problematisation of an understanding of Bildung as the internal transformation 
of the self. On his view, even though Bildung occurs in exchange with the world – 
and therein, certainly also leaves a mark on the world –, Bildung eventually returns 
to the self. Scholars like Greene (1978) and Saito (2005) have pointed at 
comparable problems in certain readings of Dewey’s growth as individualistic. To 
add to that discussion, I have argued based on an evolutionary reading that growth 
entails the transformative ‘return to the self’ and the world simultaneously. I have 
argued that this simultaneity is what distinguishes Dewey’s growth from Bildung; it 
opens a space for processes of Bildung to be thought of relevant for social progress, 
rather than mere ‘perfecting of the self’. I have also argued that this simultaneity 
derives directly from the evolutionary underpinnings in Dewey that set a focus on 
adaptation as fluid, never-ending, non-predetermined, and, most importantly, 
involving both movements of active and passive, of ‘adaptation to’, and ‘adaptation 
of’. 
 
6.1.3 Vygotsky’s development-focused Marxist pedagogy 
 
Just like Dewey, Vygotsky wanted to use an evolutionary framework to 
explain the connection between development of the mind and society, while also 
overcoming a Cartesian worldview (Kozulin 2015b). While Dewey’s ‘strategy’ was to 
develop an ‘ultranaturalism’ (Popp 2007, 12), i.e. a theoretical approach to the 
context of education compatible with Darwinism in all aspects, Vygotsky combined 
Darwinism with Marxist social philosophy to develop a theory of human 
consciousness and higher cognitive functioning. In other words, based on his 
particular evolutionary understanding, Vygotsky developed a theory of phylogenetic 
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cognitive evolution, which he then applied to the conceptualisation of learning, 
development and education. 
 
On Vygotsky’s view, the nature of human cognition and activity in culture 
could not be accounted for in an exclusively Darwinian framework (Vygotsky 1925- 
30/1987, 113). On this basic epistemological level, I argue, Vygotsky can be 
understood as significantly different from Dewey’s ‘ultranaturalism’. Instead of using 
the principle of adaptation to define the relationship between human individuals and 
their material, social and cultural surroundings, Vygotsky used the historical- 
materialist notion of labour to conceptualise human existence in the world. On that 
perspective, rather than thinking of human activity as a primarily ‘reactive’ to 
external impulses, Vygotsky understood human activity to be directed at 
purposefully shaping the environment through collaborative activity. Following the 
historical materialist underpinnings of his thinking, Vygotsky thought that the 
historically developed objects and artefacts shape human reality and history; 
humans use tools to define the ‘metabolism’ of their relationship with the world. The 
process is what Marx defined as labour: ”Labour is first of all a process between 
man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, 
regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature.” (Marx 
1887/1990, 283) 
 
Tools – objects, artefacts, habits – gain meaning while they are being used 
within collaborative activities, which, in the process of applying these tools, create 
the reality the individual moves in. In this understanding of the constructive role that 
individuals and groups have in the creation of their own environment, their own 
reality, through collaborative labour, the impetus for activities, are not problems 
posed by an environment that is ontologically external to the individual. Rather, 
activity is directed by the collaborative use of tools within the co-created reality. 
Because of its ability for such collaborative activity, on Vygotsky’s view, the human 
species transcends the formerly adaptive relationship with the environment and 
establishes a fundamentally new relationship to each other and to nature (Dafermos 
2018, 83). 
 
Vygotsky thought of individual development as fully engrained in social 
interactions. In his theory, there exists no conceptual space for thinking of ‘the 
179  
social’ as separate from a ‘material environment’ that is standing out- and alongside 
social relationships. Artefacts are not tools in and of themselves, but are made into 
tools within collaborative labour. In Dewey, without necessarily being qualitatively 
equal, experiences of negativity nonetheless stem from both material and social 
‘interaction’ (English&Benner 2004). There is, thus, a conceptual difference between 
the social and the material in Dewey – even though they are complexly related in 
many ways. This conceptual difference has some bearing on their conception of the 
nature of ‘educational environments’. While in Dewey educative experiences can 
emerge in interactions with ‘things’, in Vygotsky, learning – and development in 
particular – are unthinkable to begin with a person being confronted with a ‘thing’. 
The ‘thing’ in Vygotsky becomes part of the educative process – ‘the artificial 
formation’ of the individual – as a tool within collaborative activity. There is, in 
Vygotsky, no ‘material’ in and for itself. For Vygotsky, the ‘labour’ aspect of all 
human behaviour, thinking and learning – i.e. the underlying collaborative rationality 
aimed at co-constructing the environment based on historically developed artefacts 
used as tools for action – is evolutionarily highly relevant. It brought about a new 
way of relating to the environment: 
 
In this logic, the beginning of a uniquely human life in phylogeny 
(and the advent of the human species as such) is associated with 
and marked by a shift from adaptation to a given environment that 
governs in the animal world, to an active and even proactive, that 
is, goal-directed and purposeful – collaborative transformation of 
the environment. (Stetsenko 2017, 167) 
 
The social is an existential part of what Vygotsky defines as human nature. Humans 
develop in collaboration: Individuals are “being brought into existence by and 
through their own transformative acting.” (Stetsenko 2017, 196) This, Stetsenko 
(2017) brings to the point, “is quite different from acting in a changing environment” 
(196). 
 
Education, on Vygotsky’s perspective, is the “artificial development of the 
child” (Vygotsky 1931/1987, 110). In purposeful collaboration with other members of 
society, the individual integrates tools into her/his activity, and psychological 
operations. The human individual, in other words, is shaped by a collaboratively 
constructed historical-material reality, in which’s further development she/he 
participates. The mind, thus, is fundamentally socially shaped, by the ways cultural 
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tools and artefacts are used. In that process, the child increasingly replaces her/his 
‘hereditary experiences’ with ‘historical experiences’. In other words, unconditional 
responses to external stimuli are negated and replaced with conditional responses. 
As a consequence, the individual is increasingly autonomous in her/his activity and 
functionality and reactivity to external pressures are replaced by purposeful activity. 
This process of increasing freedom from external pressures is what Vygotsky 
understands to mean ‘education’; just like in Dewey, it is life-long and without an 
end. This open-endedness, I think, is lost in the portrayal of Stetsenko (2017). The 
way she discusses Vygotsky, one gets the feeling that the aim is to be free from 
external pressures entirely and that only once no activity is responsive or adaptive 
anymore, the individual is ‘educated’. I think that the potential of Vygotsky’s 
perspective lies exactly in the struggle, in the process and in the unattainability of 
ultimate purposes. The aim of education, on my reading of Vygotsky, is to struggle 
for freedom and purposes, not necessarily to attain freedom and ultimate purposes 
– a perspective that a Deweyan focus on negativity in experience as productive to 
the individual’s and society’s development puts emphasis on. 
 
6.2 Adaptation-perspectives on learning and teaching 
 
The evolutionary lens has provided novel perspectives on the educational 
concepts of the three thinkers studied, which is particularly relevant for Dewey and 
Vygotsky, who are both still part of educational discourses today. It transpired from 
the analysis that evolutionary concepts and ideas are often conceptually ambiguous 
as they bear the potential for a variety of meanings and definition. Due to this 
inherent ambiguity, it is necessary to draw different educational concepts of 
adaptation apart and clarify vague terminology more widely, outside of the limited 
frame of the three theories studied. What is needed, is a more general and 
systematic understanding of evolutionary reasoning in the context of education. To 
draw out such a more general understanding from this study, I will focus on one of 
the core concepts of evolutionary educational reasoning: Adaptation. 
 
Adaptation stands out as a core concept of evolutionary educational theory 
for several reasons. Firstly, all three thinkers use concepts of adaptation to define 
education – with highly different starting points and results. Adaptation, in a sense, 
is what unites Spencer, Dewey, and Vygotsky most – because they all use it – 
while, at the same time differentiating them the most – because they all define it 
differently. Consequentially, the concept offers itself as a point of analytic focus to 
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draw together the findings of these analyses to contribute to a broader theoretical 
understanding of evolutionary frameworks in education. Secondly, based on this 
study I claim that adaptation most potently influences the definition of core 
educational concepts like learning, development, teaching, pedagogy, and the aims 
of education themselves. 
 
Adaptation, I contend, is at the heart of what defines evolutionary 
frameworks in education. The way adaptation is defined, as this thesis has shown, 
directs a theories’ stance on how individuals exist in relation to their environment. 
Furthermore, an educational concept of adaptation raises and informs questions 
about the extent to which nature and nurture are involved in how individuals develop 
emerge, and how individuals organise and direct their activity. How adaptation is 
conceptualised, therefore, also directly informs how the possibility of Bildung, and, 
perhaps in particular, the possibility of purposeful pedagogical interaction 
(Erziehung) is reflected upon. Increasingly, in recent and current discourses, 
concepts of adaptation are connected to learning, which makes a clarification of the 
concepts a timely matter. Evolutionary educational psychology, for example, due to 
its neo-Darwinian foundation, strongly supports an understanding of development, 
learning, and educational practices as adaptations. Such an understanding, on 
Hollis’ (2012) view, forms an alliance with a neo-liberal agenda in promoting an 
understanding of education as a means of adapting people to the demands of the 
labour market. Learning, therein is defined as an increase in adaptability to remain 
responsive to altered economic demands (Hollis 2012). 
 
At the same time, the evolutionary idea of adaptation is inherently 
challenging as a concept. Adaptation is one of the oldest evolutionary concepts that 
performed the perhaps biggest transformation in meaning over time in the 
intellectual history of the principle of evolution (see chapter 2 on the evolution of the 
term and concept of evolution). Originally introduced by Lamarck as a biological 
concept describing a hereditary change in an individual’s lifetime, in post-Darwinian 
evolutionary paradigms the concept of adaptation describes a phenotype’s fitness 
within natural selection. Adaptation is ambiguous in the sense that it is used both to 
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describe a trait that is understood to be an adaptation to a particular change in the 
environment, and the process of an organism changing to suit transformed 
environmental conditions (Mayr 1991). Adaptation – what it means, how it works, 
and where it is effective – is an ongoing point of contention in evolutionary science 
today, dividing neo-Darwinian positions from anti-adaptationists (see chapter 2 for 
more detail on those paradigms). 
 
For these reasons, enhancing our understanding of different educational 
concepts of adaptation, I consider to be one of the main contributions of this thesis. 
Understanding that ‘learning as adaptation’ can mean highly different things is key, 
not only to promote a more nuanced discussion of the thinkers studied in this thesis, 
but also to critically inform current educational discourses. To contribute to our 
understanding of educational concepts of adaptation, I will draw out the links 
emerging from Spencer, Dewey, and Vygotsky between educational concepts of 
adaptation and learning and analyse how they inform theories of teaching. After 
having developed the conceptual foundation to distinguish and discuss different 
educational concepts of adaptation, I will analyse the concept of adaptation used in 
the documents of PISA. PISA is singular in its potency to inform educational 
discourses internationally; how it defines adaptation in relation to learning and 
teaching is, therefore, of prime importance. 
 
6.2.1 Types of educational concepts of adaptation 
 
The concept of adaptation significantly informed how Spencer, Dewey, and 
Vygotsky came to conceptualise education. Spencer (1850) defined education as 
the preparation for ‘complete living’. Complete living, on his view, means the free 
and competitive exercise of one’s “faculties” (44) in the pursuit of individual 
happiness. The only infringement on freedom in this pursuit, following Spencer’s 
utilitarian moral philosophy, is everyone’s equal right to do so. Spencer paired his 
moral theory with a teleological Lamarckian evolutionism. On that perspective, only 
if the younger generation is prepared for ‘complete living’ the evolutionary trajectory 
can unfold according to the laws of evolutionary movement; society and human 
nature gradually improve over the generations through biological inheritance and 
natural selection. The aim of education, therein, is to not interfere with that trajectory 
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by teaching “ornamental knowledge and attire” (Spencer 1889, 25). Instead, 
education ought to enable the individual to be able to compete as well as possible in 
society, by adapting to its status quo, and obey to the utilitarian principle of equal 
freedom. Spencer used a Lamarckian notion of adaptation to develop a rationale of 
compliance with the status quo. Therein, adaptation means the “adjustment of inner 
to outer relations” (Spencer 1892a, 389). Resulting from his concept of adaptation, 
as I have argued, Spencer developed a theory of education assigning it the role of 
the ‘safeguard’ of natural processes to occur freely, rather than having any direct 
relevancy within evolution. Education, on that view, was a means to prepare 
individuals for competition, yet without interfering in that competition by ‘helping’ 
more disadvantages individuals. This notion of education is inhumane as it is 
specifically directed at “weeding out” (Spencer 1850, 203) the ‘less skilled’. Spencer 
used an evolutionary framework to naturalise ‘this battlefield’, to make it seem 
lawfully given, rather than societally constructed and arbitrary in its rules for 
competition and selection. An educational concept of adaptation to, it follows, is 
highly problematic because it fosters exclusion and the instrumentalisation of 
education for various purposes outside of the concern for the individual’s learning, 
development, and wellbeing. 
 
Dewey’s concept of growth was the necessary expansion of Spencer’s one- 
directional notion of adaptation. Growth means the simultaneous transformation of 
the individual and the world in experience. While Spencer was focused on 
behaviour, Dewey thought of adaptation as a process involving intelligence and 
decision. He ‘installed’ the mind as a mediator between the environmental stimulus 
and the subject’s reaction to overcome their dualistic divide (Dewey 1916/2008, 
125). On that definition, adaptation is a process that is related to changes in the 
environment, yet without undermining the subject’s agency. The individual is 
learning from the experience of being in the world actively – in doing, in acting – and 
passively – in undergoing the consequences of what has been tried in activity. In 
accordance with his concept of evolution as a contingent, non-terminating process, 
growth describes a process with no end. Consequently, the process moves to the 
centre of focus rather than the outcome (Saito 2005, 53). 
 
Education, in Dewey, means the “reconstruction and reorganisation” (Dewey 
1916/2008, 78) of experiences and endowed tendencies throughout the individual’s 
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lifetime – both in and outside of formal education. Continuously, the individual 
transforms its knowledge, concepts, habits, etc. in order to overcome discontinuities 
emerging in relation to the environment. In turn, by acting in the world, the subject 
transforms and shapes her/his environment. The relationship between the individual 
and the environment is one of doing and undergoing leading to simultaneous and 
unceasing transformation of both in connection with each other. In defining 
education as growth, the Darwinian natural selection paradigm was important for 
Dewey. It resonates, I argue, in the emphasis he puts on moments of discontinuity 
to induce learning and growth. Growth, following that perspective, emerges from a 
gap, a need, a problem posed at the encounter of individual and world. Education 
defined in relation to growth means supporting learners in the reflective processing 
of passive and active experiences, as well as the preparation of relevant learning 
environments that are closely aligned with the interests and needs emerging from 
the learner’s life-world. In opposition to Spencer, who deemed ‘cultural’ 
environments as negatively artificial, Dewey (1889/2008) defined adaptation as 
“social adaptation” (41), and the environment as “a distinctly social one” (41). 
Because growth has no pre-determined, or objectively better or worse trajectory, the 
socio-cultural environment, and the communicative exchange with others is key to 
individual development and social evolution. 
 
A Deweyan concept of adaptation entails both passive undergoing, and 
active doing; it involves ‘adaptation to’ as well as ‘adaptation of’. Such a concept of 
adaptation integrates the individual’s agency into the process of growth. It informs 
an understanding of education that aims for capacity to grow rather for a certain 
outcome. Because growth is always temporal, education is seen as an unceasing 
process, requiring flexibility and non-attachment to ideas and habits that no longer 
serve the individual in relating to the environment. Growth is the ability to learn from 
experience in a way that informs future problem-finding and-solving and the creation 
of ends-in-view. Education on this perspective is tightly connected to the socio- 
cultural and material environment of the learner. Its focus lies on the present, rather 
than on the attainment of pre-defined educational outcomes. 
 
Vygotsky’s theory of education is similar to Dewey’s in many ways. Both 
think of education as a process transforming the self and transforming the 
environment, respectively the socio-cultural reality, simultaneously. They also both 
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emphasise the relevance of accounting for societal realities and individual 
constitutions in pedagogical interaction. However, looking at their evolutionary 
frameworks, and in particular their concepts of adaptation, Dewey and Vygotsky 
differ considerably. As discussed above, while Dewey retained an ontological 
‘external’ (Godfrey-Smith 1996), Vygotsky thought of the environment as only and 
solely consisting in its use within collaborative activity. The socio-cultural reality is 
co-constructed in a group of actors from the application of historically shaped tools 
in that collaborative activity. By deconstructing the distinction between the external 
and the individual, Vygotsky dialectically negates the adaptation paradigm. By doing 
so, however, it remains deeply embedded into how he thought of human nature and 
development (Stetsenko 2017, 199). Vygotsky replaced the Darwinian perspective 
on human society, culture, and mind with Marxist historical materialism to develop a 
novel perspective on human evolution. On that view, human nature has evolved the 
cognitive and linguistic capacity for labour, meaning the collaborative purposeful 
transformation of the world. In evolving to that stage, the human species was 
actually able to develop a qualitatively new relationship with the environment – an 
‘external’ environment, in Vygotsky, is replaced by a socially co-constructed reality. 
This reality functions according to its own rules and does not underlie the principles 
of natural selection and adaptation. Vygotsky defines this development, by which 
the human species began to collaboratively transform the environment outside of 
adaptation and reactivity to external pressures and demands, as a ‘leap’. 
 
In Vygotsky’s conception, in the collaborative process of mastering cultural 
tools and employing them with increasing autonomy toward “the artificial mastery of 
natural processes of development” (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 88) the cultural tools 
themselves are subjected to transformative processes. Learning and cognitive 
developments, thus, in a Vygotskian perspective, cannot be viewed as detached 
from the socio-cultural practices that enable those developments in the first place; 
an intellectualist approach to human cognition leads to a profound misreading of his 
works, and, in particular, his educational concepts. Education, following a 
Vygotskian perspective, means the collaborative, purposeful formation of the 
environment and the concomitant transformation of the individual. 
 
Vygotsky’s concept of education is based on, what I call, a post-adaptation 
paradigm. On that understanding, education is the formation of individuals in relation 
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to socio-cultural realities through the collaborative use and elaboration of tools. 
Individual development, in a post-adaptation paradigm, is inseparable from the 
individual’s participation in cultural change. Educational practices in a Vygotskian 
perspective are therefore to be understood as highly contextualised, relational 
endeavours; they are neither biologically determined, nor socially formable. Rather, 
there emerges a zone of potential formation at the intersection of the individual’s 
hereditary constitution and the potentials of the lived-in socio-cultural context. 
Rather than the subject being adaptable to external changes, on this conception, 
education’s aim is to enable people to choose purposes and alter the socio-cultural 
reality accordingly. 
 
In summary, from the hermeneutical studies of Spencer, Dewey, and 
Vygotsky’s educationally relevant works, I derive three different educational 
concepts of adaptation: 
 
1) Adaptation to, engendering a notion of education as the one-sided ‘fitting- 
in’ of the younger generation into a pre-defined structure, or according to a 
pre-defined vision 
 
2) ‘Adaptation to’ and simultaneous ‘adaptation of’, informing a concept of 
education as a capacity to adapt increasingly intelligently to new demands 
both through formal education and the formation of the individual in everyday 
interaction. 
 
3) Post-adaptation, informing a concept of education as the collaborative 
transformation of socio-cultural realities according to chosen purposes and 
social aims. 
 
Each of these three concepts of adaptation inform education in a particular way. 
While this list is not exhaustive, but merely a cross-section through some of the key 
figures of the tradition of evolutionary reasoning in the context of education, it does 
illustrate the range of meanings associated to the concept of adaptation in 
educational discourses. 
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6.2.2 Adaptation and Learning 
 
Recently, adaptation as an educational concept has become increasingly 
popular in connection to learning. Disciplines like evolutionary educational 
psychology and human behaviour ecology have taken on an evolutionary framework 
to study learning in the context of processes of adaptation. Despite this common 
ground, the two approaches differ greatly. Evolutionary educational psychology is 
concerned with a phylogenetic perspective, which means that it focuses on how 
evolved learning dispositions and biases influence social behaviour, cognitive 
mechanisms, or motivation (Geary 2002). Human behavioural ecology, in contrast, 
focuses on the significance of the environment in learning processes of the 
individual (Martin 2012, 92). A confusion of these two levels is potentially the source 
of considerable mis-conceptualisation, making it worthwhile to disentangle them. 
 
As an adaptation-strategy, learning has the enormous advantage of having a 
quick effect that does not rely on the generation-spanning physical transformation 
that other species rely on. Lots of animals learn. It is an important part of their 
adaptation to the environment (Hollis 2012, 95). The closer an animal is to the 
human species genetically, the longer is the period of immaturity in childhood, and, 
consequently, the potential for learning. Human development, however, is shaped 
by learning more than any other species, which makes the utilisation of an 
evolutionary adaptation-focus to think of learning rather obvious within the discipline 
of education (Bjorklund&Beers 2016, 3). For education as a practice concerned with 
learning, the extent to which humans can be shaped through experience, and to 
what extent natural and hereditary predispositions are involved in that process are of 
prime significance. The concept of adaptation offers a lens to think about these 
drivers and motivations of learning. 
 
To think of learning in terms of adaptation, is by no means a new research- 
phenomenon. All three thinkers presented in this thesis draw from ideas of 
adaptation, i.e. “the act or process of changing – or, indeed the change itself – so 
as to become better suited to a new situation or in a new application” (Hollis 2012, 
95) to reflect on processes of learning and teaching. I will now analyse how these 
modern evolutionary frameworks for thinking about learning in relation to adaptation 
have emerged. 
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Spencer’s theory of education stands as an example of an approach that 
disconnects learning from adaptation. He was interested primarily in performance 
and behaviour – processes of learning did not matter to him, and, thus, receive little 
attention in his works. The ‘correct’ behaviour is, ‘what matters’, and not processes 
of understanding and developing. Looking at his evolutionary epistemology this 
makes sense: In Spencer, learning is irrelevant; due to the Lamarckian nature of his 
evolutionary theory, he thought of adaptation primarily in biological terms. Spencer 
cares about learning to the extent to which it aligns behaviour and values with the 
moral principles of what he deemed to be the ideal society. In that ideal society the 
‘real’ adaptive process, i.e. the biological adaptation, would be allowed to occur. The 
learner, the educative subject vanishes in Spencer’s future-oriented evolutionism 
based on biological inheritance. Where adaptations are biologically inherited, 
learning as an adaptive method loses its footing. 
 
In Dewey, in contrast, learning from experience is the key component of the 
subject’s adaptive relationship to the world. For Dewey, learning occurs within the 
reflective processing connecting doing and undergoing. Doing, i.e. the acting and 
intervening in environments, is inseparably connected to learning since 
opportunities for learning open up when our actions break down due to encounters 
with the unexpected and we arrive in an ‘in-between’ realm between old and new 
ideas and action (English 2013). On that view, learning from experiences is 
understood as an enhanced ability of the learner to deal with future experiences. 
Education as the reorganisation of experiences is a key component of the 
individual’s learning development (meaning development through learning). This re- 
establishment of continuity through educative experiences that lead to learning is, 
what I think Dewey understood adaptation to mean. ‘Adaptation to’, therein, is 
supplemented with ‘adaptation of’: The subject ‘does something’ to the world and, 
by this action transforms the environment. This action, in turn, is an opportunity for 
an educative experience. 
 
Just like Dewey, learning in Vygotsky is necessarily learning from 
experience. In that, learning is what connects the subject and the socio-cultural 
reality he/she moves in; it is, a mediator, and thus, at least in some sense of the 
word, a means for adaptation. Vygotsky, however, supplemented the concept of 
learning with the concept of development to differentiate adaptive processes from 
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post-adaptive, deeply transformative processes of the individual’s way of ‘being in 
the world’. All mental functions, in Vygotsky, first exist as social relations that are 
later being integrated into mental functions as psychological tools. Instead of 
supplementing ‘adaptation to’ with ‘adaptation of’, as it was Dewey’s approach, 
Vygotsky sought to dialectically negate an adaptation-paradigm when it comes to 
conceptualising human growth. Vygotsky defined learning with reference to the 
historical materialist idea of negation: in making “historical experiences”, 
unconditional reactions transformed into conditional ones. In Vygotsky (1925- 
30/1987), however, learning, or “historical experience” (68) is only a precursor for 
development, which means the overturning of previous ways of action into a 
qualitatively new way of relating to the socio-cultural reality. In teaching, learned 
concepts, or everyday concepts, are complemented with their more abstract 
scientific counterparts. By learning those psychological tools, the individual 
fundamentally alters her/his relationship to the environment, moving away from 
reactivity, to purposeful co-creation of socio-cultural realities. Instead of “acting in a 
changing environment”, as we observe it in Dewey, Vygotsky though of “people 
actively changing their environment and, moreover, being brought into existence by 
and through their own transformative acting.” (Stetsenko 2017, 196) 
 
Thinking learning in connection to adaptation, I conclude, is a key part of 
evolutionary educational theory. In Vygotsky and Dewey, learning opens up a space 
for agency and decision; they both use learning as a ‘mediator’ between the 
environment and the subject. Their highly different concepts of environment, 
however, limit this analogy; in the case of Vygotsky the sovereign external 
surroundings of Dewey are replaced by a constructed socio-cultural reality 
consisting of tools and chosen purposes. Nonetheless, they both think of learning as 
the ever-changing relationship between the subject and her/his ‘environment’ and 
shared an interest in how humans develop in alignment with their environments, and 
how they are involved in its transformation. 
 
The important difference between Dewey and Vygotsky when it comes to 
their evolutionary perspectives on learning and adaptation is the question of how 
learning begins. Processes of learning, in Dewey, emerge from the individuals 
experience of discontinuities between and her/his environment, and the 
accompanied experience of negativity (English 2013). “The in-between realm of 
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learning”, in Dewey, emerges from “encounters with the new and unexpected.” 
(English 2013, 55) In Dewey, learning begins with an encounter with something 
external to the learner. While the environment is to a significant extent social and 
also socially constructed through processes of common meaning-making (Hansen 
2002), Dewey’s material environment is also to another extent a sovereign material 
entity functioning according to its own logics (Godfrey-Smith 1996; Bredo 1998). 
Growth, and with it learning, thus, occurs between the subject and the world. 
Through the reflective processing of those experiences of negativity the individual 
re-creates continuity in experience. In the process of learning from experiences of 
discontinuity, the internal and the external, the individual changes, and through this, 
also changes the way he or she acts in the world; the subject and the world grow at 
the same time. 
 
Both Dewey and Vygotsky wanted to overcome the subject-object dualism. 
While it was Dewey’s approach to do so by connecting them functionally, that is, by 
making them dependent on each other in the process of growth, Vygotsky, in 
contrast, attempted to dissolve the dualism by thinking of them as ontologically 
dependent on each other. On his view, the ‘external’ does not have any meaning in 
and of itself, but becomes a reality within the transformative activity of individuals; 
the ‘external’ becomes a reality in labour, as a tool. “In this realm, things are what 
they are in the light of whether and how they matter to people by virtue of being 
included into human activity of transforming and ultimately creating the world.” 
(Stetsenko 2011, 34) 
 
Dewey’s concept of growth depends on the recognition of a ‘thing’ outside of 
what the individual knows from previous experience: “To recognize the thing is to 
grasp its definition. To perceive is to acknowledge unattained possibilities” (Dewey 
1925/2008, 144). Before growth can happen, Dewey emphasises here, the 
individual has to recognise the unattained possibilities of the external event, or 
sensation. Without such recognition, learning and thus growth cannot occur. In 
Vygotsky, the individual’s motivation to learn comes from the desire to ‘master’ the 
socio-cultural reality in which he/she always already moves. With the increasing 
integration of tools, i.e. through learning, the individual becomes increasingly able to 
participate in the co-creation of the socio-cultural reality he/she inhabits. 
191  
It can be noted, thus, that both Dewey and Vygotsky think of learning as a 
reaction to a gap, or a need of some sort: In Dewey this gap is emerging ‘naturally’, 
from the contingency of our interactions with an environment external to us; in 
Vygotsky the gap emerges from the desire for ‘mastery’ and autonomy. Learning, in 
Vygotsky, has the purpose of artificially forming the individual to increasingly 
‘inhabit’ the socio-cultural reality he/she lives in, to make the individual an 
increasingly effective agent of the co-creation of that environment (Glassman 2001, 
5). On Glassman’s (2001) view, in Vygotsky’s conception, “tools and symbols are 
used in the service of culturally defined goals that are far beyond the immediacy of 
Dewey’s ends-in-view.” (6) Dewey’s ends-in-view are based on the principles of 
problem-solving and functionality in the moment with the aim of establishing 
continuity between previous knowledge and new experiences. Dewey’s ends-in- 
view, are, following Glassman, still tied to externalist direction. In Vygotsky, in 
contrast, “people actively and deliberately transform circumstances and conditions 
of their life in simultaneously co-creating their world and themselves” (Stetsenko 
2017, 110), which means that aims for transformation are artificially created based 
on chosen ends and purposes. 
 
6.2.3 Learning and transformation 
 
The discussion of the difference in how Dewey and Vygotsky conceptualise 
the beginning of learning, how they discuss what ‘sparks’ processes of learning, and 
the concomitant potential for transformation leads us over to the point of 
transformative agency of the individual. I argue that there is a social-transformative 
aspect of processes of learning which is crucial not only to Vygotsky, but also – 
counter the characterisation of Stetsenko (2017) – to Dewey. 
 
According to Stetsenko (2017), Dewey “remained firmly within the Darwinian 
mode of thinking and treated human beings as not much different from other 
biological organisms.” (168) He defined humans as “responsive rather than 
deliberate and proactive with the mind understood as a biological organ of 
adaptation to the ‘given circumstances’ rather than an instrument of change.” 
(Stetsenko 2017, 161) The overarching point that Stetsenko makes is that Dewey, in 
his approach to integrate humans fully with other animals in Darwinian evolution, 
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failed to acknowledge the particularities of human nature and culture. She argues: 
“Progressive as it is, especially for its time and place, Dewey’s position is still 
affiliated with the ethos of adaptation as expressed, for example, in his core 
metaphor of organic growth.” (Stetsenko 2017, 196) On that perspective, the power 
and agency of humans to transform their environment is supposedly lost in Dewey 
but finds reinvigoration in Vygotsky. On such a reading of Dewey, he remained 
firmly within an adaptation-paradigm, thinking of the “state of imbalance in organic 
organism-environment interactions” (Stetsenko 2017, 165) as the root of learning 
and growth. On Stetsenko’s (2017, 164) reading, Dewey’s pragmatist concept of 
adaptation is about ‘coping’, about reactivity to external pressures and needs. This 
external definition of aims of actions supposedly stands in direct contrast to 
Vygotsky’s approach to think of learning processes as the result of labour-activities, 
which are purposeful and based on chosen aims. 
 
While I agree with Stetsenko’s assessment of Dewey’s philosophy being fully 
Darwinian in aspiration, I disagree with this characterisation of Dewey’s growth as 
meaning ‘adaptation to the given circumstances’. I also want to put up for question 
her portrayal of Dewey as disinterested in social transformation. As I have argued at 
length, the dialectic nature is essential to Dewey’s notion of growth that necessarily 
involves the transformation of the self and the world. In The Quest for Certainty 
(1929/2008), Dewey describes the bi-directional character of his concept of 
adaptation, meaning both the passive “appeasement with those powers that decide 
our fate” (67), and the active “changing the world (rather than oneself) through 
practical action” (67). Even though I agree with the broad characterisation of Dewey 
as an ‘externalist’ (Godfrey-Smith 1996) and a proponent of a Darwinian adaptation 
paradigm, it is key to balance that view with Dewey’s explicit differentiation of 
animals, which are driven “by unconscious adaptation and survival”, and humans, 
which replace those ways of adaptation with “conscious deliberation and 
experimentation” (Dewey 1889/2008, 54) Growth is, as I have argued, Dewey’s 
attempt to redefine the relationships between human individuals and the world 
without having to categorically detach them from the process of evolution. Dewey 
(1889/2008) emphasised that being ‘adapted’, on his view, meant more than being 
‘adapted to’ the environment: “I have discussed this particular case in the hope of 
enlarging somewhat our conception of what is meant by the term "fit"; to suggest 
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that we are in the habit of interpreting it with reference to an environment which long 
ago ceased to be.” (41) Instead of merely being reactive, humans, due to their 
cognitive ability for learning from experience and mediating environmental stimuli 
intelligently, have established a more complex relationship with the environment 
than other animals. 
 
Stetsenko (2017) deems Vygotsky’s Marxist interpretation of Darwinism to 
be “the next important step after Darwin (integrating his approach and superseding 
it).” (165) She argues that the “broad political ethos at the core of Vygotsky’s project 
countered principles of adaptation and competition for resources as the core 
grounding for human development that takes the ‘givenness’ of the world for granted 
and assumes that individuals have to fit in with its status quo.” (108) Based on the 
evolutionary reading of growth, and the concomitant clarification of what Dewey 
understood adaptation to mean, I propose a counter-characterisation of Dewey as 
someone who very much believed in the transformative agency of human 
individuals. Growth is a necessarily dialectic process that involved both the subject 
and the world (Dewey 1916/2008, 5; Popp 2015, 50). By participating in societal 
institutions, the subject actively shapes them while simultaneously being shaped by 
them in turn (Rogers 2012, 238). Shared moral values, and social habits, and tools 
are the result of a common processes of meaning-making which involves processes 
communication and conscious selection which direct the constitution of ends-in- 
view. 
 
When Dewey states that “conformity, not transformation, is the essence of 
education” (Dewey 1916/2008, 64) it is crucial to clarify what understanding of 
transformation he is up against: Dewey put high value on social progress as an 
educational aim; he did not, however, think of social progress and transformation as 
entirely determinable, but, instead, as a contingent and open-ended process of 
growth. It follows, thus, that Dewey disqualifies ‘transformation’ as an educational 
aim only under a definition of transformation as planned formation of structures. This 
is, perhaps, one of the main points of contention between Dewey and Vygotsky, 
who put high value on the purposeful formation of societal institutions according to 
chosen aims for societal transformation. Dewey (1939/2008) opposed this in his 
criticism of Marxism and their objection “to any suggestion of identification of their 
creed with theological systems of the past. But all absolutisms tend to assume a 
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theological form” (122). Societal transformation understood as a necessary element 
of growth, however, based on what is encountered, “the actual” (Reich et al 2016, 
1001) is a key component of the intrinsic value of education for Dewey. 
 
A more valid criticism, I argue, emerges in contrasting Dewey’s notion of 
growth with Vygotsky’s emphasis of the struggle. Stetsenko (2017) criticises the 
‘smoothness’ to Dewey’s growth, arguing that “Dewey’s philosophy reflected an 
environment that knew nothing of crisis and radical discontinuity.” (165) On her 
view, growth is “boundless” (165), and “without either predetermined end points or 
normative criteria of progress [that] came at the expense of insisting on finding 
radical solutions for social ills.” (165). Similar points of contention have been raised 
by Saito (2005) and Greene (1998) who have criticised Dewey for linking 
intellectual development, democratic values, and morality in his notion of growth. 
Similarly, Noddings (1998) has pointed towards Dewey’s “refusal to separate the 
intellectual and the moral” (484) and consequential idealistic perception of society 
that becomes necessary in order to envision society as the incubator of moral 
values. 
 
I agree with Stetsenko that it is worthwhile criticising Dewey’s concept of 
growth in the way it conceptualises social transformation and progress in relation to 
education. Dewey (1916/2008) equalises “the moral and the social quality of 
conduct” (369) and defines progress in terms of a momentary continuity between 
individual ends-in-view, and moral and social habits. Morality, in its association with 
social conduct, is defined in terms of functionality and what Dewey calls ‘social 
adaptation’ (Dewey 1902/2008, 261). In social adaptation, increased shared 
meaning and common ends – considering the evolutionarily developed social 
human mind – can be described as progress. This makes ethics situational, 
meaning that there exist no apriori moral standards – they have all evolved, as 
Dewey described in a quote used further above, result of “the outworkings of the 
endeavour and thought of humanity” (Dewey 1899/2008, 69). The emerging moral 
dimension in Dewey’s concept of growth is problematic insofar as it counteracts the 
‘ultranaturalist’ aspiration of Dewey. As Saito (2005) points out, in Dewey, ”the 
ethical is continuous with, not the same as, nature. The ethical grows out of the 
physical universe as an extension of nature.” (20) This means that although morality 
is not strictly perceived as natural, on Dewey’s view, morality is continuous with 
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nature, ‘growing out of it’. He assumed that morality is inherent to intellectual growth 
(Noddings 1998, 43), and, thus, arrives not from learning moral values, but from 
learning itself. 
 
As an alternative to Dewey’s understanding of morality as evolved, I suggest 
thinking of democratic values, and a society committed to equality and social justice 
not merely as matter of organic evolutionary growth, but as a matter of struggle and 
break. Integrating a Vygotskian perspective to do so, as suggested by Stetsenko, is 
indeed intriguing. While in Dewey, learning is the establishment of continuity, the 
integration of the old and the new, in Vygotsky, learning is the negation of hereditary 
experience, the overturning of the old and its discontinuation in the new. Change 
and transformation, therefore, seem to be more ‘fundamental’ in Vygotsky than in 
Dewey. However, what is lost entirely from Stetsenko’s perspective is an 
acknowledgment of the problems caused by the normative space that Vygotsky 
opens up. While there is doubtlessly great potential in the political nature of 
Vygotsky’s concept of education – in terms of striving towards aims of equality and 
inclusion (Stetsenko 2017, 105) – there is, naturally, a flipside to this potential: Who 
gets to define social aims and purposes according to what criteria? 
 
Dewey opposed non-functional definitions of educational ends most vocally 
in his criticism of Spencer. Dewey (1908/2008) put emphasis on avoiding any 
“ideals of a Utopian millennium" (57) in his own evolutionary epistemology. Dewey’s 
concept of growth was the explicit attempt to formulate a pragmatic concept of 
individual and societal development that would gain its direction from within, i.e. 
from the process of growth itself, rather than from without. The ideal of democracy, 
in the context of Dewey’s growth, is legitimised in its functioning as an optimal 
condition for growth. In Vygotsky, in contrast, exists an explicitly normative 
component. In Vygotsky, in the words of Stetsenko, 
 
reality is understood as an arena of human struggle and activist 
striving that is therefore immanently and inherently infused, at its 
core, with emotions, passions, feelings, values, and interests – 
while not ceasing to be material and practical at the same time. 
(Stetsenko 2017, 199) 
 
Inherent to the way Vygotsky seeks to redefine reality not as an external 
‘thing’ in and of itself, but rather as a space of meaning created in collaborative 
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labour-activity, is the necessity to define the shape of that space ideologically. While 
in Dewey’s growth, truth is informed by functionality in an environment, in Vygotsky, 
truth is defined in its functionality to reach an ideological goal, “guided by the end 
points to which people are committing (even though these end points might never 
be achieved).” (Stetsenko 2017, 110) While Stetsenko (2017) embraces social- 
democratic values like “social justice, equality, and human rights” (113) as core 
pillars of this ideological goal, I want to accentuate that this is, of course, not a 
given. The ideological goal furnishing transformative activities is about what groups 
of people want and deem a worthy ideological goal to pursue with their activity. That 
this is highly problematic has been demonstrated throughout history, not least in 
Vygotsky’s own times and the socio-political consequences they yielded. The study 
of Popkewitz (1998) maintains that Vygotsky’s psychological insights cannot be 
detached from his ideas on cultural evolution and Marxist revolution without losing 
the profound embeddedness of cognitive functions and developments in historical 
and cultural context. The open-endedness of Dewey’s growth that Stetsenko 
criticised appears in a new light: Instead of being a result of political disinterest, the 
open-endedness of Dewey’s growth is a political decision in itself. Growth seeks to 
develop a perspective on the development of a just society that is justified 
functionally, rather than ideologically. 
 
I conclude that societal transformation is a key element of processes of 
learning and development for both Dewey and Vygotsky. While Dewey defines 
social progress functionally, Vygotsky requires the definition of social purposes. 
While that latter approach potentially enhances individual agency in the formation of 
society, it brings with it the issue of having to define social purposes. The 
evolutionary framework, I argue, shapes these connections made between 
individual development and societal change. It links individual learning and 
development with changes in the environment. Learning, adaptation, and 
transformation in evolutionary educational theory are, thus, tightly linked. I now 
move on to discuss how education and teaching play into this connection. 
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6.2.4 Evolutionary concepts of teaching 
 
In evolutionary educational theories, learning is what connects the subject 
and the world in one way or another, depending on how the adaptive relationship is 
defined. In Spencer, a Lamarckian understanding of adaptation led to a disregard of 
processes of learning and cultural transmission, as these educational processes are 
replaced by biological inheritance. As a result, both the educational subject, and the 
teacher, are virtually irrelevant in Spencer’s theory of education. Contrasting 
perspectives can be found in Dewey and Vygotsky, who both assign important roles 
to processes of learning for the development of the individual and socio/cultural 
evolution. 
 
In both Dewey and Vygotsky, learning is understood to be a process of 
transformation of the subject, the subject’s being in the world, and, in consequence, 
the world, or socio-cultural reality, itself. Psychologically, learning, on their view, is a 
mediating factor between stimulus and response. They both place prime 
significance on experience when it comes to the constitution of that mediating factor; 
Vygotsky’s concept of ‘historical experience’, I argue, is largely coherent with 
Dewey’s notion of ‘educative experiences’. Where the two thinkers differ, I gather 
from the analyses of their concepts of learning, is how they think learning begins, 
whether their aim is to negate or to integrate, and, finally, to what extent the learning 
process is connected to education and teaching. 
 
Dewey’s concept of education includes both processes of pedagogically 
directed learning and development (Erziehung), and processes of self-formation 
based on everyday experiences and communication (Bildung). Educative 
experiences are experiences that allow the individual to establish connections 
between ‘doing’ and ‘undergoing’, From an educational point of view the most 
pressing question is how educative experiences can be pedagogically created and 
organised (Dewey 1898/2008, 174). Experiences are not merely the result of events 
occurring in the material and social environment; experiences are a matter of 
meaning-making which is a complex process of social construction and intelligent 
conscious selection. In other words, experiences – and, therefore, processes of 
growth – are not externally inducible; they are created by the learner, not the 
teacher (Garrison et al 2012, 43). The role of teacher, in Dewey, is the preparation 
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of educational environments that direct growth; so teaching is always indirectly 
influencing learners via the environment. Every environment enables a spectrum of 
experiences, and it is the task of educational practitioners to provide relevant 
environments (Hansen 2002). Educational environments that enable educative 
experiences are those that provide socio-culturally relevant learning opportunities 
that tie on to the learner’s previous experience by opening up space for productive 
discontinuity. The creation of such educational environments and supporting 
learners in reconstructing their experiences at these moments of negativity is a 
pedagogically complex task that is also absolutely necessary for growth. In 
Democracy and Education (1916/2008) Dewey writes: “In directing the activities of 
the young, society determines its own future in determining that of the young.” (47) 
Teaching, I gather from this, is key not only for the growth and learning of the 
individual, but also central for the positive transformation of society. 
 
In Vygotsky, teaching is not only a key contributor to successful learning and 
education, but, in fact, connected to a qualitatively different kind of individual growth 
that can only be achieved through teaching (Derry 2013, 71). Informed by his 
Marxist-Darwinist evolutionism, Vygotsky differentiates processes of learning from 
developmental. While learning is gradual quantitative change – resembling Dewey’s 
concept of growth – developments are leaps which fundamentally negate previous 
ways of acting and behaving. Learning leads to development through teaching; 
Vygotsky conceptualised this particular kind of learning as obuchenie, which is 
translated by Dafermos (2018) as “instruction-learning” (165). While in Dewey the 
material environment is a potential source of educative experiences, in Vygotsky, 
experiences leading to qualitative transformations of the individual are limited to 
processes of obuchenie within ZPDs. 
 
All learning in Vygotsky is social learning; it is through collaborative activity, 
that material artefacts and cultural tools are being integrated in the intellectual 
activity of the individual and gain meaning. All mental functions, on a Vygotskian 
perspective, first exist as social relations (Vygotsky 1925-30/1987, 87). The 
relationship between the learner and the teacher, however, is particularly important. 
While informal social interactions, or interactions with peers in schools can 
contribute to processes of learning, in Vygotsky, it requires the pedagogical 
expertise of the teacher to recognise the ZPD and provide the encounter with the 
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relevant scientific concepts to elevate, and ultimately negate and transcend the 
learner’s everyday concepts (Chaitlin 2012, 43). In his concept of the ZPD, Vygotsky 
makes teaching a constitutive component of development. Hence, while in Dewey 
the teacher is key for processes of cultural transmission, the preparation of 
educational environments, and the support of learner’s reflective processing of 
experiences, in Vygotsky, there is a certain quality of individual growth that can only 
be achieved through ‘being taught’. 
 
6.3 Educational concepts of adaptation today – the example 
of PISA 
This thesis has demonstrated that the concept of adaptation is a, if not the 
key principle of evolutionary educational theory. It had a significant impact on all 
three thinkers studied in this thesis and continues to provide a popular framework 
for current learning theory. However, to conceptualise ‘learning as adaptation’, albeit 
being popular, is highly ambiguous: ‘Adaptation’ can mean a plethora of different 
things and can, in turn, informs educational theory in manifold ways. This way 
adaptation is defined informs how the subject is thought to develop in relation to the 
environment, and, therein, sets the foundation for how learning and teaching are 
understood. 
 
One of the most influential educational discourses of our times that uses 
‘adaptation’ in relation to education is produced by the PISA. Despite the enormous 
influence that the PISA results have on educational discourses internationally, the 
way it understands ‘adaptation’ in relation to education and learning remains 
undefined. In the following, I will contribute to this gap of conceptual clarity by 
analysing PISA’s concept of adaptation in the light of the findings that this thesis has 
produced regarding educational concepts of adaptation. After having contextualised 
PISA in the broader sociocultural and economic development of neoliberalism, I will 
use the conceptual apparatus developed in this thesis to argue that PISA presents a 
one-sided understanding of ‘adaptation to’ that leads to the subordination of 
education to the demands of the neo-liberal labour market. In concluding this 
chapter, I will contrast the limited and limiting concept of adaptation that PISA 
disseminates internationally with alternative approaches identified in this thesis. 
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6.3.1 Contextualisation - the hegemony of PISA 
 
PISA is a comparative global study, testing performance of 15-year-old 
school students in the subjects of reading, maths and science. It is conducted and 
disseminated by the Organisation for Economic Collaboration and Development 
(OECD) since 2000. PISA is the perhaps most important player in an overarching 
movement of the globalisation of education that is marked by the de- 
contextualisation of education from national contexts and “travelling reforms” 
(Steiner-Khamsi 2012, 3) through processes of policy-borrowing and -lending (Grek 
2012, 43f.). 
 
Sociologically, the globalisation of education is located within the broader 
historical-cultural development of the so-called knowledge society and economy 
(Takayama 2012, 151). ‘Knowledge society’ is a vague term standing alongside 
other buzzwords like ‘post-industrial society’, used to describe the neoliberal 
globalised economy, which is focused on the self-regulation of a free global market 
through the distribution of information, technological advances and the subject’s 
ability to use and ‘update’ knowledge in a self-organised way according to economic 
demands. Lorey and Neundlinger (2012) call this development “cognitive capitalism” 
(3). In cognitive capitalism, education is seemingly ‘naturally’ connected to 
economics, and is reformed and transformed within that logic “as if the relationship 
between education and the economy is uncontested.” (Lauder 2012, 249) The 
extent to which the subordination of education under economic interests is part of 
the OECD’s broader education strategy can be observed, as one example of many, 
in the following quote published in the OECD Observer: 
 
These are important times for in all the member countries of the 
OECD. The never-ending search for competitive advantage in the 
global knowledge economy has led all public policy-makers to 
focus on education as a key factor in strengthening 
competitiveness, employment and social cohesion. This is an 
inevitable consequence of the increasing complexity of all our 
economies. Indeed, the pace of technological change worldwide 
is now so fast that, to a large extent, we must plan for the 
unknown. The only certainty is that education needs to drive these 
changes. If it does not, then we are all in trouble and we will fail our 
citizens. (Dempsey 2004, 7) 
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This development has led to a human capital rationality in education and a 
widespread redefinition of educational institutions as tools for economic growth and 
the production of ‘human capital’. Human capital theory describes a framework that 
defines human activity and education in terms of production and capital. In the past 
few decades, human capital theory has become one of the most powerful policy 
development frameworks in education internationally (Gillies 2015, 1053), 
perpetuating an understanding of education as an investment and constructed 
educational institutions as providers of the required ‘human capital’ – especially 
regarding the subject’s willingness for life-long learning (Lorey&Neundlinger 2012, 
11). Following the consumer rationality inherent to neo-liberalist agenda in 
educational theory, research, policy and practice, educational institutions are being 
subordinated under what Ozga (2012, 165) called “regimes of accountability”. 
Educational institutions are increasingly structured like businesses that offer a 
service to consumers. They are being held accountable under economic standards 
through monitoring and external evaluation – and are then argued to be failing and 
needing governing. This development has also significantly shaped educational 
research, which has become part of the system of accountability and monitoring 
(Sobe 2012, 82). 
 
Over the past few decades, in the context of strengthened neo-liberal market 
politics the established connections between education and economic development 
have deepened. Neo-liberalism, under one definition, means the expansion of 
economic principles, logics, and mechanisms into non-economic spheres of life 
(Brown 2016). It is characterised by the liberalisation of markets and the 
strengthened importance of multinational enterprises and supranational 
organisations like the OECD. Subjects are constructed as “market actors” (Brown 
2016, 3) through the discursive practices of human capital theory in order to 
contribute the macro-agenda of nations competing over economic prosperity in a 
globalised economy. 
 
PISA stands exemplary for these recent developments in educational 
thinking, policy, and research that has to be understood not isolated, as a testing 
instrument, but in the broader context of the modern socio-economic and cultural 
evolution of neo-liberalism. While PISA doubtlessly produces valuable data, it has 
increasingly expanded its discourse and enforced what Reich et al (2016) deem a 
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reductionism in educational discourses. PISA has incorporated virtually all realms of 
education, influencing curricula reform, school reforms, and teacher education 
internationally (Ozga 2012). It goes beyond the influence of any other soft-governing 
body. Because of its high impact on public dialogues about education, which it 
infused with an accountability-rationale, PISA has managed to establish a research 
culture in education aimed at the “monitoring of monitoring” (Sobe 2012, 89), 
suggesting the controllability of individual’s ability – and willingness – to ensure 
desired economic developments (Reich et al 2016, 1006). As a consequence, 
evidence-based, quantitative research has gained acclaim in education departments 
globally and is, it seems, increasingly more likely to acquire funding. In the same 
stride, governmental evaluating bodies, such as OFSTED in the UK, were 
established to strengthen the case that education “should be or become an 
evidence-based practice” (Biesta 2006, 1). The call for ‘effective’ education that lies 
at the foundation of such a concept of education implicitly transports the 
unexamined assumption that education produces measurable outcomes. As a 
consequence, PISA introduced a measurability-rationality to curricula and school 
reform inducing a profound transformation of what knowledge is deemed relevant 
(Grek 2012, 43) 
 
PISA stands in comparison to no other in the way it is received and 
perpetuated as “gold standard” in both research and policy-making (Ozga 2012, 
166). The reason for the unique ‘PISA-effect’ in terms of the soft-governance of 
educational policy and research, Takayama (2012) explains with the high public 
attention that PISA generates due to the “highly contradictory, ambiguous meaning, 
symbols and texts” (150). Takayama (2012, 150) argues that PISA was purposefully 
created as a polysemic tool whose data can be interpreted and applied in different 
national contexts and for different political purposes. According to Takayama, 
PISA’s argumentation can even be described as hegemonial because of its 
demonstrated ability to ideologically incorporate counter-discourses and redefine 
them for their own purposes. This can be observed especially in recent publications, 
where high emphasis is put on traditionally social democratic values like equity and 
inclusion, which it reframed in a human capital approach (Takayama 2012, 15). 
PISA includes these values “as a strategy to justify the OECD’s global policy 
discourse that marginalises educational goals not suited for quantification of 
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measurement.” (Takayama 2012, 151) PISA, following this argumentation, disguises 
its economic and policy agenda with a reference to these social democratic values 
to justify its own position in governing social and cultural developments. The 
individual, although supposedly freer than ever before from legal interference, is 
discursively tied to the fulfilment of economic growth through the incorporation of 
notions of citizenship, self-fulfilment, and well-being defined through monetary 
success and status (Brown 2016, 4). I argue that its use of the undefined notion of 
‘adaptation’ is part of the polysemic strategy of PISA. 
 
6.3.2 Adaptation and adaptability in PISA documents 
 
In this chapter, concepts of adaptation have materialized as highly 
interesting in the way they inform views of education, learning and teaching. It has 
also transpired, however, that the term ‘adaptation’ is ambiguous, carrying a 
multitude of potential meanings and implications. Due to its major influence on 
virtually all realms of educational thinking and acting, the way PISA defines 
education – and educational concepts of adaptation – is important to unpack. In 
particular, if we assume that the ambiguous, polysemic nature of PISA is part of its 
hegemonial status in informing educational research, practice, policy, and theory. 
 
That PISA documents use the term ‘adaptation’ frequently is not surprising. 
PISA is intrinsically leaning towards an idea of adaptation to and adaptability due to 
its framing in human capital theory. In the knowledge and information centred 
economy, the individual is expected to learn in with the aim of matching the 
demands of the labour market (Lauder 2012). In Knowledge and Skills for Life. First 
Results from PISA 2000, the OECD states: “PISA is based on a dynamic model of 
lifelong learning in which new knowledge and skills necessary for successful 
adaptation to a changing world are continuously acquired throughout life.” (OECD 
2001, 9) Knowledge and skills are conceptualised as requirements for successful 
adaptation in a contingent world. In an increasingly complex globalised economy, 
economic developments are not foreseeable – instead of thinking about particular 
knowledge and skills that ensure that adaptation, PISA focuses on the subject’s 
ability to remain adaptable to the demands of a highly contingent economic 
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environment. Adaptation, it follows, is reframed into adaptability – being ‘well 
adapted’ means to be adaptable. 
 
Adaptability is a highly circulated concept in current learning theory and 
psychology. It is commonly defined as “the capacity to adaptively regulate cognition, 
emotion, and behaviour in response to new, changing, and/or uncertain conditions 
and circumstances.” (Martin 2012, 90) In an adaptability-focus, learning is seen as a 
tool of the individual to adapt quickly and flexibly to ever accelerating micro- and 
macro-level transformations. ‘Learning to learn’, therein, becomes a core aim of 
educational practices: “If young people leave formal education before they have 
learned how to learn, they will not be able to update their skills to meet the needs of 
a fast-changing and increasingly globalised labour market.” (OECD 2010b, 94) 
Besides the skill to learn, the motivation and willingness to remain adaptable 
throughout one’s life by learning continuously what is necessary economically, 
receives high emphasis in PISA’s adaptability: “Adolescents with a positive attitude 
to learning are more likely to leave school with a better chance of successfully 
adapting and acquiring new skills throughout their lives.” (OECD 2006b, 84) PISA’s 
understanding of adaptability, we follow, is a mixture between skilfulness, 
knowledge and attitude to adapt to external demands. 
 
PISA’s strategy for enforcing “adaptation to changing circumstances” (OECD 
2001, 98) is built on a combination of “new knowledge and skills necessary for 
successful adaptation to a changing world” (OECD 2010a, 9), and the active 
fostering of “attitudes […], motivation and capacity to continue learning throughout 
life” (OECD 2004, 110). PISA is quintessentially neoliberal as it counts on people 
governing themselves according to seemingly free choices in a way that contributes 
to the overarching aim of economic growth (Mikelatou&Arvanitis 2017, 501). 
Lifelong learning, in a neoliberalist framing, is the attempt to diverge the 
responsibility for the individual’s economic success back to the individual itself, 
rather than reflecting on it structurally. Demonstrating its hegemonic argumentative 
potential, to ensure people’s compliance, PISA incorporates and redefines ideas like 
“general well-being” (OECD 2006b, 84) and argues that the ability and willingness 
for adaptation to is an inherent quality to ‘successful citizenship’. Especially in later 
publications, it appears that citizenship is increasingly used interchangeably with a 
notion of the “educated person” (OECD 2006a, 21), which, in turn, is used to justify 
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and reframe adaptability under economic standards – both in terms of skill and 
attitude – as an educational aim. In Assessing Scientific, Reading and Mathematical 
Literacy. A Framework for PISA 2006, we read: “A mathematically literate citizen 
realises how quickly change is taking place and the consequent need to be open to 
lifelong learning.” (OECD 2006a, 76) Mathematical skill, in this quotation, is 
connected to (an undefined) notion of citizenship that is used to justify adaptability 
and the willingness to adapt to contingent developments, as ‘the rational thing’. 
 
PISA’s attempt to justify its adaptation to strategy to ensure the educational 
provision of the required human capital, does not stop, however, with reference to 
reason, democratic values, or supposed well-being. In PISA 2009 Results: What 
Students Know and Can Do, adaptability is connected to competitiveness of nations, 
on a macroeconomic level: “The world is indifferent to tradition and past reputations, 
unforgiving of frailty and complacency and ignorant of custom or practice. Success 
will go to those individuals and countries that are swift to adapt, slow to complain 
and open to change.” (OECD 2010b, 5). “Economic growth”, PISA maintains further, 
“depends, to a large extent, on a workforce that is flexible and able to adapt to 
different needs.” (OECD 2010b, 94) PISA connects education to the overcoming of 
economic crisis (OECD 2013, 3). As a consequence, education is made directly 
answerable to economic developments, justifying monitoring and measuring of 
‘learning outcomes’ of students, and ‘teacher success’ through quantitative 
comparison. Individual’s adaptability, i.e. the ability and willingness of adapt to 
changing environments through learning, is connected to macroeconomic success. 
 
In this argumentation, education is put in a position of accountability which 
informs PISA’s definition of learning profoundly: Learning, within that accountability- 
rationality is commodified to an almost comedic degree when discussed in terms of 
“the rate of learning that occurs per hour” (OECD 2011, 20). PISA establishes itself 
as a necessary monitoring entity and argues that “direct measures of human capital 
are necessary to understand how various sills develop over time, and how they 
contribute to social and economic growth.” (OECD 2012, 3) In the same stride, 
competition is discussed as a necessary means to find best practices and to 
improve the ‘efficiency’ of education: “While national and regional evidence 
continues to be important for management and accountability, it has become 
increasingly critical for countries to be able to benchmark their measures of human 
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capital internationally for competitiveness and productivity.” (OECD 2012, 3) The 
rationality of measurability that PISA helped to establish has an enormous impact on 
how we view and research learning and teaching today: Learning is increasingly 
defined in terms of measurable outcomes and performance. The accountability- 
rationality also altered the perception of the teacher, whose ‘value’ is measured by 
the performance output of their student (Akiba&Shimizu 2012, 247). In the context of 
the neoliberalist formation of society and economy through educational policy, 
curriculum and practice reforms a, what Apple (2016) deems, “clearly a form of 
Social Darwinist Thinking” (505) re-emerges. 
 
I contend that adaptation and adaptability emerge as key concepts of PISA. 
The OECD uses PISA to frame learning and education in a human capital approach, 
and thus reconstruct educational institutions as tools for economic growth. 
Adaptability is discursively reframed with reference to democratic values, 
citizenship, autonomy and well-being. However, in connection with PISA’s 
understanding of adaptation strictly as adaptation to that was developed in this 
chapter, we begin to perforate the true nature of PISA’s idea of adaptability and 
lifelong learning as serving a macroeconomic interest rather than the emancipation 
or Bildung of the subject. 
 
I note, in agreement with Apple (2016) that interesting commonalities emerge 
between PISA’s definition of education and adaptation and a Spencerian concept of 
passive adaptation to. In PISA, just like in Spencer, the individual is not seen as an 
agent of societal change, but rather but in reactivity to contingent changes occurring 
externally. What defines the relationship between the subject and the world, on this 
reading of adaptation, is adaptability. Adaptability, in both Spencer and the studied 
PISA documents, is the aim of education as it ensures adaptation to contingent 
environments. While in Spencer, adaptability is conceptualised in his idea of 
preparing students for ‘complete living’, in PISA, adaptability is promoted through 
the notion of ‘lifelong learning’. They both look at education as instrumental to an 
externally defined societal aim; as I have argued above, in this perspective, an 
accountability-paradigm is introduced, which leads them both to connect adaptability 
with competition in a rationality of selection and comparison (Stetsenko 2017, 48). 
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Interestingly, at first sight, there exist similarities between PISA and Dewey 
as well. According to Bellmann (2007b), “several representatives of the German 
discipline of education” (421, translation mine) have associated American 
pragmatism, and Dewey in particular, with PISA. Oelkers (2003), to name a well- 
known thinker falling into that category, finds that “the philosophy of PISA is 
pragmatic: Learning is defined as lifelong adaptation.” (89, cited from Bellmann 
2007b, 423) Indeed, adaptation as an unceasing process shaping the individual’s 
being-in-the-world is a core theme of Dewey’s pragmatic evolutionary theory of 
education and learning. This lends itself to a comparison with PISA’s notion of 
adaptation as adaptability to contingent (economic) developments. There is also 
without a doubt a parallel between Dewey and PISA in the focus on adaptability as 
an educational aim: In Evolution and Ethics (1898/2008) he writes: “If one is fitted 
simply to the present, he is not fitted to survive. He is sure to go under. A part of his 
fitness will consist in that very flexibility which enables him to adjust himself without 
too much loss to sudden and unexpected changes in his surroundings.” (41) 
 
Despite these parallels, the association of Dewey with the philosophy of 
PISA is misleading. The richer evolutionary perspective developed in this thesis 
allows me to contribute to Bellmann’s (2007b) criticism of such an association 
between Dewey and PISA. This thesis has shown that educational concepts of 
adaptation are inherently ambiguous and require further clarification. Adaptation, as 
the analysis of Spencer in comparison with Dewey has shown, is a polysemic 
concept – to define learning as lifelong adaptation, as it is the case in Dewey’s 
educational philosophy of growth, does not mean the same thing as the passive 
‘adaptation to’ philosophy at the heart of PISA. While PISA promotes a concept of 
adaptation to that lacks any notion of societal transformation, Dewey’s concept of 
adaptation is necessarily dialectic, involving ‘adaptation to’ and ‘adaptation of’ as 
part of growth. Experience, which, in Dewey forms the basis of growth, is “trying” to 
cause change in the environment; it is the “active sense of control of means for 
achieving ends.” (Dewey 1916/2008, 52) Experience can never exist merely in a 
one-directional way, forming and changing the subject without changing the 
subject’s surroundings. “Adaptation, in fine, is quite as much adaptation of the 
environment to our own activities as our activities to the environment.” (Dewey 
1916/2008, 53) This transformative agency is missing from PISA. ‘Adaptation to’, in 
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Dewey, is supplemented with ‘adaptation of’ – to assume a kinship between Dewey 
and PISA is, based on the perspective presented in this thesis, false. 
 
6.4 Future possibilities for evolutionary educational theory 
 
The aim of education, following PISA, is the adaptation of the individual to 
the reality of an unpredictable economy. ‘Adaptation to’ in a contingent environment 
means to ensure adaptability; it means to make sure that individuals remain flexible 
to respond to economic demands by learning. There is virtually no trace to be found 
in any PISA documents to date that evokes an idea of social transformation. Then 
again, it does not exactly come as a surprise that the OECD does not have a deep 
interest in societal transformation outside of economic interests. 
 
Due to the hegemonial rhetoric of PISA and the success with which it has 
established itself as ‘the gold standard’ in education, it seems almost impossible to 
think of education outside of its role in the provision of human capital. As a result of 
the wide acceptance of the accountability paradigm governing education on the 
level of educational institutions, to use the words of Stetsenko (2017), “the 
schoolroom today that is the scene of a large-scale experiment in Social Darwinism 
with its principles of natural hierarchy of inborn capacities presumably fixed by 
biological inheritance that necessitates constant control and testing.” (20) 
 
This thesis has shown that there exist alternative ways of thinking education 
and learning in reference to evolutionary movements and adaptation. Both Dewey 
and Vygotsky present alternate, less restricted concepts of adaptation that embed 
individual development, learning, and educational practice within broader 
evolutionary developments, while at the same creating spaces for intelligent, 
agentive, and purposeful activity. In closing this chapter, I want to use the findings of 
this thesis to reflect on alternative ways of thinking education as adaptation; ways 
that go beyond PISA’s instrumental perspective on education. To that end, I will 
sketch out some lines of thought emerging from Dewey’s and Vygotsky’s alternative 
education concepts of adaptation. 
 
Most fundamentally, Dewey’s and Vygotsky’s evolutionary perspectives 
provide a potential alternative for PISA’s individualistic and simplistic conception of 
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learning. Following its “neo-Darwinian ethos” (Stetsenko 2017, 171) PISA is focused 
on competition and comparability. It thereby perpetuates a focus on the individual’s 
cognitive activity and promotes a conception of learning in terms of the measurable 
output it produces – individual performance in testing situations and ‘learning’ are 
equalised. In both Dewey and Vygotsky, the social aspect plays a significant role in 
learning and both problematize the idea that learning is primarily cognitive and 
individualistic. In Dewey, ‘the social’ is part of the environment that influences the 
subject’s behaviour, and is, in turn, influenced by it. “Social adaptation” (Dewey 
1902/2008, 261), he emphasises is key for the development of the human species 
and their ability to form democratic interactions and develop common meaning. 
What is learned through the process of reflective ‘undergoing’ – both in terms of 
cognition and habits of conduct – depends largely on the ‘doing’, the acting in a 
social environment. In Dewey, learning is also not happening in separate, closed 
‘units’, but rather, in a Jamesian perspective, in the form of a stream in constant flux. 
In Vygotsky the social is even more constitutive in the individual’s learning and 
development as, on his view, all mental functions first exist in collaborative action. 
Teaching, on a Vygotskian perspective, which is a particular kind of social 
relationship, makes qualitative transformations of the subject’s activities and her/his 
relationship to the world possible in the first place. Vygotsky’s ZPD also introduces 
an alternative understanding of performance, as it moves away from a mind-set that 
only values activities that the individual can do without help, to a collaborative view 
on learning and creating. 
 
When it comes to Dewey’s particular contribution to envisioning alternative 
perspectives on education, English (2013), Saito (2005), or Reich et al (2016) 
emphasise the transformative element in Dewey’s concept of education and use it to 
criticise current agendas forming education in a way that I think is well applicable to 
PISA’s one-sided idea of education as adaptation to. What I can add to that 
discussion is the evolutionary focus that has brought to light the significant 
difference between Dewey’s and PISA’s educational concepts of adaptation. 
Dewey’s educational concept of adaptation describes the dialectic movement of 
growth that transforms that subject and the world simultaneously. The relationship is 
adaptive in the sense that the subject’s decision-making is reactive to external 
realities, manifesting both in the form of passive ‘adaptation to’, and active 
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‘adaptation of’. I argue that to read Dewey with an evolutionary focus draws out at 
least two important aspects of his thinking that could be used to develop an 
alternative, less one-sided notion of education than is currently promoted by a 
neoliberal discourse: his anti-instrumental view of education, and the open- 
endedness of educational processes. 
 
A Deweyan concept of adaptation informs a perspective on education that 
goes beyond learning, beyond institutions, and beyond ‘human capital’ (Reay 2016). 
In Dewey, education is growth, and growth is life. Dewey is, to use Rorty’s 
characterisation, an “edifying philosopher” (1979, 370) who is focused on the 
process, rather than its outcome. This makes a Deweyan view on education 
fundamentally anti-instrumental: Educational practices do not have to justify 
themselves in the light of outer purposes; they are not held accountable by the 
‘output’ they produce. Instead, I argue, in a Deweyan perspective the focus lies on 
the ‘input’ that educational practices and environments open up for further 
processes of growth. Following from Dewey’s anti-instrumental and functionalist 
view on education comes the acceptance of the contingent nature of educational 
processes. For some of Dewey’s critics, the dialectic flipside to this openness is its 
openness. Rorty (1979), for example, in his understanding of growth that - as 
discussed at length in chapter 4 – has been criticised by Saito (2005) and Greene 
(1987), sees in growth the “conformity to the norms of the day.” (367) Because 
transformation is seen as “organic growth” (Dewey 1916/2008, 66), it is submitted to 
the principle of functionality, which makes it contingent on external factors, rather 
than directed by chosen purposes. To use the words of Reich et al (2016): “For 
Dewey, ideals can be immensely valuable, but only if they can connect to the actual” 
(1001). While some thinkers – such as Stetsenko (2017) for example – see the 
open-ended conception of growth as problematically relativistic, Dewey himself 
supposedly saw in the principle of functionality (as a foundation to growth) a 
safeguard against the instrumentalisation of education such as he observed in 
Spencer and his followers, but also in Marxist philosophy (Dewey 1898/2008). 
 
In summary, at least two interesting contributions of Dewey’s evolutionary 
perspective in rethinking education emerge: Firstly, his anti-instrumental view of 
education as a value in and of itself stands in stark contrast to the accountability- 
perspective prevailing in current educational discourses. This understanding of 
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education comes with the fundamental acceptance of educational processes as 
contingent and open-ended, which, in turn, poses particular demands on educator’s 
ability to deal with that uncertainty and induce educative experiences based on it. 
Based on to the Darwinian framework, Dewey rejected the Hegelian absolute and 
thought of ‘unfolding’ and development as dependent on the environment (Reich et 
al 2016, 998). Secondly, Dewey’s dialectic educational concept of adaptation allows 
us to think of education beyond the limited human capital scope of PISA and brings 
education out of the economic domain, and ‘back into life’ by connecting out-of- 
school learning with school learning (Reay 2016, 34). Education, on Dewey’s view, 
is not preparation for a pre-determined future, but relevant to the very core of the 
subject’s present relationship with itself and the world leading into a contingent 
future. 
 
The particular contribution of Vygotsky lies, in part, in the way he goes 
beyond Dewey and also contradicts him. A Vygotskian perspective opens up 
reflection about human activity as having potential beyond its functioning as a tool of 
adaptation – it allows us to think of individual agency and responsibility in 
transforming society according to democratic ideals, to strive for equality and social 
justice. On a Vygotskian perspective, human evolution is dependent not on external 
factors, but on what is “taken up by people” (Stetsenko 2017, 35). On that view, 
development and learning as socio-culturally formable and conceptualises innate 
tendencies as the foundation for processes of negation, rather than manifestation. 
Everybody, in Vygotsky, has the potential to become an actor of social change if 
participation in the co-creation of the socio-cultural reality is enabled. In Vygotsky, 
“in contrast to the idea of mind as consisting of innate potential that can be 
developed only within very limited parameters, the idea implicit in a sociogenetic 
approach – that mind is not just developed but created by social activity.” (Derry 
2013, 44) Endowments at birth, on that view, play the role of the starting position for 
the artificial formation within the socio-cultural reality at hand, rather than being 
paths to be manifested with reference to environments. With the historical- 
materialist idea of the leap, Vygotsky creates argumentative grounds for thinking of 
something human conduct beyond mere functionality. 
 
Vygotsky’s perspective is at the heart of a popular research program in 
evolutionary psychology today. Evolutionary psychologists embrace Vygotsky’s 
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pluralistic evolutionary framework and the fact that he makes a qualitative difference 
between biological evolution and cultural evolution based on human’s ability for 
culture, tools, and purposeful transformation of their environment in a collaborative 
effort. The so-called “Vygotskian intelligent hypothesis” (Moll&Tomasello 2007, 647) 
claims that due to the collaborative nature of human activity, the human species 
built out a particular way of relating through “shared intentionality” (Moll&Tomasello 
2007, 645). Vygotsky’s post-adaptation paradigm, in other words, seems to be 
confirmed in the current discourse (Moll&Tomasello 2007, 647). However, moving 
away from a merely psychological perspective on learning into a critical-educational 
lens, the emphasised normativity in Vygotsky presents an important challenge. 
Educational theory has to go beyond the mere study of learning and its 
‘effectiveness’, delving into questions of values, aims, and the desirability of those 
from different perspectives (Biesta 2016). Vygotsky, while presenting interesting 
starting points for thinking education today, cannot suffice. While Vygotsky’s unique 
potential lies in the fact that he abandons an adaptation paradigm, and makes non- 
adaptive, purposeful social transformation imaginable, the fact he abandons 
Dewey’s functionality principle is also Vygotsky’s biggest liability in terms of 
reintroducing the normative component that Dewey sought to control by focusing on 
functionality. 
 
Based on these reflections, what can be concluded regarding future 
potentials of evolutionary ideas emerging from a Deweyan and Vygotskian 
perspective? Both educational concepts of adaptation present unique benefits, while 
also inheriting their own set of issues. It might be worth pondering whether, instead 
of an either/or, Dewey’s dialectic adaptation and Vygotsky’s post-adaptation 
paradigms may be fruitfully combined without forfeiting either of their positive 
potential. Maybe functionality as a leading principle can be preserved without 
abandoning Vygotsky’s idea of the leap. In that way the new space created in 
Vygotsky’s post-adaptation paradigms for human agency in transforming societal 
conditions purposefully would be preserved, while at the same time integrating 
Dewey’s ‘normative safeguard’. 
 
Without attempting to fully expand such a perspective at this point, I argue 
that growth and negation may exist alongside each other in the struggle that is 
human existence in a complex society. Such a perspective is consistent with both 
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Dewey and Vygotsky: Vygotsky’s concept of learning, which he qualitatively 
distinguishes from development, inherits a space for the accumulative movement 
we find in Dewey’s growth. The leap, therefore, already depends on its dialectic 
counterpart, the ascending, the accumulation. And even though Vygotsky’s concept 
of struggle is perhaps embedded more clearly as a constitutive part of his wider 
philosophy, Dewey’s idea of growth did not exclude struggle. “Opposition between 
the individual and the group” (Dewey 1932, 69), in Dewey, is a necessary 
component of growth; it forms discontinuities, which, as elaborated at length above, 
are necessary for change and progress. Growth and breaking, accumulation and 
leap, I conclude, are both already part of Dewey’s and Vygotsky’s perspective – 
albeit with different foci. 
 
In an output-oriented view of education and learning, moments of crisis that 
would potentially give rise to positive breaks and leaps are considered something to 
be overcome as quickly as possible (English 2013, 55). If we were to embrace both 
the accumulative, smooth nature of educational processes, and the negative, 
breaking elements with them, both the integration of the old and, at times, its 
negation, the inherent contingency of educational processes could be seen not as a 
problem that ought to be controlled through testing, unification and 
compartmentalisation, but as a key asset. Instead of fostering compliance with the 
existing system through ‘adaptability to’, we could think of education in terms of 
enabling and fostering positive struggle. In this positive struggle with the status quo, 
movements of integration and negation become possible in the process of 
simultaneous transformation of the individual and society. Rather than thinking of 
education only functionally, we could think of it as based on what is encountered in 
reality, with the ongoing struggle to leap beyond that encountered reality. If released 
from the “regimes of accountability” (Ozga 2012) that PISA’s understanding of 
adaptation as ‘adaptation to’ engenders, educational institutions could be aiming at 
critical citizenship that could be both problem-solving, problem-finding and problem- 
creating, rather than the production of human capital. Teaching, on that view, 
becomes the practice of the learner cultivating freedom from external powers, a 
practice of the “mastery of external determinations” (Derry 2013, 85). The aim of 
education would be to grow and, at times, to negate, combining processes of 
accumulation and integrations with moments of breaking, of discontinuity; it would 
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be focused on current societal issues (outside of economic crisis), while at the same 
time allowing for moments of leaping outside of the immediate. 
 
6.5 Thesis summary 
 
In this thesis I have studied the evolutionary educational theories of Spencer, 
Dewey and Vygotsky. Based on a conceptual framework developed for the 
assessment of evolutionary frameworks in education, I have studied and compared 
different evolutionary educational concepts of these three thinkers. It transpired from 
that analysis that even though all three thinkers draw from evolutionary concepts, 
they differ greatly in their more detailed assumptions about the nature of evolution. It 
also emerged from that analysis that acknowledging those differences enables 
novel understandings of some key educational concepts, such as Dewey’s growth, 
and Vygotsky’s ZPD. As a first key insight, this thesis has demonstrated that 
acknowledging evolutionary underpinnings in educational theories and studying 
them based on an informed scientific-conceptual framework aimed at capturing 
evolutionary concepts in an educationally relevant manner, is a significant 
undertaking that produces new insights and meaningful perspectives. 
 
As a second core insight, in drawing together the findings of these 
hermeneutical studies, I found that adaptation is a constitutive element of the 
theoretical synthesis between evolution and education. Concepts of adaptation are 
highly ambiguous as they vary significantly in meaning depending on the 
evolutionary ontology they are built upon. Concepts of adaptation are complexly 
related to educational concepts. Adaptation describes the relationship between the 
subject and the world; concepts of adaptation function as ‘bridging points’ between 
evolutionary concepts, theories and paradigms, and concepts of education, 
teaching, and learning. This meaningful role at the intersection of evolutionary 
concepts and educational theory makes adaptation highly relevant as an 
educational concept. Three types of educational concepts of adaptation were 
identified in the studies of Spencer, Dewey, and Vygotsky 1) one-way adaptation, or 
adaptation to, 2) dialectic adaptation involving the simultaneous transformation of 
the subject and the environment with the aim of re-creating continuity, and 3) post- 
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adaptation, building on the assumption that instead of adaptation to external 
demands, human activity is defined by collaborative purposes. 
 
These three types of educational adaptation inform different understandings 
of learning, teaching, and education. In Spencer, due to the Lamarckian 
evolutionism learning is replaced by genetic inheritance. Teaching, on that view, is a 
practice of preparing students for ‘complete living’, which means to make them 
adaptable to, and competitive in society. In Dewey’s Darwinian understanding, 
education is a process of growth that combines the simultaneous transformation of 
the self and the world through educational experiences, i.e. experiences consisting 
of active ‘doing’, and passive ‘undergoing’. Growth is the ongoing relating of the 
subject to the world. Teaching, in Dewey, means the enabling of relevant 
experiences and supporting learner’s reflective processing of experience. In 
Vygotsky’s Marxist-Darwinism, learning is understood as a precursor to qualitative 
developments that are facilitated through teaching. Education, on his view, is the 
negation of previous experiences and endowments at birth with the purpose of 
increasing self-determination. Rather than thinking of learning as induced by an 
external ‘actual’, Vygotsky thinks of learning as induced by collaborative, purposeful 
labour activity. This perspective puts collaboration in a group of learners at the 
forefront, while also preserving a strong concept of teaching in the ZPD. 
 
Using the conceptual knowledge developed in this thesis on educational 
concepts of adaptation, I analysed currently prevalent educational concepts of 
adaptation promoted in the OECD’s PISA publications. As a third core finding it 
transpired that PISA promotes an understanding of education as a means of 
‘adaptation to’ that promotes adaptability to external demands as a core aim of 
education. In that, I have argued, a Spencerian educational concept of adaptation 
appears to re-emerge. PISA disguises its conservative agenda in the rhetorical 
disguise of a social-democratic quest for citizenship, equity, and wellbeing. Using 
this hegemonial argumentative strategy, PISA is able to push the economic, 
neoliberal agenda of the OECD and position itself as a necessary monitoring- 
agency ensuring societal progress. Using the alternative educational concepts of 
adaptation presented by Dewey and Vygotsky, in closing the thesis’ argument, I 
sketched out the future potentials of evolutionary frameworks in education that go 
beyond PISA. Such potentials are the dissolution of a compartmentalised and 
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individualised concept of learning and the concomitant embedding of learning and 
education in all formal, informal, and non-formal aspects of life beyond childhood 
and adolescence. Furthermore, Dewey and Vygotsky promote and an anti- 
instrumental view on education as a value in and of itself, as well as a framework to 
embrace the contingency of processes of education and learning. In that, they 
refocus on the agency and responsibility of the learner in her/his own growth, as 
well as the growth of society. In that, they provide a frame for thinking of education 
and pedagogical practice as highly socio-culturally relevant and put a novel 
emphasis on teaching/the role of the teacher. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to enhance our understanding of evolutionary 
theories in the context of educational theorising in order to enhance our ability to 
discuss evolutionary ideas entering the discipline of education critically and theory- 
informed. To that end I developed a tool for discussing evolutionary ideas prevalent 
in educational theories, identified adaptation as a core component of the synthesis 
of evolution and education and illustrated how these analytical tools are able to 
inform historical-hermeneutical studies as well as an informed critique of current and 
future educational discourses. The significance of such an informed critique has 
been illustrated with an in-depth analysis of the genealogy of the ideas like 
‘education as adaptation’, or ‘learning as adaptation’ and their current manifestation 
in the current educational discourse. It transpired that there prevails, both historically 
and with regard to present discourses, a lack of appreciation of the ambiguous 
nature of educational concepts of adaptation. The categorisation developed in this 
thesis contributes to the clarification of educational concepts of adaptation. It may 
hopefully provide educational thinkers and practitioners with a tool for reflection and 
criticism, which will help the differentiation of educational concepts of adaptation and 
allows to protrude to the underlying and implicit assumptions about education, 




Akiba, M., Shimizu, K. (2012). ‘Teacher Licence Renewal System: Global and Local 
Influences on Teacher Accountability Policy in Japan.’ In: G. Steiner-Khamsi and F. 
Waldow (eds). World Yearbook of Education. Routledge, 246-263. 
 
Alcock, J. (2017). ‘Human Sociobiology and Human Selection Theory.’ In: M. 
Tibayrenc and F. Ayala (eds). On Human Nature. Elsevier Science, 383-396. 
 
Aleck, A.W. (1931). Essentials of mental hygiene in the history of education to 
Herbert Spencer. New York University, dissertation. 
 
Andresen, S., Tröhler, D. (2001). ‘Die Analogie von Menschheits- und 
Individualentwicklung. Attraktivität, Karriere und Zerfall eines Denkmodells.’ In 
Vierteljahresschrift für Wissenschaftliche Pädagogik 77(1), 145-172. 
 
Andreski, S. (1971). 'Introductory Essay: Sociology, Biology and Philosophy in 
Herbert Spencer.' In: S. Andreski (ed.). Herbert Spencer, Structure, Function and 
Evolution. Scribner. 
 
Apple, M. W. (2016). ‘Challenging the epistemological fog: The roles of the 
scholar/activist in education.’ In European Educational Research Journal 15(5), 505- 
515. 
 
Ayala, F. (2005). ‘The Evolution of Organisms: A Synopsis.’ In: F. Wuketis and F. 
Ayala (eds). Handbook of Evolution Volume 2. The National Academies Press, 1-26. 
 
Ayala, F. (2016). Evolution, Explanation, Ethics and Aesthetics. Towards a 
Philosophy of Biology. Elsevier. 
 
Baader, M.S. (2005). Erziehung als Erlösung. Transformationen des Religiösen in 
der Reformpädagogik. Beltz. 
 
Barnes-Homes, D. (2005). ‘Behaviroral Pragmatism is A-Ontological, Not Antirealist: 
A Reply to Tonneau.’ In Behavior and Philosophy 33, 67-79. 
 
Becker, N. (2011). ‘Evolutionäres Denken im Kontext erziehungswissenschaftlicher 
Diskussion.’ In: E.M. Engels, O. Betz, H.R. Köhler and T. Potthast (eds). Charles 
Darwin und seine Bedeutung für die Wissenschaften. Attempto Verlag, 225-241. 
 
Bellmann, J. (2007a). John Dewey’s naturalistische Pädagogik. Schoeningh. 
 
Bellmann, J. (2007b). ‘Der Pragmatismus als Philosophie von PISA? Anmerkungen 
zur Plausibilität eines Deutungsmusters.’ In Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft 
10(3), 421-437. 
 
Benner, D., English, A. (2004). ‘Critique and negativity: Towards the pluralization of 
critique in educational practice, theory and research.’ In Journal of Philosophy and 
Education 38(3), 409-428. 
218  
Benner, D. (2017). ‘John Dewey – a Modern Thinker’: On education (as Erziehung 
and Bildung) and democracy (as a political system and a form of associated living). 
In: L.J. Waks and A. English (eds). John Dewey’s Democracy and Education: A 
centennial handbook. Cambridge University Press, 263- 278. 
Bernstorff, F. (2009). Darwin, Darwinismus und Moralpädagogik. Julius Klinkhardt. 
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